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ABSTRACT
Even though organized labor in the United States has 
been primarily concerned with such goals as higher wages, 
shorter hours, and better working conditions, it has also 
indicated an interest in many other economic, social and 
political problems.
*»
The purpose of this study has been to show the 
attitude of organized labor toward monetary reform and 
monetary policy i,n the United States from 1866-1965. The 
views of the peak organizations, such as the National 
Labor Union, Industrial Congress and Industrial Brotherhood, 
Knights of Labor, American Federation of Labor, Congress 
of Industrial Organizations, and the merged AFL-CIO have 
been selected as representative of American organized labor. 
Labor union convention proceedings, organized labor 
publications, governmental hearings, and the works of 
scholars in the fields of labor and money and banking have 
been utilized in the research.
The development of organized labor's attitude toward 
monetary policy and monetary reform has been in three
vi
primary stages: 1866-1928, limited knowledge and under­
standing; 1929-1945, expansion and learning; 1946-1965, 
increased maturity and involvment.
Prom 1866 to 1929, organized labor suffered from a 
basic lack of understanding of the United States monetary 
system and a clear definition of money. Yet, the plat­
forms of the early national labor unions include.d monetary 
reform proposals which were limited in depth and somewhat 
radical by nature. The defects of the National Banking 
System perhaps justified organized labor's proposals for 
monetary reform. Even when the enactment of the Federal 
Reserve System attempted to overcome these defects, 
organized labor did not exhibit its opinion toward the new 
system; however, it pragmatically supported amendments 
which would be beneficial to the laboring class. Deep- 
rooted fears of bankers resulted in organized labor's 
efforts to by-pass commercial banks whenever possible by 
the use of postal savings and labor banks.
In the 1929-1945 period, organized labor expanded
its knowledge of the operations of the United States'
monetary system and its interest into the area of
international monetary reform. The Great Depression
brought to organized labor leaders a realization of the
vii
need for exploration in this area. No doubt influenced 
by financial experts1 articles which appeared in organized 
labor publications, it supported those legislative 
measures which sought to strengthen, centralize and 
regulate the banking system. Although organized labor was 
not critical of the Federal Reserve's easy monetary policy 
in the 1930's, it advocated stronger government action to 
achieve business recovery.
In the pfcist World War II era, organized labor has been 
more actively involved with monetary reform legislation 
and has deepened-its analysis of monetary policy. It 
felt that the Federal Reserve's tight monetary policy was 
executed to fight a "phantom inflation" at the expense of 
high levels of employment and production. Because of its 
desire that the objectives of the Employment Act of 1946 
be achieved, organized labor has offered proposals con­
cerning the methods by which the Federal Reserve could 
strengthen and use more judiciously the instruments of 
monetary control. It has recommended that changes be made 
in the structure and composition of the Federal Reserve 
System with primary emphasis on the inclusion of organized 
labor's representation.
In view of the progress organized labor has made in 
its understanding of the United States monetary system, 
no doubt the future will bring an even greater partici­
pation on its part. If Congress should abrogate the 
independence of the Federal Reserve and bring it under 
closer control, organized labor may well achieve its 
desired place within the System's composition.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Nature of the Problem 
From its meager beginnings almost 200 years ago, 
American unionism has grown into a varied and complex 
constituent of today's society. Although organized 
labor throughout the years has shown primary interest in 
such matters as higher wages, better working conditions, 
and shorter working hours, there have been many other 
economic, social and political problems that have come 
to its attention. Some of them have received little more 
than passing notice; others at times have greatly agitated 
organized labor and caused active exertion on its part.
One economic area which has attracted the interest of organ 
ized labor is monetary policy and monetary reform because 
changes in these areas have a decided effect on the 
laboring man.
Even though the average worker has little or no under­
standing of monetary policy and .reform as it pertains to
1
the economy, he may be concerned with the cost of borrowing 
money, the purchasing power of his dollar, or the security 
of his savings. Therefore, in order to protect the interests 
of their members, labor leaders have become involved with the 
"money question" by expressing their thoughts in pamphlets, 
newspaper and journal articles, convention resolutions and 
in government hearings. They have brought forth their 
views to the members of their associations and to the public 
at large.
Purpose
Histories of organized labor have been written wherein 
labor's position on monetary reform and policy have been 
briefly mentioned or incorporated to some extent. However, 
to the knowledge of this writer, a thorough inyestigation 
of labor's attitude toward this subject has not been made.
The purpose of this dissertation is to present an 
explanatipn of organized labor's attitude toward the changes 
that have taken place in the United States monetary system 
and monetary policies. The study delves into the reasoning, 
thoughts, and justifications of labor's position toward 
monetary policy and monetary reform. The various proposals 
set forth by organized labor as their solutions to the
3
monetary problemswill be examined with special notice to 
its continued growth of awareness and concern.
Sources
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations, today and prior to the merger of 
1955, have issued various publications voicing labor's 
attitude toward monetary policy and monetary reform. The 
following are examples: The American Federationist (AFL;
also AFL-CIO), Economic Trends and Outlook (AFL-CIO), 
Industrial Union Department Bulletin and Digest (AFL-CIO), 
Labor1s Economic Review (AFL-CIO), AFL Weekly Newsletter 
(AFL), Labor1s Monthly Survey (AFL) and Economic Outlook 
(CIO). These, in addition to statements presented by the 
AFL-CIO, are used quite extensively in the dissertation. 
Further significant sources which state formally the 
attitude of organized labor are convention proceedings and 
government hearings. Other government documents are 
incorporated in the study as they pertain to specific acts 
and bills, along with the works of authors in the fields 
of labor and money and banking.
Method of Approach and Organization
This dissertation will concentrate on the views of the 
peak organizations such as the National Labor Union, 
Industrial Congress and Industrial Brotherhood, Knights of 
Labor, American Federation gf Labor, the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations, and the merged AFL-CIO as repre­
sentative of American organized labor.
The study will:
1. Trace the viewpoint of post Civil War labor organ­
izations toward monetary reform from 1866 to 1900.
2. Present a picture of the significant changes in the 
banking system from 1900 to 1928 and the position taken by 
organized labor. Special consideration is given to the 
Federal Reserve, Postal Savings Banks, and Labor Banking.
3. Examine the basic monetary reforms that were 
initiated during the Great Depression and the reaction to 
these reforms and the proposals offered by organized labor;
4. Set forth the basic monetary policy of the Federal 
Reserve from 1914 to 1965 and the effects on and concern by 
organized labor.
5. Show recent participation of organized labor in 
Bretton Woods and Federal Reserve legislation.
6. Evaluate the historical stand taken by American 
organized labor toward monetary policy and monetary reform 
and determine what their expected position could be in the 
future.
CHAPTER II
MONEY, LABOR AND POLITICS, 1866-1900
The Post-Civil War proponents of monetary reform in 
the ranks of the labor movement derived their ideas largely 
from Edward Kellogg.'*' After losing his fortune in the Panic 
of 1837, he studied the monetary system and developed a 
plan for financial reform. Kellogg argued that the nation's 
monetary laws were oppressive to labor because bankers were 
permitted to create and loan money. The result was money 
scarcity and high interest rates. Kellogg felt that a 
fundamental reform was needed, and to achieve this, he 
recommended that the government establish a "National 
Safety Fund" with one or more branches to make public 
loans in every state. Through real estate mortgages 
bearing a 1.1 per cent interest rate, paper money would 
be issued from the fund. In turn, banks would have to 
lower their interest rates, enabling the workingman to
^"Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the 
United States (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc.,
1947), p. 421.
secure money more reasonably.2 In the 1850's, Kellogg's 
plan did not impress the labor movement, for their experi­
ences with wildcat banking had made them skeptical of paper 
money schemes.3
During the Civil War, there was growing concern by 
labor over bankers' political control:
While the workingmen were enlisting in the services 
of their country, the bankers and owners of gold 
were working their way into Congress . . . These 
men enacted such legislation as was beneficial to 
themselves; they diminished the volume of currency 
and reduced the price of labor and property . . .
Immediately following the War, financiers and the
working class were locked in a struggle over the redemption
of government bonds. Businessmen demanded redemption -
in gold and the debtors.wanted redemption in greenbacks
5which had been issued during the Civil War. Also, the 
high interest rates on government bonds diverted money from
2Edward Kellogg's original work, Labor and Other 
Capital, appeared in 1848. For additional information, 
see Edward Kellogg, Labor and Capital: A New Monetary
System, ed. Mary Kellogg Putnam (New York: John W.
Lovell Co., 1884), 374 pp.
a
Joseph G. Rayback, A History of American Labor (New 
York: The MacMillan Company, 1959), p. 124.
^T. V. Powderly, Thirty Years of Labor 1859 to 1889 
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: T. V. Powderly, 1890), p. 35.
industrial, commercial and manufacturing e n t e r p r i s e s . ^  it 
was in this type of financial climate that the workers 
found themselves. Unable to cope with these problems, 
they turned to organized labor to introduce various plans 
of monetary reform.
National Labor Union
The National Labor Union, organized at Baltimore in
1866, was the predecessor of the Knights of Labor and the
American Federation of Labor. The most prominent demand
by workers at the 1866 convention was an eight-hour day.^
There was some discussion on the money situation, however:
The right of the workingmen to take action on the 
subject of the currency of the United States was 
at that time seriously questioned. It was an 
unpardonable offense to suggest to Congress that 
it should take notice of the issue of legal tender 
paper money or an issue of government bonds bear­
ing a low rate of'interest.
Yet, the consensus among leading trade unionists was 
that a new weapon had to be found to end labor's degradation 
and. elevate it to its rightful place in society. This
gFoner, o£. cit.. p. 422.
7 . . .John R. Commons and Associates, History of Labour in.
The United States. II (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1953),
pp. 86-87.
8Powderly, ojj. cit., p. 42.
weapon was cooperatives formed by the workers. But, as long
as the control of credit and money remained in private
hands, laborers could not by any system secure their
position. It was first necessary that the monetary system
9be "restored to the people."
There were several labor leaders, among them William 
H. Sylvis, Richard F. Trevellick, and Andrew C. Cameron, 
who were advocates of Kellogg's theories. They persuaded the 
National Labor Union in 1867 to adopt a monetary reform 
platform based on a modification of Kellogg's program.^0 
Their plan called for the repeal of the national banking 
system, and the substitution of legal-tender treasury 
notes as the exclusive currency of the nation. The govern­
ment would set the interest rates and reduce to three per 
cent the interest on bonds redeemable for greenbacks. In 
addition, government loans in the form of greenbacks would 
be available to the public at about one per cent interest. 
Sylvis, in his enthusiasm for the currency reform, said,
"When a just monetary system has been established there
9Foner, o£. cit.. pp. 417-420.
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will no longer exist a necessity for trade unions.
The money reformers of the National Labor Union were 
quite aware that inflation of prices would follow their 
proposal. Yet, immediately following the Civil War, 
prices were declining as a result of retirement of green­
backs by the Secretary of the Treasury. When congressional 
legislation of 1868 ceased their retirement to prevent the 
decline in prices, it stopped short of the inter-convertible
bond and government loans to private business— the machinery
l ?of the revolutionary scheme.
By 1870 the National Labor Union had split into two 
factions: half trade and half political. With business
recovery, many of the trade unionists found greenbackism 
"highly amusing." This description annoyed the reformers 
and contributed to lack of unity. Some of the members 
supported a labor party, while others, stressing "pure and 
simple" unionism, looked upon political activity as a hope­
less vision. In this disjoined state, survival of the 
organization was virtually impossible.
H-The platform of the National Labor Union, 1867, is 
reproduced by Powderly, op. cit.. pp. 46-52, 203.
• ^ C o m m o n s  and Associates, pp. cit., II, pp. 121-122.
■^Rayback, op. cit., p. 128.
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Although the National Labor Union was short lived, it 
played a significant role in labor history. While placing 
strong emphasis on monetary reform and political action, it 
pointed out to the American people that the government of 
the United States was becoming dominated by large scale 
industrial and financial i n t e r e s t s . ^
Industrial Congress and Industrial Brotherhood 
With the disintegration of the National Labor Union, 
the effort to form a national federation had not ended; 
shortly before the Panic of 1873, a new attempt was made. 
Representatives of the National Trade Union, which had 
withdrawn from the National Labor Union, assembled at 
Cleveland in July of that year.^ Under the name of The
Industrial Congress, they drew up a plan of action, although
16no constitution was adopted. Because of the trade union 
nature of the Congress, the financial plank in the platform 
concerning the interconvertible bond and paper money system 
was included only after heated debate, while cooperative
■^Foner, op. cit., p. 432.
15Commons and Associates, op. pit,., II, p. 157. 
•^Powderly, pp. cit., p. 60.
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1 7ventures were given only a brief endorsement. '
The second convention, held in Rochester, New York,
in April of 1874, was of greater importance because of the
fusion of the Industrial Brotherhood with the Industrial 
18Congress. The convention accepted the ritual, as well
as the name, of the Industrial Brotherhood. However, some
delegates were opposed to item eighteen of the Brotherhood
platform for it appeared to dictate to the government.
The plank read as follows:
To prevail upon the government to establish a just 
standard of distribution between capital and labor 
by providing a purely national circulating medium 
based upon the faith and resources of the nation, 
issued directly to the people, without the inter­
vention of any system of banking corporations, 
which money shall be of legal tender in the pay?- 
ment of all debts, public or private, and 
interchangeable at the option of the holder for 
government bonds, bearing a rate of interest not 
to exceed three and sixty-five hundredths per cent,
subject to future legislation.
The feelings of the majority were expressed by one
delegate when he said:
. . . Money is only the representative of value.
We make the value. Why, may I ask, should we not
•^Commons and Associates, 0£. cit.. II, pp. 160, 161.
l®Ibid., pp. 163, 196. The Industrial Brotherhood was
a secret labor federation.
19«rhe entire platform of the Industrial Brotherhood 
is given by Powderly. ojp. cit.. pp. 63-65.
i
13
see to it that the value is honestly and fairly 
represented by an honest American currency based 
upon the real tangible possessions of the people 
of the United States, instead of a few imaginary 
golden dollars . . .
A vote was then taken and the platform was adopted. This
concept for monetary reform would continue but not the
Industrial Brotherhood for it had been launched during the
Panic of 1873 and ensuing depression.. Few delegates
attended the convention of 1875 which marked the close of
21their organization.
Greenback Labor Party 
As organized labor's interest and strength in political 
action dwindled during .1874 and 1875, the main initiative 
for political organization was assumed by the farmers. In 
1875, there were several attempts to organize an Independent 
Party, and one convention was held in Cleveland. Delegates 
were agrarians, lawyers, and some leaders from the trade
unions that folded. They adopted a platform stressing
22financial reform and were called the Greenback Party.
The platform declared "the solution of the money question
20Ibid., p. 63.
^Commons and Associates, op. cit.,' II, pp. 166-167.
22Foner, op. cit.. pp. 475-477
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more deeply affects the material interest of the people
than any other question in issue before the people." The
Party demanded the payment of the national debt in green-
backs and the issue of interconvertible legal tender
currency and bonds bearing not more than 3.5 per cent per 
23annum.
That same year, representatives from organized labor 
and Grangers attended a Cincinnati Conference headed by 
Horace H. Day who had been a participant in the National 
Labor Union. Against Day's wishes, the delegates chose 
to unite with the Greenback Party, and accepted its plat­
form, which differed slightly from their own. Prom the 
time of the uniting until 1879, every Greenback platform 
included the repeal of resumption of the Specie Payment 
Act^ which had passed in January of 1875. This inclusion
23Commons and Associates, op. cit.. II, p. 168.
94^The Act contained a variety of provisions designed 
to appeal to silver advocates (replacement of fractional 
currency by silver coins); paper money advocates (removal 
of all limits on the aggregate issue of national bank notes 
and linking the retirement of greenbacks— the aggregate 
outstanding not to fall below $300 million— to the increase 
in national bank notes); and gold standard advocates (its 
main provisions). Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson 
Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960 
(Princetons Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 48.
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was a contribution of the Cincinnati Conference.2®
Generally, organized labor was not interested in 
uniting with the Greenback Party because it felt the 
Party would not be of special benefit to them. But, in 
1877 laborers began to join2® because of resentment toward 
government handling of strike s.V ari ous  alliances of 
laborers and Greenbackers appeared in Ohio and Pennsylvania, 
while a Workingmen's Party was developing in New York.
These mergers suggested to greenback and labor party 
leaders the feasibility of uniting their forces, and the 
result was a national convention held at Toledo, Ohio, in 
1878. The National Party was thus formed and adopted the 
typical greenback and labor demands in its platform,2® 
but the interconvertible 3.65 bonds were not mentioned.2^
25Foner, op. cit., p. 477. See also, Commons and 
Associates, op. cit.. II, p. 169.
26Foner, op. cit.. pp. 478-479.
27'The most violent and most significant labor uphevel 
in the nineteenth century was the Railway Strike of 1877.
For detailed discussion, see Rayback, pp. cit.. pp. 133-136.
28Commons and Associates, pp. pit., II, pp. 240-241.
29Foner, pp. pit., p. 483.
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The presidential election of 1878 was the apex of the 
Greenback Labor Party, with disintegration following 
shortly thereafter. The alliance was based on a shallow 
foundation. The agrarian element stressed monetary reform 
and cared little for labor demands.3® In that same year, 
the chief demand of the party (the repeal of the Specie 
Payment Act) disappeared as January 1, 1879, was the date 
fixed for resumption.3  ̂ By 1880, the party platform 
called for a government monopoly of paper currency and for 
unlimited coinage of silver. Thereafter, the Party itself 
was of iittle significance, although the financial program 
lived on.32
Knights of Labor
The Noble Order of the Knights of Labor was formed 
by Uriah Stephens at Philadelphia in 1869.. It stemmed from 
a Philadelphia Garment Workers Local which had been black­
listed into almost total inactivity during the recession 
of 1866-68. Thus Stephens felt the need for concealment of
3®Rayback, op. cit., p. 138.
3^Commons and Associates, pp. cit., II, p. 248.
32Friedman and Schwartz, loc. cit.
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labor1s activity and the Knights remained a secret organi­
zation from 1869 to 1878.33
In the early years, the Knights participated in a 
unifying movement which had been initiated by the Junior 
Sons of '76.^ A convention was called at Tyrone, 
Pennsylvania in 1875, and included the socialists, Sons 
of '76, and Knights, but the unification was not a success. 
Agreement could not be reached on the matters of monetary 
reform and the use of political action.^
A surge of workmen came into the order as a result 
of the Railway Strike of 1877 and indecision over the 
attitude to take toward the Greenback Labor Movement. A 
national convention became a necessity and was called in
l Oearly January of 1878 at Reading, Pennsylvania. The 
Reading General Assembly accepted for the most part the 
preamble of the Industrial Brotherhood and by doing so, 
evidenced their realization that reforms would come mainly
33Commons and Associates, oja. cit.. II, p. 197.
34The Sons of '76.were organized at Pittsburgh in 
May, 1874, and placed monetary reform as the main objective 
of its platform. Ibid., pp. 201-202.
3 5JRayback, oj3. cit., p. 144.
36Ibid.
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3 7through political agitation and action.
Money was by no means overlooked in the Knights' plat­
form. The fifteenth section of the preamble read as 
follows:
To prevail upon governments to establish a purely 
national circulating medium, based upon the faith 
and resources of the nation, and issued directly 
to the people, without the intervention of any 
system of banking corporations, which money shall 
be a legal tender in payment of all debts, public 
and private.3®
It is to be noted that the delegates made no mention 
of the interconvertible bonds in that section.39 The 
Knights' attitude toward the money question remained un­
changed until 1884. Then, the Knights' preamble was 
slightly altered by the addition of "that the government 
shall not guarantee or recognize any private banks or 
create any banking corporations."40
There were many factors which led to the rapid decline 
of the Knights. From a membership of 700,000 in 1886, its’
37 Powderly, oj d. ext., p. 131.
38Powderly, Ibid., pp. 128-130, reproduces verbatim tho 
preamble adopted at Reading, January 3, 1878.
39Ibid., p. 203.
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number dwindled to 100,000 by 1890.^^" Failure was due to
the interrelated effects of irresponsibility on the part of
the membership, fumbling leadership, poorly organized and
unsuccessful strikes, the dissipation of energy and funds
in cooperative ventures which collapsed, and the attempt
to draw the unskilled, industrial workers into a single,
unified labor organization which caused the withdrawal of
42support by the national trade unions.
At the Knights' convention in December, 1889, in
St. Louis, an agreement was reached with the National
Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union which united their
demands. It included the abolition of national banks and
the issue of legal tender treasury notes in lieu of national
bank notes, regulating the amount needed on a per capita
basis as the business of the country increased. They further
43advocated the free and unlimited coinage of silver.
Although the Knights were still active in the 1890's, 
its membership continued to decline and its industrial
41Commons and Associates, oja. cit.., II, p. 482.
42Dulles, op. cit.. p. 148.
43Powderlv, op. cit.. pp. 342-343, gives the full 
agreement.
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strength was a matter of the past. The Knights made a final 
step away from the wage-earners1 movement when a report was 
made by the Grand Master Workman to the General Assembly of 
1894:
The Order of the Knights of Labor is not so much 
intended to adjust the relationship between the 
employer and employee as to adjust natural 
resources and productive facilities to the 
common interest of the whole people . . .  It is 
not founded on the question of adjusting wages, 
but on the question of abolishing the wage- 
system and the establishment of a cooperative 
industrial system. When its real mission is 
accomplished, poverty will be reduced to a 
minimum and the land dotted over with peaceful, 
happy homes . . .44
Brief Historical Setting for the Silver Movement 
Before a study of labor's attitude toward the silver 
question can be made, it is first necessary to review the 
history of the silver movement. The last three decades of 
the nineteenth century, particularly the years after 1890, 
witnessed political fervor over the money issue.
The focal point for silver agitation was the Coinage 
Act of 1873 which failed to mention the minting of the
44Knights of Labor, Proceedings. 1894, p. 1, cited in 
Commons and Associates, op. cit.. II, pp. 494-495.
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standard silver dollar. The Act provided for only subsidiary 
silver coins and a trade dollar which was to be used in 
dealing with the Orient.^
The silver dollar was actually a coin little known to 
Americans. Since the world market price of silver had been 
higher than the mint price, the silver dollar had not been 
in circulation since 1836. The Coinage Act of 1873 gave 
legal recognition to the fact, and silver spokesmen in 
Congress did not oppose the legislation.^ However, as the
A nprice of silver began to decline, the silver supporters 
began to feel that it was a conspiracy on the part of 
Eastern bankers and legislators to demonetize silver without 
the general knowledge of the public. So determined was
45J. Laurence Laughlin, The History of Bimetallism in 
the United States (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1888),
pp. 93-102.
46Friedman and Schwartz, op. cit.. p. 114.
47David R. Dewey in Financial History of the United 
States (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1903), p. 406,
gives the market price of silver from 1840 to 1895. "The 
reasons for the price decline seem clear; on the supply 
side, rich new mines were opened in the American West, and 
there was a world wide increase in productivity; on the 
demand side, a number of European countries shifted from the 
bimetallic to a gold standard and sharply reduced their 
monetary use of silver." Friedman and Schwartz, loc. cit.




their effort to discredit the act that the episode was
labeled the "Crime of 1873."^®
The silver producers demanded that the only remedy to
the Crime of '73 was the free and unlimited coinage of
silver. Debtor farmers in the Middle West and South joined
silver producers because they felt free silver would increase
the money supply and thereby lower the real burden of their
debt. Greenbackers joined the silver proponents for they
felt that issuing silver dollars was just as effective as
49issuing more greenbacks.
The forty-fourth Congress (1875-1877) did not enact 
any silver legislation although the House passed a free- 
coinage bill proposed by Representative Richard P. Bland of 
Missouri. Later, the Senate amended the House bill and, 
when the Bland-Allison Act passed in February, 1878, it 
was for silver purchase instead of free coinage. The pur­
chases under the Bland-Allison Act absorbed over sixty per 
cent of American silver production; yet, it was not
4ft' °Alexander Dana Noyes, Forty Years of American 
Finance. 1865-1907 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1909),
pp. 35-36. See also Dewey, pp. cit.. p. 404.
^ F r i e d m a n  and Schwartz, op. cit.. p. 115.
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sufficient to counteract the world forces which tended to
50lower the price of silver.
Free silver forces were dissatisfied with the legis­
lation because it did not provide for unlimited coinage.
From that time forward, agitation for free silver was 
carried on with religious zeal, and the theme of "The
51Crime of 1873" was resounded in the pro-silver speeches.
In 1890, the high tariff advocates agreed to support 
a silver coinage bill in exchange for silver support on the 
tariff,^ and the result was the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. 
The measure provided for the purchase of all the American 
output of silver, but did not admit unlimited coinage.53
In 1893, the United States was experiencing a business 
depression. Congress attributed the money panic to the
^The Senate Bill provided that the Government should 
purchase and coin into dollars not less than $2,000,000 and 
not more than $4,000,000 worth of silver each month. The 
silver so purchased was to be coined into silver dollars 
which were full legal tender. Dickson H. Leavens, Silver 
Money (Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, Inc., 1939),
pp. 38, 39.
C lJ Friedman and Schwartz, op. cit., p. 116.
52Noyes, op. crt., pp. 147-149.
53The bill authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to 
purchase 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion each month and 
to issue in payment thereof treasury notes of full legal 
tender. Dewey, pp. cit., p. 437.
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Silver Purchase Act of 1890 and had the purchase clause 
repealed. Although opinions may differ as to the causes 
of the panic, the act was undoubtedly an important factor.^4 
Such men as William Jennings Bryan were vigoriously 
opposed to the repeal. Later, Bryan acquired the Democratic 
nomination for president on a free-silver plank. In the 
political campaign of 1896, Bryan was opposed by the Repub­
lican nominee, William McKinley, who accepted a platform 
favoring the gold standard. Even though the Republicans 
were victorious, legislation did not immediately follow to 
end the money controversy, for free silver advocates still 
had a majority in Congress. During the next four years,
the increased prosperity followed by new gold discoveries
55served as a prelude to gold legislation.
The gold standard was triumphant in 1900 with the 
passage of the Gold Standard Act. The gold dollar was 
declared the standard of value with the following provision:
54Leavens, op. cit., p. 43. Also, see W. Jett Lauck,
The Causes of the Panic of 1893 (Cambridge: The University
Press, 1907). 122 pp.
55For a detailed discussion of the election see, Stanley 
L. Jones, The Presidential Election of 1896 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1964). 350 pp.
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It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the 
Treasury to set apart in the Treasury a reserve 
fund of $150,000,000 in gold coin and bullion, 
which shall be used for.such redemption purposes 
only.56
Even though the legislation passed, it was only a 
compromise, for the silver advocates in the Senate con­
tinued to push for their cause. In the presidential
ielection of that year, the money controversy was again
of prime importance, but with Bryan's second defeat, the
57silver issue on the national scene was closed.
American Federation of Labor and 
the Silver Movement 
The demand for a federation of trades and labor unions 
resulted from the fact that the Knights of Labor did not 
meet the needs of those workers who were interested in craft 
rather than labor unionism. The Knights stressed a more 
general "uplift program," while the craft groups felt that 
concern should be directed strictly to economic problems. 
Centralized and autocratic in character, the Knights' 
organization could not satisfy the demand for national
56Noyes, op. cit., p. 254.
57Dewey, pp. pit., p. 469.
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federation along craft lines, which would preserve trade 
autonomy and at the same time combine the forces of the
COcraft groups.
Therefore, in 1881, a convention was called in 
Pittsburgh to form a federation of trade unions. One 
hundred and seven delegates attended, of whom forty-eight 
represented neighboring Knights of Labor Assemblies in 
Pennsylvania, the others representing craft unions from 
more distant places. The name adopted at the convention 
was the Federation of Organized Trade and Labor Unions 
of the United States and Canada.®0 This new federation 
adopted almost in its entirety the program, including the 
political platform, of the Knights of Labor. Greenbackism 
alone was the only major plank of the Knights which was 
omitted.®0 When the next convention was held the following
year, the political plank was repealed and a manifesto,
/
cpMollie Ray Carroll, Labor and Politics (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923), p. 28.
59Foner, op. cit.. p. 519.
60Carroll, pp. cit.. p. 30.
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61which discontinued political action, was issued.
In 1886, the federation was completely reorganized
6 pand the name, "American Federation of Labor," substituted. 
Their stand on political action remained the same. The 
Federation recommended that its members cast their votes,
independent of party, for the candidate who was most likely
63to promote their interest.
This was not the case, however, in 1893, when the
American Federation of Labor by implication endorsed a
64.political party. The panic and resulting depression had . 
created unrest among the laboring class. When the Annual 
Federation convention was held at Chicago, Illinois in 
December of that year, there was a discussion on the 
monetary situation. It was felt that the repeal of the 
"Sherman Bill" had failed to improve the financial or 
commercial condition of the country, and had actually
61Morton A. Aldrich, The American Federation of Labor 
(New York: The McMillan Company, 1898), p. 257.
62Carroll, op. cit.. p. 28, points out that it was not 
until several years after 1886 that the American Federation 
of Labor decided to trace its origin back to 1881.
63Aldrich, loc. cit.
28
intensified the distress. One delegate voiced the opinion
that the resolutions adopted at the Bimetallic Convention,^
held in Chicago in August, 1893, expressed the sentiments
of the masses of the people. A motion was made that the
American Federation of Labor should endorse the silver
convention's resolution and recommend to Congress the
passage of a free coinage silver bill at the ratio of 16
ounces of silver to 1 ounce of gold. This would be a means
of relieving the monetary stringency and returning the
nation to prosperity. The resolution was adopted by the 
66convention.
The Federation had been officially represented at the 
American Bimetallic League Convention in Chicago during the 
sxammer, although there had been no previous endorsement of
65^he Bimetallic Convention was held by the American 
Bimetallic League, an independent silver organization 
established in St. Louis in November, 1889. Jones, op. cit., 
p. 19.
66American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1893, p. 60. 
The Congressional Record carried petitions advocating free 
and unlimited coinage of silver which had been submitted by 
the following labor unions: Brotherhood of Painters of
America, No. 72, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Trow Moulders'
Union No. 247, Cleveland, Ohio; Tailors Local Union, Ottumwa, 
Iowa, and the Window Glass Workers Assembly No. 300, 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. U.S., Congressional Record, 53rd 




67bimetallism. The convention was called in an effort to
stir public opinion against the repeal of the Sherman
68Silver Purchase Act. Samuel Gompers, president of the 
American Federation of Labor, agitated on behalf of free 
silver in cooperation with the Bimetallic League. At the 
annual Federation convention in 1894, Gompers in his report 
stated:
In compliance with the resolution favoring the 
remonetization of silver at a ratio of 16 to 1 
. . .  a large number of circulars were distributed 
throughout the country on the subject, and a 
better appreciation of the matter is now had by 
members of the respective organizations, as well 
as our national legislators . .
The convention once more adopted the policy of favoring
70the free coinage of silver, although all the national 
unions were not in agreement. The typographical union 
dissented. Also, John McBride, president of the United 
Mine Workers, was elected- Federation president over Samuel 
Gompers. 71
67Commons and Associates, o£. cit.. II, p. 510.
68Jones, op. cit., p. 23.
6Q̂American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1894, p. 13.
70Ibid., p. 29.
71Commons and Associates, pp. cit., p. 513.
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Under McBride1s editorship of the American Federation-
ist in 1895, numerous editorials and articles appeared
urging "free silver." One writer pointed out that the
eastern press, with few exceptions, favored the single
gold standard while the west and south favored bimetallic
currency. The argument was made that the east was a
creditor to the south and west. In order to secure money
to develop their resources, the south and west were forced
to turn to eastern financiers. He further stated that the
solution wanted by the south and west was a return to the
same conditions under which their debts were contracted 
72prior to 1873. In the writer's logic, the following
a
argument supported his position:
The favorite argument of the gold standard men is 
that the silver dollar is only worth 57 cents, but 
they cannot deny that an ounce of silver will buy 
as much now as it did in 1873, for with silver in 
1873 worth $1.32 per ounce, it would buy one 
bushel of wheat valued at that time at about $1.30 
per bushel, and in 1895, with silver worth 60 cents 
an ounce, we can still buy a bushel of wheat, valued 
now at about 60 cents. This proves that silver, 
measured by all other staples, has not declined, 
but that the purchasing power of gold has doubled.73
^2prank L. Hoenes, "The Free Coinage of Silver at a 




Another article condemned President Grover Cleveland, a gold
standard man, and closed with "bimetallism is in the air
74and is bound to come."
In addition to the American Federationist, many other 
publications no doubt attempted to influence the workers for 
free coinage. One of the most famous was William H. Harvey's 
Coin1s Financial School published in June, 1894.7^
IIn his book, Harvey used the device of placing an
adolescent by the name of Coin upon the platform of the
lecture hall of the Chicago Art Institute. Eventually,
Chicago's distinguished bankers, businessmen, and scholars
were drawn to the Institute to hear the cogency of his
arguments. Coin would engage many of them in debate, force
them to admit errors in fact and logic-, and win them over
76to the free silver side. These lectures had never occurred,
74American Federation of Labor, Editorial, American
Federationist, May, 1895, p. 31.
7^William H. Harvey, Coin's Financial School (Chicago: 
Coin Publishing Company, 1894) 204 pp. See also: William
H. Harvey, Coin1s Financial School, ed. Richard Hofstadter 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1963) 249 pp.
76 .Corn answered a question supposedly asked by J. R. 
Sovereign, Master Workman of the Knights of Labor, on money 
based on labor. See Harvey, ed., op. cit., pp. 170-172.
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of course, but many people believed they had. Since
77Harvey's book had become a national best seller in 1895,
he published a new one, Coin1s School Up to D a t e , 78 which
contained a new series of imaginary debates.
The Populists circulated among many of the workers
an abstract of organized labor petition^ sent to Congress.
Not only did the petition demand a return to the free and
unlimited coinage of both gold and silver at 16 to 1 and
condemn interest bearing bonds, but also, it expressed
organized labor's attitude toward the demonetization of
silver in 1873:
Again, is'it not obvious to every one that the 
striking down of one-half the world's volume of 
money makes the remaining half a comparatively 
easy matter for capitalists to control and 
manipulate, and that toilers, to obtain money
77 . .See Jones, op. cit., pp. 32-33 for a detailed
discussion.
7QWilliam H. Harvey, Coin's Financial School Up to 
Date (Chicago: Coin Publishing Company, 1895).
79Some of the signers of the petition were: J. R.
Sovereign (Knights of Labor), Samuel Gompers (American 
Federation of Labor), P. J. McGuire (United Brotherhood of' 
Carpenters and Joiners of America), Frank P. Sargent 
(Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen), and John McBride 
(United Mine Workers of America). William J. Bryan, The 
First Battle, A Story of the Campaign of 1896 (Chicago:
W. B. Conkey Company, 1896), p. 167.
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for the purchase of their food supplies, are 
placed entirely at the mercy of the foreign and 
American money-sharks, who, by contracting the 
currency, can force a panic or famine in money 
at their supreme will?
Would they be guilty of such a crime? We only 
say in reply, look at our present helpless con­
dition. Does it not seem to you, in the light of 
the fact here given, that, where in the midst of 
plenty there is wide-spread suffering and unhappi­
ness, there is considerable meat in the refrain 
from Wall Street: "Dig on, ye toilers, dig; the
legislative button that we press will do the rest."®®
These publications along with numerous other articles and
speeches on the free silver issue aroused even greater
sentiment. This, coupled with the economic depression of
the nineties, set the stage for William Jennings Bryan's
rise to fame.
William Jennings Bryan and
The American Federation of Labor
(
As the publicity of the financial debates intensified 
in 1895, Bryan, with his eloquence and personable manner, 
became a leading figure in the Democratic Party. He wanted 
to unite all those who believed in free silver— independents, 
Populists, Republicans, and Democrats under one banner and
®®Ibid., pp. 166-167.
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81if at all possible, under the Democratic Party.
In the presidential campaign of 1896, the money question 
became a paramount issue. The Democratic Convention nomi­
nated Bryon upon the silver platform, after hearing his 
preliminary oration which ended with the following sentence:
Having behind us the producing masses of this nation 
and the world, supported by the commercial interests, 
the laboring interest, and the toilers everywhere, 
we will answer their demand for a gold standard by 
saying to them: You shall not press down upon the
brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not 
crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.®^
Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of
Labor, stated:
Bryan spoke the language of humanity and he 
appeared as the proclaimed savior of the common 
people who would break the power of the gold 
standard scepter of Wall Street.
The American Federation of Labor in 1895, reaffirmed 
its position on "free silver," with the qualification that 
it did "not in any degree endorse any political party that 
may have made free coinage a partisan political question.
0*1 , xJones, pp. cit., p. 70.
82Bryan, op. cit., pp. 199-206.
83Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor (New 
York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1925), p. 87.




This produced a storm from the Bryanites because labor failed 
to endorse the Democratic Party and a protest from the 
Republicans who interpreted the resolution as favorable to
Q CBryan. It is quite evident that some labor groups were 
for Bryan as indicated by an editorial in The Electrical 
Worker;
The Workingmen's Bryan Club which is a non-partisan 
organization, has now a membership of over 2,000 
composed of nearly as many Republicans as Democrats 
. . .  In addition to this central club, ward clubs 
have been organized in all the wards in the city, 
so that the number of St. Louis Workingmen who have 
enrolled their names in the Bryan clubs already 
number over 2,500, and hundreds are joining each 
meeting night.
The editorial further stated that 35,000 people had appeared
to hear Bryan speak at a mass meeting of the Workingmen 
87of St. Louis.
Also, of interest to laborers was an address circulated 
by the Central Bryan Club which encouraged the workers to 
join their organization. Their address first attacked Mark
Q C Gompers, loc. cit.
Q C°°The Electrxcal Worker was the official journal of th^ 
National Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of America, an 
affiliate of the American Federation of Labor.
^National Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of America, 
The Electrical Worker. October, 1896, p. 5.
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goHanna, by pointing out his unfavorable interference with 
labor's efforts, but the financial question remained the 
most significant topic of the circular. It appealed to the 
workers that "a vote for silver is a vote against foreign
OQbankers and Wall Street skylocks."
Despite such efforts as the Bryan Club's, skepticism 
prevailed among the workers. The press secretary of a 
local union in San Francisco commented in The Electrical 
Worker:
"Sixteen to One and Bryan" is the watchword with a 
great many of the boys. They seem to think there 
is a scarcity, and I believe they would like to 
have some, thinking, perhaps, Mr. Bryan would, by 
his election show them an easier road to prosper­
ity than by climbing poles. There are also a few 
of us who think McKinley and sound money, with 
protection, will give us a chance to climb.poles 
and earn good hard 100-cent dollars . . .
Employers, in many instances, attempted to influence
and educate their workers in McKinley's behalf by posting
placards in the workshops, distributing pamphlets among
88Jones, op. cit.. p. 289, points out that 
Marcus A. Hanna, campaign manager and influential associate 
of- McKinley, was more sympathetic toward labor, organized 
and unorganized, than most industrialists.
89National Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of America, 
The Electrical Worker, loc. cit.
90_, . ̂Ibid., p. 8.
the laborers, hiring shopforemen who were well informed
on the money question, acquiring speakers to talk to the
men during their lunch hour, slipping leaflets into pay
envelopes, developing sound money clubs among the working-
91men, and other such actions.
The presidential election of McKinley proved that
labor in general had not responded to the Democratic appeal
and organized labor was divided among itself. James R.
Sovereign, head of the Knights of Labor, joined the
Populists who endorsed Bryan while Terence V. Powderly,
ex-president of the Knights, campaigned for the Republicans.
The American Federation of Labor was noncommittal to a
party and Gompers, president of the Federation, stated:
I was for free silver, not the Democratic Party.
If the Democratic Party favored free silver, well 
and good, for legislation is altogether too fre­
quently enacted by partisan sponsorship.99
At the 1897 Federation convention, W. D. Mahon of the
Street Railway Employers' Association, charged that action
should be taken against President Gompers for collusion
qii 5XJones, op. cit.. p. 334.
92Ibid.. pp. 75, 317.
93Gompers, op. cit., p. 87.
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with the Democratic National Committee. After an executive
session, the following resolution was adopted: "Resolved,
that we endorse the President's position, dismiss the
94charges and exonerate him from blame." Bimetallism was 
last mentioned at the American Federation of Labor Con­
vention in 1898 when an adopted resolution read as follows:
i
"Bimetallism is so strongly entrenched in the labor move­
ment that it is not necessary at this time to debate the 
95question."
National Banking System 
Another aspect of the financial question which aroused 
labor's interest during the 18901s was the national banking 
system, which was established under the National Bank Act 
of 1864. This act was "to provide for a national currency,
secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and provide for
96circulation and redemption thereof." A national bank
94̂National Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of America, 
"16th Annual Convention of AFL," The Electrical Worker. 
January, 1897, pp. 6-7.
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1898, 
p. 63.
96For the full act, see: U.S., Congress, Senate,
Committee on. Banking and Currency, Federal Banking Laws 
and Reports. 1780-1912 (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1963), pp. 348-374.
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could be established by five or more associates with no 
less than $50,000. In order to issue notes, each national 
bank was required to deposit with the Treasury, United 
States bonds equal in amount to one third of the capital 
stock? the bank was then entitled to receive circulating 
notes equal in amount to ninety per cent of the current 
market value of the bonds. The bank association could then 
issue the notes which would circulate— in payment of taxes, 
lands, salaries, debts, and other demands within the United 
States.97
The American Federation of Labor clearly stated their
7negative attitude toward the System at their convention in
1894 with the adoption of Plank Twelve:
The abolition of the monopoly privilege of issuing 
money, and substituting thereof a system of direct 
issuance to and by the p e o p l e .
The American Federation of Labor did not point out the method
by.which this should have been accomplished? however, several
writers took it upon themselves to give their recommendations.
97Ibid.. pp. 349, 350, 354, 356,357.
98American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1894,
p. 50.
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One method of fulfilling plank twelve was offered by
J. T. Small, a correspondent for the American Federationist,
who suggested the use of a mutual banking system. Small
explained that a money free from interest, if at all possible,
was wanted by the people. Under the National Bank Act,
notes were primarily circulated first through loans to
businessmen at a rate of interest varying from six to twelve
per cent. Small's plan was based on the formation of mutual
banks by the workers themselves. Their property would be
pledged as security for their own note issue. Thus, the
worker could derive the same benefits, minus the excess
interest charge, rather than deal'with a national bank for
. . 99a.loan. He urged the workingmen to consider his idea.
But Stephen T. Byington had an entirely different 
approach to the "issue of money directly by the people."
He felt that money issuance was a monopoly in the hands of 
Congress and their favorites— National Banks. It was 
suggested by Byington that any individual wishing to make a 
gold or silver coin or issue paper money of any sort, could
99J. T. Small, "Mutual Money," American Federationist. 
June, 1895, pp. 57-58.
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do so without the approval of the government. He believed
that people would learn through experience which was of
value and which was not, and eventually uniformity would be
reached to which all would agree.
John McBride, editor of the American Federationist
in 1895, asserted that the strength of the national banks
consisted chiefly of confidence on the part of depositors,
rather than upon their ability to pay dollar for dollar.
He maintained that if all depositors surrendered their
certificates of deposit, and demanded their money, every
national bank in the country would be forced to close its
doors. This system of confidence and credit, he felt,
was anything but creditable to the government and to the
people. In conclusion, he stated:
We must take from speculators, bankers and brokers 
the power to control our medium of exchange before 
interest can be reduced to a minimum, usury be 
wiped out, and business done upon a cash rather 
than a credit basis.
■^^Stephen T. Byington, "To Abolish Money Monopoly," 
American Federationist, October, 1895, pp. 106-107.
American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "The Kind 
of Money Needed," American Federationist. August, 1895, 
pp. 84, 85.
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The national banking system and gold standard again 
captured the attention of the American Federation of Labor
when the Gage Bill was presented to Congress in December of
1021897. Two resolutions pertaining to this bill were
adopted at the Nashville Convention because the Federation 
feared adverse effects if the bill passed. The resolutions 
stated that this bill would firmly entrench the gold 
standard on the American Economy and would fasten the 
national banking system on the people. The Federation felt 
that the bill was simply an undisguised effort to retire 
greenback and other government paper money by substituting 
national bank notes in their stead.103
In reaction to the American Federation of Labor's 
financial resolutions, Secretary of the Treasury Gage wrote 
a letter to President Gompers defending his bill. He
102The bill, H.R. 5181, read as follows: "To provide
for the refunding of the National debt, for establishing a 
redemption fund, and a division of issue and redemption in 
the Treasury of the United States and to modify existing 
laws respecting National Banks, and for other purposes." 
U.S., Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., XXXI, 
Part 1, p. 234.
*| no #xw-»The bill was sponsored by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, Lyman J. Gage. American Federation of Labor, 
Proceedings. 1897, p. 113.
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mentioned that if the gold standard was inimical to the
interest of the laboring classes, then it was inimical
to all classes. He did not believe that the exploitation of
one class by another, either through false weights, partial
laws, or a bad monetary system, could be made to work for the
permanent benefit of the exploiting class. Gage had also
taken personal offense by the passing of the resolutions
and further stated:
. . . that the permanence of the gold standard (for 
which I argue) operates in this evil direction, 
then your resolutions of condemnation are well 
founded, and I am justly charged, either with an 
ignorance which constitutes me a foolish advisor, 
or with a perversity of motive which makes me 
an evil advisor . . .104
In defense of his position, Gage admonished Gompers and said
that if either Gompers or any of his associates could prove
that the views expressed in the kill were not in the best
interest of the American monetary system, then he would
105abandon his efforts.
•^^Letter from Lyman J. Gage, Secretary of the Treas­
ury, to Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation 
of Labor, as cited in American Federationist. January, 189F, 
p. 254.
105Ibid., p. 260. <J
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Gompers immediately wrote a letter of rebuttal to
Gage in which he reaffirmed the Federation's stand on the
Gage Bill. He pointed out that resolutions were made to
voice the opinion of a group and therefore offered no
arguments. Hence, the Federation was simply utilizing its
right to express an opinion, as Gage had done by suggesting
the bill. Gompers discussed at some length the effects a
gold standard would have on the laboring class and concluded
this portion of his defense with the following statement;
You must abandon the advocacy of gold monometalism 
unless you can show that the demonitization of 
silver and the doubling of the demand for gold 
resultant therefrom, has not caused gold to grow 
dearer and prices lower to the great injury of 
all producers of wealth. You should at least 
show that the perpetuation of the gold standard 
will not result in making money dearer and human 
flesh cheaper. •L06
Gompers questioned Gage quite extensively on the feasibility
of the national bank note substitution, and stressed that
"it will make the banks the masters, the many the slaves,
1 0 7and would enrich the few and impoverish the multitude."
Letter from Samuel Gompers to Lyman J. Gage, cited 
in American Federationist. January, 1898, pp. 260-261.
107Ibid.. p. 262.
45
Apparently, Gage never replied to Gompers' letter 
although he was offered an opportunity. The bill brought 
about a lengthy discussion in the Banking and Currency 
Committee of Congress, but was not passed.
Summary
Organized labor during the latter part of the nine­
teenth century responded to the needs of its members 
with programs for monetary reform. Especially during hard 
times, a sufficient supply of money was not available to 
the working class and the interest rates on bank loans 
further burdened the laborers. In their dispair, the union 
members turned to their leaders to resolve their problems. 
Monetary reform was the solution.
The National Labor Union, Industrial Congress and 
Industrial Brotherhood, and Knights of Labor advocated the 
abolishment of the national banking system and the issue 
of paper money by the government directly to the people. 
Political action was stressed by various leaders as a 
means of achieving labor's goals, and also, a number of 
unionists joined the Greenback Labor Party. Some labor 
leaders felt that if money reform transpired, then coopera­
tives would be the answer to return labor to its rightful
46
place in society.
Of special significance during this period was the 
formation of the American Federation of Labor which was 
destined to become a strong representative of the working 
class as well as their guide in many important issues. The 
Federation, too, urged the abolition of the national banking
system, but wanted money to be issued by the people, not
/
by the government. The American Federation of Labor, as 
well as the Knights of Labor, recognized that the free and 
unlimited coinage of silver was a means by which the worker 
could secure additional money, and therefore, participated 
in the silver movement.
CHAPTER III
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN 
THE BANKING SYSTEM 1900-1928
From the time of the passage of the National Banking 
Act in 1864, certain inherent weaknesses in the Act were 
brought before the public. Little attention was given to 
these defects until the 1890's which marked the beginning 
of the banking reform movement.^
Organized labor had been opposed to the System from 
its beginning and offered its own solutions to the banking 
problems, as was shown in Chapter II. In 1906, the American 
Federation of Labor at the Minneapolis convention slightly 
changed its attitude and stated in its Declaration of 
Principles:
We favor a system of finance whereby money shall be 
issued exclusively by the government, with such 
regulations and restrictions as will protect it
•'•Henry Parker Willis, The Federal Reserve (New York: 
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1915), pp. 25-27.
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from manipulation by the banking interest for their 
own private gain.^
This differed from their 1894 statement which specified
"issuance to and by the people," not by the government.
There is no doubt that organized labor had justifiable
complaints about the system because one of the basic defects
was the inelasticity of the currency. This did not mean
that the currency could not be increased, but that it could
not be expanded and contracted in accordance with the
4increase and decrease m  the demand for it.
In addition to the currency problem, the system lacked 
an open market committee for commercial paper, an effective 
means of clearing and collection of checks, a provision for 
the organization of American banking institutions in foreign 
countries to stimulate foreign trade and an overall 
cohesiveness and coordination of commercial bank policies. 
Also, the actions of the Independent Treasury System, under 
which the government acted as a partial custodian of its
2American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1906, p. 239.
3Supra. Chapter II, p. 39.
^Lawrence E. Clark, Central Banking Under the Federal 
Reserve System (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935),
p. 12.
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own funds, resulted in irregular withdrawals of money from
bank reserves and from circulation. This was detrimental
5to general business conditions and, in turn, to labor.
Further, the reserve arrangement® of the system 
worked ineffectively and led to pyramiding of reserves.
For example, country banks would mail their checks to 
reserve agents for collection and upon mailing, the checks 
would be counted as legal reserve. The reserve city 
banks would do likewise in sending the same checks to the 
central reserve banks. Some checks, therefore, were
7counted twice and the legal reserves were inaccurate.
Through the pyramiding of reserves, the greatest con­
centration of funds was in New York City. The New York 
banks, governed by the profit motive, primarily made call 
loans, many of which were used in the securities market.
This entire procedure became quite unsatisfactory during
5 .A. Barton Hepburn, A History of Currency in the
United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915),
pp. 397-399.
gNational banks were required to keep a legal minimum 
reserve against their deposits. The amount required depended 
upon the bank's classification as: (1) central reserve city
banks, (2) reserve city banks, or (3) country banks. Clark, 
op. cit., p. 4.
, 7 Ibid., p. 5.
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periods of credit stringency when the call of these loans
had an unbalancing influence on the money market and stock
exchange transactions. The effect was felt throughout the
nation and resulted in financial panics.®
The Panic of 1907 definitely emerged from inadequacies
in the banking system. By the latter part of that summer,
it was apparent that the money market was faltering.
Securities were overvalued by conservative standards, and
building construction was beginning to slacken. In mid-
October, the panic actually began with runs on some banks
9 •and trust companies. Many banks, like depositors, sought 
to turn their assets into cash, and thus, loans decreased 
and the call-money rate greatly increased. The banks 
tried to lessen the shortage of currency induced by the 
private hoarding of cash. They introduced, on a large 
scale, clearinghouse certificates and the Treasury tried to 
stem the panic by pouring money into the banks. With this
®Ibid,., pp. 6-12.
9On October 22, 1907, the Knickerbocker Trust Company, 
holding $50 million of deposits for 17,000 depositors, 
closed its doors. Paul Studenski and Herman E. Krooss, 
Financial History of the United States (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952), p. 253.
51
additional amount of currency in circulation, the Panic was 
halted.
The financial conditions of 1907 were reflected in
the November convention of the American Federation of Labor.
A delegate from the International Photo-Engravers' Union
of North America, Louis A. Schwarz, blamed the unscrupulous
banking methods of the large financial centers of the country
for the financial panic which seriously affected the
interests of the laboring class. Business and trade were
demoralized and the demand for labor was reduced. Schwarz
then offered the following resolution:
. . . that this convention go on record, being the 
voice of organized labor, as being unanimously in 
favor of any efficient methods that may be employed, 
to place the currency of the United States upon a 
more elastic and safe basis to prevent the possi­
bility of the scarcity of currency, and that this 
convention, representing the working people of the 
United States, demand of the people's represent­
atives in Congress, that immediate steps be taken 
toward this end.^
It was further resolved that organized labor was opposed
to the hoarding of currency, and advocated the restoration
•*-Qlbid.. pp. 52-53. See also, Clement Juglar, A Brief 
History of Panics, trans. DeCourey W. Thom (New York: The
Knickerbocker Press, 1916), pp. 165-181.
■^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1907, 
p. 239.
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of all savings to the different channels that served to 
keep the currency of the United States in healthy circu­
lation. The resolution was considered, but it was felt 
by the Executive Council that the matter had already been 
covered by the Declaration of Principles adopted at the 
previous convention.^2
Immediately following the Panic of 1907, Congress took 
steps toward correcting the weaknesses in the American
Banking System by passing the Aldrich-Vreeland Act in May 
13of 1908. The Act was an emergency measure to prevent a 
•shortage of currency and to establish a National Monetary 
Commission, composed of senators and representatives, to 
make a thorough study of the necessary and desirable 
changes in the money and banking system. The Act was to 
expire on June 30, 1914.^
While the Monetary Commission made their study, organ­
ized labor continued to urge a system of finance whereby
12Ibid.
13See J. Laurence Laughlin, The Federal Reserve Act.
Its Origin and Problems (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1933), Appendix C, I, p. 350, for the entire Aldrich- 
Vreeland Act.
^Studenski and Krooss, pp. pit., p. 254.
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money would be issued by the government. in 1912, John
H. Collins, a delegate of the Central Labor Union to the
American Federation of Labor Convention, acknowledged that
the President of the United States was going to submit to
the governors of the states a proposition for the creation
of additional banks for the benefit of farmers. He urged
the convention to support the proposition with certain
conditions; primarily, that if any system for more adequate
money and banking facilities were to be created, then wage
earners, as well as farmers, should be able to obtain
credit at cost. Collins further resolved:
. . . that we reiterate labor's long continued demand
for a reform in banking and currency that will stop
the abuses that yield monopolistic profits to large 
institutions and combinations . . . ®
He stressed that the voice of the representatives of- organ­
ized labor had as much right to be heard on the monetary 
problem as that of representatives of bankers and business­
men. However, the Committee on Resolutions amended the
proposal to include only the support of the President's
15American Federation of Labor,Weekly Newsletter. 
December 7, 1912, p. 4.
■^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1912, 
pp. 90-91.
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proposition with the primary condition recommended by Collins. 
The resolution was then adopted by the Convention.^7
Federal Reserve System as Solution
18The passage of the Federal Reserve Act in December, 1913, 
brought to a close over twenty-five years of effort for 
banking reform. The Act had been founded on principles and 
practices which were calculated to remove the defects of 
the National Banking System. Before the final passage, 
conflict had developed between those who favored the Aldrich 
Bill (the National Monetary Association plan) and those who 
favored the Owen-Glass Bill (Federal Reserve plan). The 
Aldrich plan, supported by many bankers and large business­
men, provided for one central bank. The Federal Reserve 
plan authorized a central banking system consisting in part 
of regional reserve banks. The Aldrich plan was rejected 
primarily because it was believed that it meant too great a
17Ibid.. p. 378.
ISpor details on legislative history, see Laughlin,
The Federal Reserve Act. Its Origins and Problems, op. cit., 
pp. 161-190.
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centralization of power in the hands of the "financial
19interests" of Wall Street.
Organized labor apparently did not support either the
20Aldrich plan or the Federal Reserve Act. Labor leaders 
did not take part in the formation of the Federal Reserve 
System and labor literature does not reveal any particular 
interest toward these two plans.
The American Federation of Labor was pragmatic and 
realized that since the Act had passed, they would support 
amendments beneficial to the laboring class. Such as the 
case in 1914 when Senator Wesley L. Jones of Washington 
introduced a bill, S. 6460, to amend the Federal Reserve 
System. The amendment would establish a system through 
which loans, not exceeding $5,000, four per cent interest, 
and twenty years' duration, would be made to any one person. 
The purpose of the loan was for acquiring or improving rural
1 Q3See Clark for a comparison of the Aldrich Plan and 
Federal Reserve Act. Op. cit.. pp. 29-31.
Of|wLysle Winston Cooper, in "Economic Policies and 
Theories of the American Federation of Labor," (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Economy, Univers­
ity of Chicago, 1925), p. 282, states that he, too, could 
find no evidence of American Federation of Labor participa­
tion in the establishment of the Federal Reserve System.
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or city property. Senator Jones, in introducing the bill, 
stated:
. . . there are a great many of our people who are 
really in a need of assistance who are not in a 
position to get their claims presented to Congress.
This bill is intended to furnish relief to deserving 
people who cannot avail themselves of the provis­
ions of the banking laws where security is required 
and a short time given and a high rate of interest 
exacted, but who will be able to secure the govern­
ment from losses . . . ̂
It was his intention that the bill would not take the place
of rural credit but would supplement those measures. In
opposition to the bill, Senator McCumber from North Dakota
stated that it was paternalistic and socialistic, and it
would give that appearance to the average reader. The bill
was referred to the Banking and Currency Committee but was
not acted upon.^
Organized labor was not discouraged and continued to
push for amendments which they felt would be in their favor.
All the while, they maintained a stand for a system of
^American Federation of Labor, "Uncle Sam to Loan 
Money?" Weekly Newsletter. September 12, 1914.
22U.S. Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd. Sess., 
1914, LI, pt. 15, pp. 14763-14764.
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finance whereby money would be issued exclusively by the 
government
Following World War I, organized labor's interest in
financial matters became more acute. At a trade union
conference held in Washington, D.C., in December, 1919, a
proclamation was issued entitled Labor. Its Grievances.
24Protests, and Demands. One grievance section dealt 
with credit and its control by private financiers. Organ­
ized labor felt that credit was inherently social and the 
"lifeblood of modern business," but the manner in which it 
was administered burdened industry rather than served it. 
Through credit, unearned incomes of financiers were enhanced 
at the expense of earned incomes of the workers. Therefore, 
they urged:
. . . the organization and use of credit to serve 
production needs and not to increase the incomes
23American Federation of Labor Weekly Newsletter. April 4, 
1914; September 5, 1914; October 21, 1916. Also, The American 
Labor Yearbook. 1917-1918 (New York: Rand School of Social 
Science, 1918), p. 59.
24Labor's Conference, Labor, Its Grievances. Protests. 
and Demands (Washington, D.C.: American Federation of Labor,
1920), p. 9. See also, Samuel Gompers, Labor's Political 
Banner Unfurled (Washington, D.C.: American Federation of 
Labor, 1920), p. 8. "Bankers Should Not Control Credit," 
.American Federation of Labor.Weekly Newsletter, October 16, 
1920.
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and holdings of financiers.. Control over credit 
should be taken from financiers and should be 
vested in a public agency, able to administer 
this power as a public trust in the interest of _
a l l  t h e  p e o p l e .
A statement issued by the Comptroller of the Currency
John Skelton Williams in 1920 was, to organized labor, an
endorsement of their charge that the control of credit by
bankers corrupted the spirit and purpose of industry.
Williams condemned the unjustifiable interest rates by
New York bankers and admitted that industry was hampered by 
26such charges. Williams further proclaimed that New York
bankers were borrowing money from the Federal Reserve at
four and one-half per cent to six per cent and loaning it
27as high as thirty per cent.
In support of Williams' condemnation of the exorbitant
interest rates, the American Federation of Labor convention
i
in 1921 demanded prompt enactment by Congress of legislation 
to limit the spread between the rate at which member banks 
of the Federal Reserve System secured money and the rate
25Ibid.
26American Federation of Labor, "Labor's Political Pro­
gram Includes Finances," Weekly Newsletter, October 23, 1920.
27American Federation of Labor, "Bankers Lecture Workers 
While Trusts Close Mill," Weekly Newsletter, October 30, 1920.
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they were permitted to charge. A maximum spread of one and
one-half per cent was recommended and legislation was
demanded to prohibit members of the Federal Reserve from
28lending money for speculation.
Due to a severe but short-lived downswing of the busi­
ness cycle in 1920 and 1921, a number of articles centering 
around the money topic appeared in American Federation of 
Labor publications,3^ and organized labor became quite 
incensed when charges were made by Federal Reserve bankers 
and their supporters that high wages were largely respons­
ible for this downturn. The Federal Reserve had recommended 
that wages of workers should be reduced to increase business 
activity.30
28AFL History, Encyclopedia. Reference Book (Washington, 
D.C.: American Federation of Labor, 1924), Vol. II, p. 85.
28Such titles appeared in the American Federation of 
Labor,Weekly Newsletter: "Wall Street Control Seems Grim 
Reality," (October 23, 1920), "Tamed Gold Standard is 
Wobbly Old Basis," (August 6, 1921), "Bankers Must Let Loose," 
(July 2, 1921), "Bankers Are Blamed," (July 23, 1921), and 
"Bankers on Strike," (September 3, 1921). Also, a meeting of 
trade union leaders in the Executive Council Chamber of the 
American Federation of Labor, February, 1921, pledge^ them­
selves to' obtain the public support and recognition of the 
administration of credit as a public trust in the interest 
of all the people. American Federation of Labor, Weekly 
Newsletter. Special Edition, April 9, 1921.
^American Federation of Labor, "Banks Check Home Build­
ing by Exacting High Interest," Weekly Newsletter, December 
3, 1921.
One journalist for the American Federation of Labor
noted that during 1921, the New York Federal Reserve Bank
had accumulated extremely high profits and had raised
salaries of its officials— an occurrence that had caused
31discussion in the United States Senate. Senator Lee S. 
Overman of North Carolina stated that the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York had spent seventeen million dollars in the 
erection of one of the finest bank buildings in the world 
and had hired men from surrounding banks at quandrupled and 
quintupled salaries. He explained that the Federal Reserve 
System was intended to be operated >on a non-profit basis, 
but the law had been amended so Federal Reserve Banks could 
retain one hundred per cent surplus. Since profits were 
so large, the senator said, the Federal Reserve bankers 
"are wasting it by increasing salaries over seven million 
since 1919. and by erecting these extravagent buildings."32 
A defense of salaries paid to Federal Reserve Bank 
officials was made by H. Parker Willis, an employee of the
O p^American Federation of Labor, "Banks Boost Salaries: 
Howl Wage Deflation," Weekly Newsletter. December 24, 1921.
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Federal Reserve Board. He stated that a comparison could
not be made between the Federal Reserve salaries and those
of other government officials whose salaries were based
largely on custom and tradition. A reporter for the
American Federation of Labor was amused at such a defense
because "trade unionists are called upon to present their
living costs and bare necessities to men who insist that
33'there are no classes in this country.'"
Alarmed by these attacks on the Federal Reserve System 
and banking institutions in general, its defenders intro­
duced in Congress in 1922, H. R. 11217:
To make punishable by law the offense of spoken,
statements or
The Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor 
took a firm stand of oppostion to this bill. They felt 
that such legislation was an attempt to protect the privileged 
few from criticism of their acts and to limit free speech 
and press. The Council noted that if the bill passed, it 
would be considered a misdemeanor to denounce the inc reased
■^American Federation of Labor, "Bankers Employee 
Defends Big Salary," Weekly Newsletter. April 22, 1922.
■^U.S., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1922, LXII, Part 5, p. 5207.
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salaries paid by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Also if any Congressman advocated a measure for the pro­
tection of the people from illegal banking acts, he could 
be fined $5,000, imprisoned for five years, or both.^ To 
organized labor's satisfaction, the bill did not pass.
While the bankers insisted on wage reductions to offset 
cyclical downturns, trade union delegates at the 1921 
convention of the American Federation of Labor had their 
own solutions. E. H. Fitzgerald and A. C. Hay of the 
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks demanded that a movement be 
instituted to-enforce labor's legal rights to legal tender 
money, and to refuse the acceptance of Federal Reserve 
notes, National Bank notes and bank checks. No doubt 
Fitzgerald and Hay wanted to accept "hard money"— gold and 
silver coins. Other portions of the resolution offered 
alternatives to Congress. One requested the repeal of all 
banking acts and the withdrawal of legal protection to 
bankers. Another urged the governmental establishment of 
banks and the liquidation of government bonds into legal




tender money. Because of the complicated nature of the
Hay-Fitzgerald resolution and the near adjournment of the
convention, the Resolution Committee referred it to the
36Executive Council for further study.
At the next convention, in 1922, the Executive
Council reported that it had made a thorough investigation
!into the subject of currency, credit, and banking, as had 
been suggested by previous convention resolutions. The use 
of savings and funds of the workers deposited in banks, 
the methods and use of credit, and the practicability of 
stabilizing the purchasing power of money were the main 
issues under consideration. The investigation was made on 
the assumption that the workers' savings were being used
by the banking institutions to discredit, crush, and destroy
- 37trade unions and to favor the employer.
The Executive Council inquired into the extent to which
bankers controlled industrial enterprises and commercial
activities. It was found that although the banking system
36American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1921, 
pp. 302-303, 470-471.
•^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1922, 
p. 88.
in the United States dominated industry and commerce in 
the sense that industrialists and merchants needed loans 
by banks, the exact form of domination could not be 
ascertained. It was,agreed that bankers were in a position 
to exert great influence over the business policies of 
concerns which required large amounts of capital and were not 
financially strong. Also, there were instances in which 
bankers were on boards of industrial enterprises and 
industrialists were on boards of banks. These were con­
sidered unfair practices because of the effect on banking 
opportunities. Therefore, the Council concluded that an 
effort should be made to secure a complete division between 
the financial and the industrial and commercial enterprises. 
Since the problem was too complex, the Council requested an
authorization to give the subject additional consideration
38before offering a definite plan of action.
Special attention was given'to the control and influence 
of banks over the industrial relations policies that might 
be enforced upon employers in their dealings with wage 




were opposed to the trade union movement and they often 
tried to compel employers to assume an attitude toward 
trade unions which would weaken, if not destroy, the
organization. Nevertheless, the Executive Council did
\
admit that bankers could also be influenced by manu-
39facturers, merchants, and trade associations.
Several proposals had been offered to the Council as 
means of improving the financial situation. It was 
suggested that the government undertake the establishment 
of banks to compete with the private ones, but the Council 
had not proceeded far enough in their investigation to 
make an official statement along these lines. Other 
proposals considered were to liberalize the postal savings 
bank system and to encourage the establishment of trade 
union banks.^ The Council felt that organized labor's 
strongest weapon in dealing with the control by bankers 
was the savings deposits of union members and their friends. 
The boycott method could be used against those bankers whose
^Ibid.. ' p. 89.
40 Supra. Chapter III, p. 68.
41Supra, Chapter III, p. 74.
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AOaims and policies were detrimental to the labor cause. ^
Also, the Executive Council had made an inquiry into
the practicability of stabilizing the purchasing power of
the monetary unit. They had given consideration to the
plans of Professors Fisher of Yale, Sprague of Harvard,
and Cassel of Sweden.^ No official recommendation was
made and the Council concluded:
Every influence and interest in our national life 
should rise above selfishness to a spirit of pro­
moting the future welfare of all and to that end 
should cooperate with the national government in 
finding a proper solution to this most urgent need 
of our time— a more stable medium of exchange.44
The American Federation of Labor showed its cooper­
ation in achieving this goal when it participated in the 
hearings on Stabilization held by the Committee on Banking 
and Currency. Congressman James Strong of Kansas defended 
the following bill, H. R. 11806:
42 American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, op. cit., 
pp. 90-91.
^See Irving Fisher, Stabilizing the Dollar (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1920), 296 pp. For a summary of the 
plans by Gustav Cassel and 0. M. W. Sprague, see Joseph S. 
Lawrence, Stabilization of Prices (New York: The Macmillar;
Co., 1928), pp. 122, 125, 293-300.
44American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, loc. cit.
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A bill to amend the act approved December 23, 1913, 
known as the Federal Reserve Act; to define certain 
policies toward which the power of the Federal 
Reserve System shall be directed; to further promote 
the maintenance of a stable gold standard; to pro­
mote the stability of commerce, industry, agriculture 
and employment; to assist in realizing a more stable 
purchasing power of the dollar, and for other pur­
poses. ̂
Mr. W. C. Hushing, Legislative Representative of the 
American Federation of Labor, testified that his organ-
tization was interested in that portion of the bill which
dealt with stabilizing the purchasing power of the dollar.
But there was some doubt in his mind whether the bill
would accomplish that purpose. He hastily added, however,
that the bill was a start in the right direction. Mr. Strong
explained that it was improbable, if not impossible, to have
absolute stabilization. However, the purpose of the bill was*
to use the Federal Reserve's money and credit policies in 
such a way as to reduce the fluctuations to a minimum.
Mr. Hushing admitted that he was not an economist, but to 
him, the bill seemed to be a practical way to begin and he
45 . .U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and
Currency, Hearings. Stabilization, 70th Cong., 1st. Sess.,
1929, p. 1.
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agreed that the American Federation of Labor would endorse
AC.the bill. But the Strong Bill was not reported out of 
the Banking and Currency Committee.
Organized labor was demonstrating a more mature effort 
by having a representative at the hearing,and by so doing, 
was expanding into the area of banking and currency. It 
was quite evident from Mr. Hushing's testimony that the 
Federation was in need of trained economic advisors who 
could more ably understand and present organized labor's 
viewpoint.
Postal Savings Banks 
As early as 1891, postal savings banks had received 
attention at the American Federation of Labor Convention 
when a delegate offered a resolution for the establishment 
of these banks by the government. The resolutions committee, 
however, felt that it was an inopportune time for such 
legislation because of other pressing trade union matters.^7
46Ibid., pp. 409-410.
47American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1891,
p. 39.
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In September of 1895, an editorial in the American
Federationist proclaimed that the postal savings banks
"would be the safest and best form of banking for the
people." It was explained that such a system was quite
successful in Great Britain and was in practical operation
in Canada. The editor encouraged postal savings because
he believed the fairly high rate of interest paid by, and
the absolute safety of, the system would make it an ideal
depository for wage earners' savings. Furthermore, it would
encourage thrift among wage earners, as well as lessen the
48power of the capitalists. This editorial apparently
reflected the feeling of the majority of the Federation
for the Convention in December of that year by resolution
officially urged the establishment of a Postal Savings 
49System.
At the 1897 convention, Millard Lloyd, a delegate from • 
the Illinois State Federation of Labor submitted a more 
detailed resolution on the establishment of postal savings 
banks. He wanted these banks to be independent of all
AQAmerican Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Postal 
Savings Banks," American Federationist, September, 1895,p. 125.
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1895, p. 68.
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banking systems then in operation in the United S t a t e s . ^0 
The resolution was adopted, but it was clarified by another 
delegate who recommended that it be understood that the 
American Federation of Labor was not in favor of national 
banks as depositories of postal savings.
The following year, the Executive Council reported 
that no progress had been made in the establishment of this 
system, but the promoters had agreed to the Federation's
C Oamendment to exclude national banks as depositories. It 
was not until the Panic of 1907 that consideration was 
again given by the Federation Conventions to the matter of 
a postal savings system. The delegates of the American 
Federation of Musicians felt that such a financial state 
would not occur in nations where postal savings banks were 
established. Whether or not this was a correct assumption, 
they felt the savings of the people would be assured and a 
simple demand for their deposits would be honored. There­
fore, it was again resolved that the American Federation 
of Labor pursue a course of pushing for the establishment
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1897, p. 3*.
51Ibid., p. 74.
52American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1898, p. 24.
of postal savings banks, and this demand continued through 
1909.53
This objective of organized labor became a reality
when in June, 1910, the Federal Government established the
Postal Savings System. The Act provided that from the
postal savings fund, five per cent was to be deposited
with the Treasury of the United States and thirty per cent
54could be invested in United States bonds. Organized 
labor, however, was not in favor of that portion of the 
legislation^ which provided that the remainder of the 
funds could be deposited with national or state banks if 
secured by public obligations. The Act did not provide 
for loaning of funds, and in 1912, the American Federation 
of Labor adopted a resolution encouraging loans to the
EClaboring people for residential improvement purposes. ° 
Along these' same lines, the Federation Convention of 1913 
adopted a resolution favoring an amendment which would
^ A m e r i c a n  Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1907, 
pp. 169, 335; Proceedings, 1909, p. 209.
54Studenski and Krooss, op. cit., p. 248.
^ Supra. Chapter II, p. 39.
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1912, 
p. 379.
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enable school district trustees to take their school 
district bonds to the Federal trustees of the postal savings 
fund and borrow money without the intervention of a third 
party.^ This effort represented a combination of interests 
which linked their concern for the educational welfare of 
their children-with their own monetary aims.
In 1912, an editorial in the Weekly Newsletter pro­
claimed the instant popularity of the postal savings 
58system. But, in reality, it was not the immediate success
CQ #its sponsors had visioned. At the 1913 Federation Con­
vention, Thomas Wright of the Brotherhood of Painters, 
Decorators and Paperhangers of America, recommended that 
Congress alter the postal banks by removing all maximum 
limitations of deposits, eliminating the provision of 
redepositing savings in private banks, and establishing 
checking account facilities. Thus, the postal savings banks
c n American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1913, 
p. 276. The Convention Proceedings of 1916 mentioned that 
organized labor was unable to secure passage of this legis­
lation. Proceedings, 1916, p. 98.
CQAmerican Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Postal 
Savings Banks Win," Weekly Newsletter, November 23, 1912.
^^Studenski and Krooss, op. pit., p. 249.
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would be in competition with the private banks. After much
discussion, it was recommended that this proposal be referred
to the Executive Council and not adopted at that time
because of the pending legislation in Congress, the Federal
Reserve Bill. The Resolution Committee felt that Wright's
60idea might be misconstrued or limit the Council. ' Yet,
there is no evidence of American Federation of Labor
participation in the hearings on the Federal Reserve Bill.
But organized labor continued to maintain a position
advocating increases in the amount of deposits in the
postal savings banks. When deposit limitations were
increased from $500 to $1,000 in 1916, it felt that
61definite progress had been made.
Proposals for change were not mentioned again until 
the downturn of the business cycle in 1920-21. The following 
year, the Executive Council reported that a recommendation 
had been made to enlarge the facilities and to increase the 
amount of and the interest on deposits. The recommendation
60. American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1913, 
pp. 276-277.
61American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1916,
p. 98.
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was issued in opposition to private bankers, who they felt 
were partially responsible for the unstable financial con- 
ditions. Prom that time, their interest in Congressional 
legislation to amend the postal savings system declined. 
Organized labor began to look for other solutions to their 
money and banking problems.
Labor Banks 
6 3Although several writers have given consideration to 
the area of labor banking, it would be negligent to omit 
it from this study. At the time some union delegates pushed 
for postal savings and government ownership of banks, others 
wanted to place the wage earners' savings in labor's own 
financial institutions. This was another reform measure 
proposed to bypass the private bankers and the high interest 
rates to workers.®^ The American Federation of Labor
62American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1922,
p. 90.
®^See for example, Richard Boeckel, Labor's Money 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1923), 181 pp.? J.
B. S. Hardman and Associates, American Labor Dynamics 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1928), 432 pp.? H. J. 
Hamblen, "The Labour Bank in America," The Economic Review, 
September 15, 1927, V.15, pp. 375-376.
®^For complete detail, see: Industrial Relation
Section, Princeton University, The Labor Banking Movement 
in the United States (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1929), 376 pp.
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Conventions from 1904 to 1919 spasmodically considered 
resolutions urging labor banking, but all proposals were 
rejected by the conservative leaders of the Federation.
In analyzing the attitude of the American Federation 
of Labor toward labor banking, it must be understood that 
the two national unions which were most active in this 
area, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, were outside the
g cFederation. It has been generally accepted that the 
first labor bank opened in this country was the Mount Vernon 
Savings Bank in May, 1920. This bank was sponsored by the 
National officers of the International Association of
65Ibid., p. 131.
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Machinists, an affiliate of the American Federation of
T , 66 Labor.
In 1920, the Machinists delegates submitted a resolu­
tion at the Federation convention for approval of labor 
banks, credit unions, and cooperative banking. Action was 
taken by the Federation to approve the cooperative move­
ment through the authorization of a Bureau on Cooperative
67Societies under Federation control. Neither at this 
convention nor the following one did labor banking receive
66In 1918, the Central Labor Council of Seattle, 
Washington, was making plans for a banking institution which 
would be known as the Trades Union Savings and Loan Associ­
ation. Its board of directors was to be composed of each of 
the unions holding stock. The institution was started in 
March, 1919, and had deposits of $61,147. It was noted that 
a large part of the banks1 assets were in Liberty bonds and 
that the state auditor credited it as 17th in reference to 
savings and assets. By June of that year, the bank appeared 
to a reporter to be making favorable progress among the 
local trade unionists, and the deposits passed $80,000. 
However, it is doubtful that this institution accepted 
demand deposits and for this reason was probably excluded 
from labor bank listings. American Federation of Labor, 
Weekly Newsletter. December 28, 1918, '-Union Savings Bank," 
May 17, 1919; "Savings Bank Grows," June 7, 1919.
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1920, 
pp. 176-180, 281-282, 396-397.
68approval, and all resolutions were defeated without debate.
The Executive Council did not feel it was in a position
to take a stand on this matter and no doubt the conservative
attitude of Gompers had an important influence on this
decision. The Executive Council in 1922, when considering
labor banks, stated that few trade unions were so organized
as to permit them to enter into the banking business.
Because of the need of funds to be used in defense of
strikes or lockouts and for the payment of other benefits,
the Council believed it unwise for the unions to convert
their funds into working capital of a bank, which, if
incorporated, could be sued and the funds seized. The
Executive Council concluded with this statement:
While we believe trade union banks are possible, 
we believe that such ventures should be considered 
with caution and should be approached with extremecare.69
The death of Gompers in 1924, and the election of 
William Green to succeed him as president of the American 
Federation of Labor did not cause any marked changes in
68American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1922, 
pp. 205, 222-223, 253, 373-374, 389-390.
69Ibid.. pp. 90-91.
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the attitude of the Federation. The Executive Council
reports continued to maintain an air of conservatism and
in 1929 stated:
A bank is one of the most sensitive of economic 
agencies. Unions engaging in banking enterprises 
should assure themselves by every precaution 
possible for the competency and dependability of 
their technical advisors. They should avail them­
selves of all the supervision and counsel obtain­
able through state banking authorities and the 
federal reserve system. Such precautions meet 
with corresponding reward in public confidence 
and the safety of the bank itself. A number of 
labor banks are developing sound and wise policies 
and are a credit to our labor movement. Labor 
banking, however, is as yet in the experimental 
stage and should be accordingly safeguarded, and 
we urge greatest caution upon all those connected 
with them. Our action is based upon our realization 
of the close connection between these banks and 
the labor movement.^0
That same year, on the fifth anniversary of the
Federation Bank and Trust Company of New York, President
Green wrote to Peter J. Bradley, President of the Bank:
I am proud of your achievement. The work which you 
have done shows that labor and labor's representa­
tives are competent to manage and control their own 
financial institutions.^
70American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1928,
p. 74.
71 .American Federation of Labor, "Union Bank Prospers: 
Labor Ability Proven," Weekly Newsletter. May 26, 1928.
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Yet, in general, labor banking was only a short lived '
venture which proved to be unsuccessful. The most rapid
expansion came between 1922 and 1924 when there was an
increase in the number of banks from 7 to 25, and reached
a peak in 1926 with 36. Thereafter, a decline set in with
72only seven in operation m  1932.
Labor banking was encouraged by professional promoters 
who gathered interest among local labor leaders. Under a 
disguise of offering assistance, some of these promoters sold 
to labor groups banks of questionable financial soundness. 
These unsound purchases eventually contributed to some bank 
failures. Other causes of failure varied from lack of
7 ̂ •support to incompetent management.' Many of the union 
groups were moving into an area where they lacked practical 
experience. Some of the union officials were exerting more 
efforts in the financial arena than around the bargaining 
table. Too, there is no doubt that the depression starting 
in 1929 contributed to the liquidation of many of the banks.
72American Labor Yearbook (New York: Rand School of
Social Science, 1932), p. 187.
7 ̂'^Commons and Associates, op. cit.. IV, p. 576.
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The notable feature of the movement is that organized 
labor did recognize that they were in an unfavorable position 
in dealing with the private bankers. Thus, it tried to solve 
this problem by establishing its own financial institutions.
Summary
In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the 
most significant change in the banking system of the United 
States occurred with the passage of the Federal Reserve Act 
in 1913. Organized labor did not participate directly in the 
hearings pertaining to the establishment of the Federal 
Reserve, but it recognized the complexity of the monetary 
issues. It lacked a comprehensive understanding of the 
monetary legislation and realized the need for expert advice.
The influence of Samuel Gompers' conservatism was 
examplified by the American Federation of Labor's rejection 
of radical monetary proposals. It did, however, encourage 
the establishment of a postal savings system and strongly 
urged that labor banks be undertaken with caution.
The interest exhibited by organized labor during this 
period was a prelude to increased participation in govern­
ment hearings and to a greater movement into lobbying for 
those monetary proposals which it supported.
CHAPTER IV
REOGRANIZATION AND REFORM DURING 
THE GREAT DEPRESSION
For over thirty years, numerous economists and 
historians1 have delved into complicated and lengthy studies 
of the causes and effects of the Great Depression— a 
depression that was not just a unique feature to the United 
States economy but was worldwide in scope.. Concentration 
in this chapter will be on organized labor, which as a 
portion of the masses affected by this financial crisis, 
expressed its reactions toward banking and monetary reform 
measures and offered its own solutions.
See: Marcus Nadler and Jules I. Bogden, The Banking
Crisis (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1933); Chester
A. Phillips, T. F. McManus, and R. W. Nelson, Banking and 
the Business Cycle, A Study of the Great Depression in the 
United States (New York: The McMillan Co., 1937); James F.
T. O'Conner, The Banking Crisis and Recovery Under the 
Roosevelt Administration (Chicago: Callagan and Co., 1938);
C. C. Colt and N. S. Keith, 28 Days, A History of the 
Banking Crisis (New York: Greenberg, Publisher, 1933);
Charles R. Whittlesey, Banking and the New Deal (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1935); Leonard P. Ayers, The 
Economics of Recovery (New York: McMillan Co., 1933).
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In the early part of 1929, organized labor became quite 
alarmed over the phenomenal rise in stock prices. An 
American Federation of Labor correspondent reported that 
the Federal Reserve System, which was intended to guard the 
nation's credit and stop money stringencies, had been 
attacked by Dr. H. Parker Willis, a professor of Banking 
at Columbia University. "For long years past," the professor 
stated, "the Federal Reserve has been wasting its resources 
and following unsound banking principles in several 
distinct directions." He requested that the Federal Reserve
cease aiding Wall Street and stop "bootlegging its accom-
/modations to the stock market." The correspondent noted, 
with a tone of sarcasm, that this was a diplomatic manner
of suggesting that the bankers cease using the people1s
2money to gamble on Wall Street.
The Federal Reserve did take action in February, 1929, 
when it warned member banks to cease using funds for 
speculative purposes. The American Federation of Labor 
felt that this notice showed how government officials could 
change front, for in 1928, Governor Young of the Federal
2American Federation of Labor, "Credit Strangled by 
Bootleg Banking," Weekly News Service. February 2, 1929.
Reserve Board had stated that loans to brokers were "a 
legitimate credit function."'
Also, the Federation was inclined to agree with a
statement by Paul M. Warburg, "a noted financier, and
substantial citizen,that the Federal Reserve by March
of 1929 had lost control of the money market to the
speculators of Wall Street. When the crash came in
October, there is no doubt that organized labor held the
4Federal Reserve partrally responsible.
Even with the collapse of the stock market, the 
Federation, as the general public, could not foresee that 
an unusually severe depression was developing. In the 
early months of 1930, there was a slight recovery associated 
with an increase in automobile production arid improvements 
in nonresidential construction. Yet, the decline in 
production and prices by the mid-1930's, along with the 
stock market fiasco, had created a downward revision in both 
short-term and long-term expectations. In the early months 
of 1931, the American economy again seemed to be staging
3 .American Federation of Labor, "Stock Market Panic 
Aided by Uncle Sam," Weekly News Service, February 16, 1929.
4American Federation of Labor, "Speculators Control 
U.S. Money Market," Weekly News Service. March 16, 1929.
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a recovery but the international financial structure 
collapsed completely, deepening the depression in the United 
States.
During this period, the Federation was informed that, 
because of a decline in prices, some banks would not extend 
credit to businessmen until workers' wages were reduced.
The argument given by bankers was that a decline in the 
costs of living meant that a wage cut would not lower 
standards of living. The Federation contended that the 
maintenance of wage rates was a dynamic factor in sus­
taining economic growth and in supporting confidence. It 
was up to the American bankers "to get money out of the 
banks and into circulation" through!loans to business.
To organized labor, the bankers could perform their 
functions more wisely if they had regular and intimate 
contacts with production technicians and representatives 
of wage earners. The bankers had to take into account the 
welfare of the worker as well as all other economic groups 
and organized labor was looking to them to help stabilize 
the income of the wage earners.^





But the workers were presented a pessimistic view by 
the Federation's Monthly Survey of Business:
i
Business here has been passing through a mild panic. 
The situation abroad, railroad difficulties, wage 
cuts and unemployment all have contributed to destroy 
confidence. Fear creates dangerous situations, 
threatening crisis. Many people, frightened for the 
safety of their funds, have withdrawn their money 
from banks; bank runs have forced the banks to get 
ready cash by selling securities for any price they 
would bring. Not only has this caused heavy losses 
because security prices are very low; the dumping 
of securities on the market has driven prices even 
lower, and the bankers' difficulties have prevented 
the granting of credit to business undertakings.®
Banking Legislation 
Despite the general feeling of despair, the American 
Federation of Labor assured its members that there were 
signs of increasing confidence in the economy among bankers 
and businessmen. President Hoover, in September, 1931, 
had proposed a plan to the Federal Reserve Advisory Council 
that the banks form a pool which would create a fund to 
supply ready cash to weaker banks through loans on bank 
assets.
£   . . .American Federation of Labor, "Restoring Confidence
At Home," Monthly Survey of Business. October 19, 1931.
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National Credit Corporation
The National Credit .Corporation was chartered on
October 13, 1931, and capital was raised by having the
banks subscribe two per cent of their net deposits. Weak
banks could secure ready cash from the Corporation for
assets which were sound but could not be given as security
for loans from the Federal Reserve Banks. The Federation
noted that this plan was designed to stop runs on the banks,
halt the stock market decline, and make it easier for banks
to grant credit for business endeavors.7
In April, 1932, the National Credit Corporation came
under critical review of a Federation writer. In his
estimation, it first prevented a number of unnecessary bank
failures, but in the final analysis was not competent to
handle the situation and failed to re-establish confidence.
As a private organization, it was not ready to take the
necessary risks, and only $155,000,000 was loaned to 575 
8banks. William Green, president of the American Federation. . 
of Labor,stated:
7Ibid.
Q American Federation of Labor, "What the Banks Owe for 
Government Help," American Federationist. April, 1932, 
p. 445.
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In the failure of the National Credit Corporation 
we have seen the failure of even collective action 
of private banks to meet the urgent need so that a 
government agency, the Reconstruction Finance Corpor­
ation, was established to conserve the intrinsic 
values in investments.9
Reconstruction Finance Corporation
An air of optimism was prevalent among organized labor
leaders when President Hoover's annual budget message of
December, 1931, recommended the establishment of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. In Hoover's opinion,
this corporation "would not overlap those ([functional
of the National Credit Corporation."'1'0 Its purpose was to
meet the emergency credit strains by granting loans to banks,
insurance companies, railroads, and farmers, thereby
releasing frozen credit for its normal use in trade. On
January 22, 1931, the bill was signed and the United States
Treasury subscribed to $500 million in capital stock. The
Corporation had the power to make loans up to two billion
dollars. The American Federation of Labor gave full approval
of this emergency measure and stated:
gAmerican Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Will Private 
Banks Measure Up?" American Federationist. March, 1932, 
p. 261.
^°Studenski and Kross, op. cit.. p. 372.
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We may reasonably expect that it will reduce bank 
failures, help to restore confidence and return 
money and credit to productive channels of trade.
If it accomplishes these ends, it will do more to 
restore business than any other move possible at 
this time.
In February, 1932, organized labor congratulated 
Congress on their good teamwork in carrying forward the 
President's reconstruction program, especially the estab­
lishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The 
Federation's Monthly Survey of Business mentioned that 
besides checking bank failures, the various financial bills 
proposed and those already passed by Congress were intended 
to help solve three other pressing financial problems: 
hoarding, inadequate loans to business, and the declining 
yield in the bond market.12
Yet, the Research Department of the American Feder­
ation of Labor felt that while Congress's measures prepared 
the way for business recovery, it would only come about 
when buying power was restored to the people.13 In the
^American Federation of Labor, "Frozen Credit," 
Monthly Survey of Business. January 20, 1932.
12American Federation of Labor, "Credit and Business,"
Monthly Survey of Business. February 19, 1932.
13Ibid.
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following month, they reported that business confidence 
was gaining. This was largely due to the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, which had prevented a large number 
of bank failures. Also, hoarders began to return their 
money to the banks. Other gains in the fields of finance 
included an increase in bond prices and loans to railroads.14
However, by January of 1933, it was quite, evident to 
the Federation that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
had not fulfilled the needs of the laborers. Even though 
it had helped to forestall bank failures, credit had not 
been extended by the banks to business. Instead, loans 
were called, plants were forced to close, men were laid 
off and unemployment increased. In addition, the suggestion 
by organized labor for increased buying power was not heeded 
and wages were still being cut.15
To further complicate the depression was the banking 
crisis in the early part of 1933. The American Federation 
of Labor realized that the banks were caught "in a closing 
vice" and that the banking difficulties were too widespread
14American Federation of Labor, "Business Confidence 
Gains," Monthly Survey of Business. March 19, 1932.
15American Federation of Labor, "Only Production 
Creates Wealth," Monthly Survey of Business. January, 1933.
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1 6to be met by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
The Hoover administration, in organized labor's opinion, 
had based its policy on the theory that deflation could be 
cushioned by loans from this Corporation and once confidence 
was restored, business would of itself be strong enough to 
move the economy forward. Congress had not made the 
fundamental adjustment to make this program effective. Only 
stronger Federal action could check the forces of deflation 
and turn business upward.17
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation1s lending 
powers were to expire in January, 1933, but they were 
extended from time to time by Presidential order and by 
subsequent amendments. In 1934, Representative McLeod of 
Michigan introduced a bill, H.R. 8479, authorizing this 
Corporation to purchase all remaining assets of closed
18banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System.
At the hearings, representatives of the American Feder­
ation of Labor urged that closed non-member state banks
17Ibid.
1 ftxoU. S., Congressional Record. 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, part 7, p. 7156.
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19also be included. The McLeod Bill was amended by the 
Committee on Banking and Currency to include all banks, 
and the bill, S. 1175, passed in the summer of 1935.^®
No doubt organized labor wanted to insure' that its 
members who had deposits in closed state banks would have 
their losses restored. This was another indication of the 
increased interest and participation of the American 
Federation of Labor in the area of banking legislation.
Home Loan Bank System
During the Hoover administration, attempts were made 
in other ways to protect capital institutions and prevent 
further deflation. The Home Loan Discount Bank Bill was 
supported by organized labor in January, 1932, as a con­
structive measure to improve the confidence of the 
21people. The Bill was passed in July, 1932, and the
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1934, 
pp. 80, 550. See also, American Federation of Labor. 
History. Encyclopedia. Reference Book, (Washington, D.C.: 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, 1960), Vol. Ill, p. 286.
20U. S., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, part 14, pp. 39, 643, 644.
•̂̂ •American Federation of Labor, "Frozen Credit, " 
Monthly Survey of Business. January 20, 1932.
system was started with a capital of $125 million provided
by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Twelve banks
were established with authority to rediscount first mortgages
for lending institutions, such as savings banks, building
and loan associations, and insurance companies. Yet, the
American Federation of Labor was somewhat apprehensive
about the Home Loan Banks' permanence and wondered if
these Banks, like other programs, would not just perpetuate
wrong principles and mistakes.
Despite the Federation's doubts, it agreed that the
system would offer the working man an opportunity to borrow
money to prevent foreclosures and would later promote home 
. 00building. But the fears of the Federation proved to be
well based for it soon became apparent that the Home Loan
Banks could not offer much relief to the distressed home
owner, and by March, 1933, only $9 million of rediscounts
23were outstanding.
00American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of 
Business, August 24, 1932.
OO #■ “’Studenski and Kross, op. cit., p. 373.
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Glass-Steagall Act
In the early thirties, the banking authorities were
faced with a problem when attempts were made to expand
the currency. Under the Federal Reserve Act, Federal
Reserve notes had to be backed by at least 40 per cent in
gold with the remainder secured by commercial paper. Due
to the decline in business activity which resulted in a
decrease in the supply of commercial paper, notes had to
be backed increasingly by gold. Thus, there was a serious
threat to the expansion of the currency. To meet this
danger, and also to make possible emergency loans from
Federal Reserve banks, the Glass-Steagall bill was proposed.
The American Federation of Labor assured its members
that Congress was trying every means to restore confidence
andi "return money to business" when they stated:
On February 15, another measure, the Glass 
Steagall bill, to open new reservoirs of credit, 
was passed by the House. It liberalizes Federal 
Reserve restrictions so that the Reserve banks 
may lend funds to their member banks on any 
sound security, such as good bonds or mortgages 
so that money may be more readily available.
The passage of this bill will free some $2,500,000 
more credit. These measures are carefully safe­
guarded against dangers of unsound inflation.?4
^American Federation of Labor, "Credit.and Business," 
Monthly Survey of Business. February 19, 1932.
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When the Glass-Steagall bill passed in February, 1932, the
provisions included an expiration date of March, 1933, which
25was extended from tune to txme thereafter. t
An article in the American Federationist helped to 
explain to the worker the basic provisions of this Act. 
Besides mentioning that member banks could borrow from any 
Federal Reserve Bank even if they did not have the security 
which had been previously required, the article also mention­
ed that gold reserves would be freed. The Glass-Steagall 
Act permitted the Reserve Banks to use, instead of commercial 
paper, United States bonds, for the sixty per cent reserve 
against the paper money in circulation. Thus, the worker 
was reassured that when foreign countries required large 
payments in gold from the United States, the Federal Reserve 
Banks would not be under a severe strain. Therefore, there 
was no immediate cause to fear normal gold withdrawals.26
With these various emergency measures being passed for 
banking relief, it was the opinion of a Federation writer 
that:
25Clark, op. cit., pp. 206-207.
26American Federation of Labor, "What the Banks Owe 
for Government Help," American Federationist. April, 1932, 
pp. 446-447.
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If the banks now fail to carry out the government's 
■* purpose by adopting a courageous credit policy and 
considering the needs of the community when loans 
are asked, they are repudiating their obligations 
to the country. Millions who are suffering from
will hold them respon-
Goldsborough Bill
Various members of the seventy-second Congress began
to introduce inflationary bills when they realized that the
Federal Reserve was not succeeding in bringing prosperity
to the country. In the spring of 1932, one group proposed
the Goldsborough Bill, which contended that the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve banks were charged
with the duty of taking all available steps of reflating
wholesale commodity prices "to the level existing before
the existing deflation," and stabilizing prices at that
level. Also, this bill would have broadened the Federal
Reserve's open-market operations and authorized the Board
28to raise or lower the official price of gold.
^ Ibid.. p. 448
28U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and 
Currency, Hearings; H.R. 10517. 72nd Cong. 1st Sess., 
1932.
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W. C. Hushing, the legislative representative of the
American Federation of Labor, participated in this hearing—
as he had on the Strong Bill (1928)— and said that his
organization was in favor of the provisions for stabilization
of the price level.2® In his testimony, Mr. Hushing stated:
You understand, of course, we are not financiers, 
and it would be foolish for us to come to the 
Committee on Banking and Currency and endeavor to 
tell you how this thing should be brought about, 
but we are in favor of the principles involved 
here, and we come here and indorse it, stand 
behind it heartily, and leave it to you gentle­
men to figure out the details as to how it shall 
be made effective.3®
The American Federation of Labor passed over such 
"old standbys" as free silver and greenbacks to support 
the Goldsborough Bill. This decision could have been based 
on Irving Fisher's support of this Bill3^ for the Feder­
ation had previously considered his plan on stabili- 
19zation.
Even though the farmers, organized labor, Congress and 
a good deal of public sentiment were for-the measure, it
2®Ibid., pp. 323-329.
30Ibid.. p. 325. It is doubtful that organized labor 
would have favored changes in the official price of gold.
31Ibid., p. 333.
32Supra.. Chapter IV, p. 95.
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did not pass. Some New York banks, most of the Federal 
Reserve authorities, and the Secretary of the Treasury 
were able to prevent its enactment.^3
Banking Collapse of 1933
When the collapse of the banking system came in the 
early months of 1933, it became clear that certain basic 
weaknesses of it had to be corrected by national legis­
lation. To the Federation, one fault of the system was 
the lact of unification. William Green had stressed the 
point in an editorial when he said:
Federal banking has steadily raised standards, but 
banks that did not wish to conform gave up Federal 
for state charters. Obviously, the first step 
toward raising the general banking practices is to 
establish the authority of the Federal government—  
then unified authority will close the escapes that 
have enabled banks to evade higher standards.34
Organized labor relied to a great extent on the
banking experts and concurred with their proposal that
all the banks should become members of the Federal Reserve
33Irving Fisher, Stable Money. (New York: Adelphi Co.,
1934), pp. 203-207.
34American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "A Unified 
Banking System," American Federationist. May, 1932, p. 563.
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System in order to achieve effective unification."^ It 
was apparent that the economic situation had brought about 
a moderation in the attitude of the American Federation of 
Labor toward the Federal Reserve and a better understanding 
of its purpose.
Of particular importance to the Federation was the 
safety of the deposits of its members. In addition to a 
Federal guarantee of bank deposits, they were concerned with 
the problem of banks' risking the depositors' money through 
investment companies. Many of these companies had bought 
speculative securities which had become worthless.^ 
Organized labor felt that a separation of security affil­
iates from the commercial banks was a necessity. At a 
banquet held by the Central Labor Union of Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania, the President of the Federation had stressed 
the growing demand for increasing government control over 
banking. He mentioned that the people wanted their funds 
to be placed in banks for safe keeping and convenient use
35Amerxcan Federatxon of Labor, "Back of the Bank 
Crisis," American Federationist. April, 1933, p. 357.
36Ibid., p. 358.
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and not to be used for speculation.3^
Also under consideration by the Federation was the 
idea of branch banking, and William Green stated in May, 
1932:
Before and during this depression the small unit 
state chartered bank had been a special banking 
risk. To meet the problems of the small banks, 
a system of branch banks is proposed. Branch 
banks are advocated by the Federal Reserve System 
to meet the needs of the rural communities 
adequately and at the same time give them the 
stability and services available in the business 
center.^
Federation publications in 1933 continued to stress 
the importance of branch banking and the basic contention 
that small banks would not fail if they were branches of 
strong city banks and had access to reserves in time of 
need. However, the Federation believed that the final 
outcome rested with Congress and its resourcefulness in 
passing legislation which would make the necessary reforms 
in the banking system.38
■ ^ A m e r i c a n  Federation of Labor, Weekly News Service. 
March 18, 1933.
38American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "A Unified 
Banking System," American Federationist. loc. cit.
^American Federation of Labor, "Banks - Crisis and 
Reform," Monthly Survey of Business, March, 1933, and 
American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Labor Wants Sound 
Finance," American Federationist. April, 1933, pp. 348-349.
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Banking Act of 1933
It was not until the Roosevelt administration that
legislation for basic reforms in the banking system were
enacted. William Green had pledged the complete cooperation
and support of the American Federation of Labor to President
Roosevelt and stated:
The responsibilities growing out of this terrible 
experience caused by the failure of the banks to 
function rest heavily upon the President of the 
United States. All classes of people are looking 
to him for leadership and constructive advice.^
With Roosevelt's approval, Senator Glass was able to
procure the enactment of the Banking Act in June, 1933.^
It was designed to strengthen the commercial banks,
weaken the connection between speculation and banking, and
give added powers to the Federal Reserve. Even though
organized labor did not participate in the hearings, they
were in general agreement with the basic provisions of
the Act.
40American Federation of Labor, "Labor Backs Roosevelt 
In Bank Collapse Emergency, Green Says," Weekly News Service. 
March 1, 1933.
41 Clark, op. cit., p. 276.
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The provision of the Banking Act which attracted the 
greatest attention from the American Federation of Labor 
was the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpor­
ation.^ This corporation could lend upon or acquire
assets of closed member banks and would insure deposits of
43all member banks and approved non-member banks.
Organized labor had worked long and hard for the 
enactment of this protective legislation. As early as 
1932, the idea had been implanted for Federation support 
when the Weekly News Service had brought to the members1 
attention a bill proposed by Henry Steagall for bank
42 . . •The provision for insuring bank deposits was not
supported by President Roosevelt. See: Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston:
Houghton Miffen, 1959), p. 433.
^The insurance which became effective January 1, 
1934, was limited to $2,500 in the case of any depositor, 
and each member of the fund was to contribute to it an 
amount equal to one half of one per cent of the total 
amount of deposits certified by the bank. Rudolph L. 
Weissman, The New Federal Reserve System. (New York: 
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1936), p. '68.
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deposit guarantees for members of the Federal Reserve 
44System.
At the November Convention of the American Federation 
of Labor, a delegate of the Ohio State Federation of Labor 
offered a resolution which requested the Executive Council 
to give its immediate attention to the subject of improving 
the banking laws of the United States so as to give to 
depositors in banks a greater security from losses. A 
similar resolution for deposit protection was introduced 
by delegate James O'Connell of the Metal Trades Department 
of the American Federation of Labor. Both resolutions 
were referred to the Executive Council for its careful 
attention and action. The Resolutions Committee reported 
that the prime purpose of banks was to provide a place for 
safe keeping of deposits. "Every protection to prevent
44 1American Federation of Labor, Weekly News Service, 
March 12, 1932. The bill by Representative Henry B.
Steagall was passed by the House but was killed in the 
Senate because of intense oppostion by Senator Carter Glass, 
a member of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. 
Senator Glass favored merely a liquidating corporation to 
advance to depositors in failed banks the estimated amount 
of their recovery. In 1933, Steagall and Glass agreed to 
combine the two proposals and incorporate them in the 
Banking Act of 1933. Friedman and Schwartz, op. cit., 
p. 434.
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depositors from loss should be provided," the Committee
asserted, "and the bank system and practices should be
remodeled to provide such protection.
The Federation President took a positive stand on this
issue in March, 1933 when he said:
The demand of Labor . . .is that the law-making 
bodies of our Nation and those in control of our 
Government take such steps as may be necessary to 
control the banking institutions of the Nation, 
to accord protection to the savings of the masses 
of the people and to prevent the dissipation of their 
deposits after they have placed them in the banks 
of the country in all good faith and confidence.
The guarantee of bank deposits was the object of a 
resolution at the October convention of the American Feder­
ation of Labor. John M. O'Hanion of the New York State 
Federation of Labor requested that the Executive Council 
draft and present to Congress appropriate legislation to 
provide for the security of depositors in banks or support 
any Federal legislation which had that object for its 
purpose. The Committee on Legislation endorsed the reso­
lution and called attention to the Report of the Executive
45American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1932, 
pp. 168, 377, 378.
4-fiAmerican Federation of Labor, Weekly News Service, 
March 11, 1933. See also, American Federation of Labor, 
Weekly News Service. March. 18, 1933.
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Council which referred to the law creating the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation.^
In January of 1934, the American Federation of Labor 
maintained that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
would do much to restore faith in the banking institutions 
and that they had supported the insurance law in all its 
legislative stages. Yet, it was still being vigorously 
opposed by the organized workers who were trying to weaken 
the law. The workingman was assured that the Federation's 
efforts would be mobilized to retain the measure as a
necessary law to protect depositors from both dishonest
. 4ftand inefficient bankers. °
Portions of a report by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg 
of Michigan on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
were reproduced by the Weekly News Service in June as 
evidence of the effectiveness of deposit insurance. The 
Senator had vigorously criticized the reactionaries who 
had assailed this corporation and had stated:
47American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1933, 
pp. 106, 156, 526, 527.
48American Federation of Labor, "Deposit Insurance 
Wins," Weekly News Service. January 6, 1934.
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In the entire history of the Republic there has 
been no other six-months period when only two banks 
closed. It is an amazing proof of the restoration 
of public confidence in our banks protected by the 
F.D.I.C. This Corporation is the main steel beam 
supporting the recovery structure. The public is 
convinced it has come to stay and must nqt be ripped 
out.^
The Executive Council reported in October that Congress 
had amended Section 12B of the Federal Reserve Act so as to 
extend for one year the temporary plan for deposit insur­
ance. It had also increased the maximum amount guaranteed 
by the Corporation from $2,500 to $5,000 per depositor.
The Executive Council felt that this law proved a contention 
always held by the American Federation of Labor that the 
guaranteeing of deposits would give people more confidence 
in financial institutions. It was also pleasing to them 
to add that the efforts to repeal the law were not effective 
because public•sentiment had been too.strong. The Resolu­
tions Committee gave full approval to this section of the 
Executive Council1s report.
^American Federation of Labor, "Deposit Insurance 
Helps Banks, Vandenberg Says," Weekly News Service, June 16, 
1934.
^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1934,
pp. 82, 550.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation by mid-1936 
had paid off 93 per cent of the insured deposits of the 
fifty-eight member banks that had failed since 1933, and 
an American Federation of Labor editor felt it instructive 
to bring these facts to the attention of his fellow members. 
Under the old system, the small depositors in many instances 
would have received but a very small portion of their 
savings, and then only after a long delay accompanying 
receiverships. The editor reiterated that under the insur­
ance system, the Federal Government guaranteed that the 
depositor would get his deposit back promptly. Despite the 
constructive social results of safeguarding the savings 
of small depositors, it was regrettable to organized labor 
that the bankers in the United States were still objecting
and using their influence against the-insured deposit 
51system. The bankers' continued objections were of little 
significance, for the system became a permanent one in 
roughly its present form under the provisions of Title One 
of the Banking Act of 1935.
^American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "And 
Bankers Oppose It," Weekly News Service. August 1, 1936.
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Banking Act of 1935
The Banking Act of 1933 was an improvement in banking,
but it fell short of reform measures suggested by many of
the financial experts. For example, the Act had failed to
require all banks to become members of the Federal Reserve
and did nothing positive to encourage branch banking.
These were reform measures which had been supported to a
52large extent by organized labor.
The real effort to extend centralized control over
banking came in early 1935 with the introduction of the 
53Eccles Bill. The main objective of this bill was to
facilitate monetary management. The inflationists objected 
to the bill because price stabilization was not the primary 
goal and they, along with organized labor, supported the 
unsuccessful Goldsborough amendment.^4
^ Supra. Chapter IV, p. 100.
53Studenski and Kroos, op. cit., pp. 396-397. The 
American Federation of Labor had favored a program in 1933 
advocated by Marriner S. Eccles, then a banker of Ogden, 
Utah, befoie the Senate Finance Committee. In organized 
labor's interpretation, Mr. Eccles had urged a policy 
calling for "a more equitable distribution of wealth pro­
duction through a unification of banking system under the 
supervision of the Federal Reserve Bank." American Feder­
ation of Labor, Weekly News Service. March 4, 1933.
54Supra. Chapter IV, p. 95.
108
With the help of Senator Glass, the Eccles Bill was 
modified substantially before it was passed as the Banking 
Act of 1935.^ No official position by organized labor 
toward the Act is revealed in their publications or 
proceedings. From their previous attitudes, one would have 
to agree that they were in accord with the greater 
centralized control over banking which was provided by the 
Act. However, as far as each and every provision was 
concerned, no valid assessment can be made as to organized 
labor's position.
Labor's Proposals For Reform 
Beginning in the early part of the depression, union 
members felt it imperative that they respond to the need 
for financial reform and offered their own proposals at 
the American Federation of Labor Conventions. It was the 
expressed hope of each delegate who enthusiastically 
offered a proposal that his would be the one which would 
be accepted and submitted to a Congressman foir legislative 
action.
55See: U.S., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 1935, LXXIX, part 14, p. 856.
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The Federation realized that education and proper 
information imparted to the workingman were the keys to a 
better understanding of the banking institutions and the 
Federal Reserve System. William Green expressed such hopes 
in an editorial in April, 1932:
Wage earners need to understand our financial 
institutions in order to formulate effective 
policies. The cooperation of a number of 
authorities in the financial field has been 
solicited for the preparation of a series of 
articles for the use of our trade-union readers.
We met uniformly helpful cooperation except from 
the bankers invited to contribute to better 
understanding of this f i e l d . ^6
The Federation affiliates throughout the country, in 
response to the financial situation and no doubt influenced 
by the various articles in Federation publications, brought 
several money and banking propositions before the 1932 
convention. Four resolutions in different forms and with
^ A m e r i c a n  Federation of Labor, Editorial, American 
Federationist. April, 1932, p. 381. The American Federation­
ist that year included writings of economists, statisticians, 
and the Secretary of the Treasury: "Weakness in American Bank 
Regulation," Charles S. Tippetts (Professor of Economics, 
University of Buffalo), April, 1932, pp. 412-418y "Lack of 
Uniformity A Weakness," E. E. Agzer (Rutgers University), 
April, 1932, pp. 419-424; "The Relation of the Treasury 
Operations to Credit and Financial Conditions," J. Ogden 
Mills (Secretary of the Treasury), April, 1932, pp. 386-390; 
"Branch Banks for America," Shirley Donald Southworth (Pro­
fessor of Economics, College of William and Mary), May, 1932, 
pp. 514-525; "The Federal Reserve System," E. A. Golden- 
weiser (Director, Div. of Research and Statistics, Board of 
Governors, Federal Reserve System, July, 1932, pp. 744-751.
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varying ideas for solutions to the problem were considered. 
The first was presented by the Amalgamated Association of 
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers who urged the assembly to go 
on record as favoring the government ownership of all 
banking institutions.^ The second was offered by the 
American Federation of Teachers, who in a more lengthly 
resolution, urged not only the enlargement of the postal 
savings system, but also recommended that the Federation 
inaugurate a nationwide campaign to expose the bankers1 
undermining American education and constructive local 
government activity. It also felt it was only through 
government control of banking and credit that private
C Qprofiteering could be terminated. The Ohio State Feder­
ation of Labor through delegate Thomas J. Donnelly voiced 
its desire that the Executive Council give immediate 
attention to legislation for regulation of savings banks 
and building and loan associations.^9 The fourth resolution 
was offered by the Metal Trades Department, (James O'Connell, 
spokesman). It believed the Executive Council should be





instructed to give its careful consideration to any Federal
and State legislation affecting and regulating banking.®®
The four resolutions were referred to the Resolutions
Committee who in turn suggested that the Convention submit
them to the Executive Council with instructions to give
careful attention to banks and banking and take whatever
action necessary to correct the abuses of the financial
61system. This report was unanimously adopted.
Education before action was the intention of Jqhn P. 
Frey, Secretary-Treasurer of the Federation's Metal Trades 
Department, when he published a lengthy article entitled 
"Bankers' Domination."®^ He explained that one reason 
collective bargaining had not made greater progress in 
industry was the opposition of the bankers to an industrial 
condition which would enable organized labor to have a
®®Ibid., p. 377. See also, American Federation of Labor, 
Weekly News Service. December 10, 1932.
61American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1932,
p. 378.
62American Federation of Labor, John P. Frey, "Bankers' 
Domination," American Federationist. February, 1933, pp. 134- 
144. See also, American Federation of Labor, Weekly News 
Sefrvice, February 4, 1933.
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voice in the industrial program. But the dominant position
which the bankers occupied over the control of credit
placed them in a position whereby they could prevail upon
the captains of industry to meet with the representatives
of labor around the conference table instead of in the
legislative chambers. This situation was an ideal, not a
reality, and Frey charged:
Upon the bankers, more than any other group, rests 
the responsibility for many of the intolerable 
industrial and economic conditions which are shaking 
our national structure to the very center. Some of 
these industrial conditions as they affect wage- 
earners, are so unjustified and so intolerable that 
they create social and political situations much 
more dangerous to our American civilization than 
all of the propaganda carried on by communists and 
others whose aim is to overthrow American insti­
tutions and supplant human liberty and freedom of 
action by dictatorship, and all that this involves.^
Frey concluded that a remedy could only come about
after a thorough understanding by the workers of the
dominant position held by bankers. This would be brought
about by the presentation of facts which in turn would
invoke further study, and only then could corrective action
,7
be taken.




Some bankers in late 1933 realized that if banking 
did not reform itself, then the Government would nationalize 
the banks. Henry Bruere, president of a New York savings 
bank, was apprehensive about the nonchalant manner in which 
most bankers were facing the financial situation and 
commented: !
I believe it is true that we must now, as practical 
men, recognize that we are going in the next months, 
in the next few years, to be compelled to test what 
we do in banking, what we do in business by its 
effect on the total economic situation, upon the 
common good.65
Such testimony gave the American Federation of. Labor
assurance that some bankers were learning that if their
financial institutions were not put in order to serve the
nation honestly and well, a nationalized banking system
would evolve.66
Even when the Annalist.a journal of finance, commerce 
and economics, admitted that "banks were permitted and even 
encouraged to publish bank statements which did not reflect
65American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Some Bankers 
Are Learning," Weekly News Service. September 23, 1933.
Henry Bruere had previously written an article for the 
American Federation of Labor, "The Mutual Savings Banks," 
American Federationist. April, 1932, pp. 396-400.
66Ibid.
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true conditions," a Federation editor was not so much
lamented by this as anxious that the bankers take immediate
67action to correct past mistakes and begin anew.
In October of that year, the American Federation of 
Teachers again urged the nationalization of the banks and a 
withdrawal of the controls on postal savings banks, so that 
these banks could perform the duties of a commercial bank.
The Resolutions Committee, after studying the teachers' 
proposal, was in accord with the thought of further liberaliz­
ing the postal savings banks, but as for the proposal to 
nationalize the banks, they were of the opinion that grave 
constitutional and fiscal questions were involved. No 
commitment could be made until after a most careful study 
of the complexities involved, and this would have to be 
undertaken by the Executive Council.
Three similar resolutions were proposed at the 1934 
convention to provide for nationalization of banks, a 
greater measure of security for the depositor, as well as 
lower rates of interest. Although the Resolutions Committee
^American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Untrue Bank 
Statements," Weekly News Service. October 28, 1933.
American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1933,
pp. 171-172, 431-432.
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felt the purpose commendable, they believed that the 
guarantee of deposits and the Home Owners Loan Corporation 
would achieve such ends. The Committee regarded the question
i
of Government ownership of less importance than a more 
rigid control of the banking system, and therefore recom­
mended that the resolutions nob be acted upon by the 
69convention. At the following convention, the Amalgamated
Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers was the only
group who requested convention approval of government
ownership of banks. However, the American Federation of
70Labor nonconcurred with this resolution.
In summary, the American Federation of Labor, like the 
general public during the early Thirties, developed a 
greater understanding and awareness of the need for a 
strong, sound banking system. The Federation turned to 
financial experts for articles to appear in its publications
®^The three resolutions for nationalization of the banks 
were proposed by the Amalgamated Association o.f Iron, Steel 
and Tin Workers, the American Federation of Teachers, and 
the Washington State Federation of Labor. American Feder­
ation of Labor, Proceedings. 1934, pp. 181, 207, 208, 273, 
254-255.
70American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1935, 
ppf 175, 509. See also, American Federation of Labor,
Weekly News Service. November 16, 1935.
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and felt that such proper information would enlighten the 
workers. Generally, organized labor leaders rejected the 
socialistic approach to banking and reaffirmed Gompers1 
basic philosophy of working within the capitalistic frame­
work. They were in general agreement with those measures 
which sought to strengthen, centralize, and regulate the 
banks and bring all such institutions under the control of 
the Federal Reserve System.
Monetary Reform 
In 1931-32, organized labor began to show growing
concern over the gold crisis and decline in international
71prices. The American Federation of Labor Monthly Survey
of Business reported in mid-1932:
The gold standard is supposed to maintain a balance 
in national currency and international trade. It 
gives the world an international money system, 
founded on stable values. Each country defines by 
law the weight of gold which constitutes its 
financial unit . . . But, when unduly large amounts 
of gold are accumulated in some countries and 
others have not an adequate supply to clear trade 
balances and meet obligations, the system breaks 
down.^2
71American Federation of Labor, "World Financial Situ­
ation is Acute," Monthly Survey of Business. October 19, 
1931.
72American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business. June 23, 1932.
117
This imbalance had caused the abandonment of the gold 
standard by Great Britain in Septfember, 1931, and some 
twenty-five countries had followed her lead within a year.
To organized labor, the gold crisis had two serious
*effects. First, those countries which had abandoned the 
gold standard experienced a depreciation in their currencies 
on the world market which resulted in falling prices of 
goods and services. Since the United States sold on the 
world market, the Federation believed United States ptices 
would follow world price trends, and her economy would be 
driven into further depression.
Secondly, those nations still on the gold exchange 
standard which held their reserves in investments in thie 
United States had withdrawn them when the panic followed 
Britain's gold suspension. The American Federation of 
Labor Research Department maintained that the consequent 
disorganization of world currencies and prices was one of 
the most serious depression problems the United States had 
to meet. It was throwing men out of work and costing the 
country millions of dollars in weekly income losses. How 
could the United States adjust payments so that its best 
interest would be served? This question was the one that 
the Research Department felt must be answered and the
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answer could come through cooperation at the conference
73table between nations.
While plans were being made in the spring of 1933 for 
an International Monetary Conference to be held that summer 
in London, Congress was being pressured to inflate the 
currency. In the opinion of a writer for the Federation, 
deflation had gone far enough and rising prices would 
unquestionably stimulate business and move the economy 
out of the depression. Yet, he felt that issuing more 
money in proportion to the United States gold stock was 
objectionable. The major obstacle was public psychology 
for people feared any monetary change and distrusted money 
not firmly tied to gold. If enough money was issued without 
gold backing, inflation would soon get out of control and 
new money would become worthless. The wirter pointed out 
that even if the currency was carefully managed, there was 
no proof either that currency inflation could be i-n
control once started or that it would raise prices in the 
first place. In reality there were more dollars outstanding 
in 1933 then in 1929, but they were being hoarded. What
73American Federation of Labor, "European Problems 
Assume Prominence," Monthly Survey of Business. November, 
1932, and American Federation of Labor, "International 
Currency Problems Are Urgent," Monthly Survey of Business. 
December, 1932.
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was needed, he concluded, was not more dollars but more
buying power in the hands of those who needed food, clothing
and shelter. This could be achieved by putting the unemployed
to work producing and exchanging goods.^
But the first step in the President's currency reform
program was the separation of the dollar from gold. On
April 20, 1933, by Executive order, the United States was
taken off the gold standard which prohibited the export of
gold coin, bullion, or certificates except under license
75issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.
With this suspension, the American Federation of
Labor brought before the workers several measures which had 
been suggested by financial experts. First, the United 
States could, reduce the gold value of the dollar and raise 
prices. This would put the United States currency on a par 
with that of other nations and stop the price decline. Yet,
^American Federation of Labor, "Why the Crisis,"
American Federationist. March, 1933, pp. 279-290.
75This action freed the Roosevelt administration's 
hands for the purpose of (1) raising domestic prices;
(2) facilitating domestic credit expansion; (3) dealing 
with foreign countries at the forthcoming London Economic 
Conference; (4) preventing any congressional action that 
might take the initiative as to reflation out of the 
President's hands. Fisher, op. pit., p. 347.
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this would not provide for a stable price level in the 
future, which the American Federation of Labor advocated.
The second proposal was to link the United States 
currency to a combination of gold and silver, "symmetalism. 
This would do away with the scarcity of the metal base gold 
but again would not stabilize prices in the future as the 
Federation desired.
To fix a gold value for our currency and then to let 
the dollar be managed to prevent too great a rise or decline 
was the third measure proposed. The American Federation of 
Labor felt that this measure did have 'the advantage of 
keeping prices adjusted in international markets as well 
as at home. It noted at the end of April, 1933, that no 
attempt was being made to "manage" the currency.
The final proposal was to reduce the gold value of the 
dollar and adjust to the price level which would be 
stabilized permanently. The American Federation of Labor 
favored price stability but remained skeptical of devalu- 
ation of the dollar. But regardless of which measure was
^"Symmetalism" is the term applied to a currency pay~ 
able in a combination of gold plus silver; "bimetalism" is 
a currency payable in either gold or silver. The Federation 
felt that bimetalism could not be safely administered except 
under an international agreement covering all important 
nations.
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chosen, the Federation felt that cooperation on the part of
77the Federal Reserve was a necessity.
World Economic Conference
On June 12, 1933, the World Economic Conference was 
opened in London with discussion centering on the estab­
lishment of a satisfactory international monetary system.
The American Federation of Labor pointed out to its members 
that America's wage earners should be concerned with the 
matter. It was explained that the United States currency 
was related to that of every other nation. If there were 
no orderly established relationship, business was crippled 
and the workers lost their jobs and incomes. It was 
realized by the Federation that no international conference 
could hope to achieve an international gold standard as 
had been the case in the past. Therefore, several measures 
of interest to organized labor were being considered.. Sir 
Basil Blackett, director of the Bank of England, had 
proposed a system of planned money. Each nation would
77American Federation of Labor, "Is A Dollar Always A 
Dollar," American Federationist, May, 1933, pp. 498-500.
See also, American Federation of Labor, "Depression a World 
Problem," Monthly Survey of Business. April, 1933.
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keep the purchasing power of its currency stable according 
to its home prices and maintain a constant price level.
The nations of the world would agree to cooperate in doing 
this, each in its own domain. Since home prices of the 
great commercial nations were determined by world prices, 
this would automatically keep an approximate stability 
between the different national currencies. If changes in 
living costs could be eliminated, then this proposal would 
be of immense benefit to wage earners.
Another plan, by John Maynard Keynes, to overcome the 
shortage of gold reserves was noted by the American Feder­
ation of Labor. Keynes' proposal was that instead of 
transferring gold between nations, an international 
authority should issue gold notes. These gold notes could 
be used for international payments and would be obtained in
7 0exchange for the gold bonds of any government.
The Federation President, William Green summarized for 
the workers in an editorial the basic objectives of the 
London Economic Conference and stressed the overall
^American Federation of Labor, "World Economic 
Conference," Monthly Survey of Business, May, 1933.
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79importance of the outcome to organized labor. However, 
the Conference was unsuccessful because a broad agreement 
among the nations on economic policy could not be reached. 
The United States was experimenting with economic nation­
alism and its delegates were unprepared to discuss currency 
stabilization. In the six weeks of existence, the only 
accomplishment of the conference was an agreement among
the principle silver-producing nations not to dump the
80metal on the market.
Gold Reserve Act of 1934
i
The Roosevelt administration decided to raise the 
general price level in the latter part of 1933 by devaluing
the gold dollar. The theoretical basis for the Gold
1
Purchase Program was the quantity theory of money. If the 
price of gold was increased, the gold supply and the amount 
of money in circulation would be expanded. It would be 
more profitable to mine gold and more currency could be
7Q' '^American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "London 
Economic Conference,1 American Federationist. June, 1933, 
pp. 575-578.
80See, James P. Warburg, The Money Muddle (New York: 
Alfred A. Knoph, 1934), 272 pp.
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issued against a given quantity of gold.®-*-
The American Federation of Labor Convention in October,
1933, had considered the question of currency inflation.
The Resolutions Committee expressed the conviction that
currency inflation could least of all benefit the wage
earners, but would reflect upon them the greatest possible
harm. It was declared:
. . .we must, under no circumstances, permit our 
government to saddld this additional and unbear­
able burden upon our wage earners and salaried 
employees under any fiscal policy or any arrange­
ment or procedure that will lessen the exchange 
value of the monetary standard used to fix wages.
The Executive Council was directed to resort to every
possible and practicable means at its command to prevent
81Studenski and Kross, op. cit., p. 389.
82American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1933, 
p. 433. Matthew Woll, a member of the Executive Council of 
the American Federation of Labor, stated: " . . .  labor
is at a loss to understand the difference between inflation 
and reflation. To labor, the.immediate, if not as well 
the ultimate, effects are the same and the appeal that 
reflation is not inflation because it is a process of 
enhancing immediate values by monetary legerdemain up to 
a given point and not beyond is merely an apology, with 
more confusion, and without adequate explanation," Matthew 
Woll, Labor. Industry and Government (New York: D. 
Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1935), p. 237. ^
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currency inflation.
Despite the objections of organized labor, starting
on October 25 at a price of $31.35 an ounce (slightly higher
than the London free-gold market), the price of gold was
gradually raised to $35.00 an ounce by December.®^ At
that time, the Monthly Survey of Business reported:
Tampering with the currency is a very serious matter, 
for the buying power of a dollar is of the greatest 
concern to every American citizen. Since we left 
the gold standard in April, declines in the dollar's 
value and demands for inflation have caused alarm 
in the business world and acted as a brake on 
recovery. Banks, business concerns, men and women 
with savings— all have hesitated to place their 
money in investments because as long as the dollar 
declines, dollars they lend now are worth more than 
the dollars they will get back in the future.
Credit for business undertakings has been hard to . 
get; investments fled to government bonds forsecurity.
QO° American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1933, 
loc. cit. The Federation was also afraid that the Roosevelt 
administration might issue paper money without gold backing. 
The effect of fiat money inflation would be to take from the 
workers any income gains they had acquired and put increased 
wealth and power in the hands of rich property owners. 
American Federation of Labor, "Inflation," Monthly Survey of 
Business. June, 1934. See also, U.S., Congressional Record. 
73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1934, pp. 426-427 where Senator 
Vandenbterg entered, for the record, an article expressing 
the attitude of the American Federation of Labor in respect 
to inflation and fiat money.
QA ,° Studenski and Kroos, loc. cit.
85American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business. December, 1933.
By January, 1934, it was apparent that the devaluation 
of gold had not increased the general price level. There­
fore, that same month, Congress stabilized the dollar by 
passing the Gold Reserve Act.
The Act placed the United States on a gold-bullion 
standard internationally and on an irredeemable paper 
standard domestically. The Federal Reserve banks were 
required to deliver their gold to the Treasury in exchange 
for gold certificates. All monetary gold was to be con­
verted into gold bullion, and .minting of gold coins was 
prohibited except for accounts of foreign countries. To 
supplement the measure, President Roosevelt fixed the 
price of gold at $35.00 per ounce.86
While there was no definite statement by the American 
Federation of Labor as to its attitude toward the Gold 
Reserve Act, Matthew Woll, a member of the Federation 
Executive Council, gives insight into organized labor's 
opinion: ’
While American Labor is opposed to currency inflation, 
it must be understood that we are equally opposed 
to a return of the old system of control of our 
deposit currency for purposes either of inflation
86 .Fisher, op. cit.. pp. 369-372.
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or deflation by our banks and bankers, national 
or international . . . Our course must be to stabilize 
our currency as soon as possible, and without restrict- 
ing the control over the volume of currency already 
exercised by our government through the Federal Reserve 
Board and the buying and selling of government secur­
ities. The nation should guarantee, and our people 
must be guaranteed, against the issuance of any 
unsecured paper money and be assured the continuance 
of the present of currency controlled by a Federal 
Reserve Board upon which private business is fully 
represented but which is ultimately under control of 
the government.87
Tripartite Accord
From the time of the passage of the Gold Reserve Act 
until the latter part of 1936, organized labor's interest 
in monetary legislation declined. Shortly after France 
abandoned the gold standard and devalued the franc in 
September, 1936, the Tripartite Accord was negotiated 
between Great Britain, France, and the United States. Each 
country undertook to keep its currency as stable as 
possible in terms of the other two currencies. This was 
to be accomplished through a stabilization fund in each 
country, and exchange of currency for gold between them 
would be made only through the stabilization funds.
87Woll, op. cit.. pp. 248-249.
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The American Federation of Labor was gratified that the 
exchange of currencies had been placed under government 
control because it would be impossible for speculators to 
manipulate exchange rates by moving large funds from one 
country to another. Also, the Tripartite Agreement would 
mean greater growth in international trade which in turn
88would provide more work for wage earners in all countries.
The agreement lasted until 1939 at which time the United 
States almost had a corner on the world's gold supply. The 
agreement did represent a step in the direction of inter­
national monetary cooperation which organized labor favored.
Summary
The Great Depression had a lasting impact on the 
attitude of organized labor toward monetary legislation.
Not since the days of William Jennings Bryan and free silver 
had the American Federation of Labor given such attention 
to the question of monetary reform.
For the first time, organized labor demonstrated an 
interest in international monetary matters and supported
88American Federation of Labor, "Workers Benefit by 
Three Power Gold Agreement," Monthly Survey of Business, 
October, 1936.
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the World Economic Conference and the Tripartite Accord.
It was apprehensive about leaving the gold standard and 
the devaluing of the dollar and supported those legis­
lative measures which urged price stabilization. This 
was a notable change in organized labor1s attitude from 
its support of the free coinage of silver in the 1890's.
It realized more than ever before the need for a 
sound monetary system. Even though organized labor lacked 
a sophisticated analysis of the monetary situation and 
understood little of money expansion and the level of 
unemployment, it was gradually maturing in its thinking 
and its approach to the basic issues. The money and 
banking crisis during the Great Depression brought to 
organized labor an aWareness of the need for an even greater 
participation in the area of money and banking legislation.
CHAPTER V
ORGANIZED LABOR'S VIEWS TOWARD 
MONETARY POLICY, 1914-1965
Since the establishment of the Federal Reserve System 
in 1913, the actions undertaken by its Board to regulate 
the supply of money and credit have been termed monetary 
policy. The fundamental importance of the effects which 
control over money and credit would have on industry, the 
worker, and the union was recognized by organized labor as 
early as the Civil War. But before any appraisal by organ­
ized labor could be made with a critical eye and a mature 
outlook, it first had to develop a basic understanding of the 
Federal Reserve's actions. It is the purpose of this chapter 
to give a historical account of the development of organ­
ized labor's attitude toward monetary policy.^
•̂ The data on monetary policy presented in this chapter 
were gathered from the following publications and for fur­
ther details, see: Harold L. Reed, Federal Reserve Policy.
1921-1930 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1930?
S. E. Harris, Twenty Years of Federal Reserve Policy 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), I and II? E. A. 
Goldenweiser, American Monetary Policy (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951)? David P. Eastburn, The 
Federal Reserve on Record (Philadelphia: Federal Reserve




During the early formative years of the Federal Reserve 
System, from 1914 until the United States entered World War 
I, easy money conditions prevailed. These conditions were 
a product of a great release of reserves to the banks under 
the Federal Reserve Act and of European gold imports. 
Organized labor had little reason to voice any criticism of 
these Federal Reserve actions, but their publications give 
no insight into the matter.
When the United States entered World War I, the objec­
tives of the Federal Reserve System were enlarged to include 
aid in financing the government. When the War ended, the 
Reserve, banks continued to subordinate themselves to the 
Treasury and maintained low discount rates (four per cent in 
New York) in order not to interfere with the sale of Victory 
notes. Since an inflation was developing, the Federal 
Reserve authorities were anxious to tighten credit condi­
tions, but it was not until late in 1919 that discount 
rates were raised.
At a trade union conference held in Washington, D.C. 
in December, 1919, organized labor urged that the control 
over credit be taken from the financiers and placed under 
the authority of a public agency, which would use this power
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2in the public's interest. This type of affirmation- on the 
part of organized labor was indicative of its lack of 
thorough knowledge of the responsibilities and actions of 
the Federal Reserve authorities.
During the period of business contraction in 1920-21, 
the American Federation of Labor held the bankers more 
responsible than the Federal Reserve authorities for the
3tight monetary conditions.
However, after the recession, an investigation of the
Federal Reserve System's action was undertaken. The
American Federation of Labor, Weekly Newsletter reported
in March, 1923:
On motion of Senator Gooding, the Senate has asked 
the President to investigate the charge that a 
secret meeting of the Secretary of the Treasury and 
55 federal reserve bank officials in this city 
fWashington], on May 18, 1920, it was agreed to 
curtail credit, increase interest . . . These 
decisions brought on the deflation movement that 
stopped business, closed factories, wrecked farmers 
and turned 5,000,000 workers on the streets.4
2Supra. Chapter III, p. 58.
3Supra. Chapter III, p. 59.
4American Federation of Labor, "Bankers, In Secret
Meeting, Stopped Industry's Wheels," Weekly Newsletter.
March 10, 1923.
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This investigation was again the topic of an article 
which appeared in the Weekly Newsletter in August, and the 
Federation reaffirmed its opposition to the private control 
of credit.^ Despite the general feeling by the public 
and organized labor against the Federal Reserve authorities' 
actions, it was the conclusion of the Congressional invest­
igating committee that the Federal Reserve System was not
gresponsible for the deflation.
Since the American Federation of Labor was not an 
authority on Federal Reserve policy, it relied on indi­
viduals in the financial field for appraisal. In December, 
1924, M. J. Mutphy, vice president of the Federation Bank 
of New York and former member of the Federal Reserve. Board, 
declared:
The time has arrived when the nation's gold reserve 
and currency issuing power should be administered 
in the interest of the nation, and to unify and 
stabilize our banking system. If we applied 
scientific credit control in the early parts of 1919, 
we might have saved much of the disasters culmin­
ated in 1920 and 1 9 2 1 .̂
5American Federation of Labor, "Federal Bank System 
Prepares for Attack," Weekly Newsletter, August 4, 1923.
6Goldenweiser, op. cit.. p. 136.
7American Federation of Labor, "Union Bank Officers
Predict High Prices," Weekly Newsletter. December 6, 1924.
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The Federal Reserve authorities maintained an easy 
money policy in the years 1925 and 1926. There were signs 
of growing speculative activity in the stock market, rising 
prices of stock, and increased use of credit to finance 
stock market activity. This speculation in the stock 
market again received critical attention from the Feder­
ation in 1926 when it was reported:
When the federal reserve bank system was installed 
several years ago, the public assumed that this 
marked the end of higher interest on money and 
stock manipulation. Now it is acknowledged that 
speculators have no trouble securing funds and the 
biggest stock market ever known has been going on 
for a year. Under the law member banks cannot 
pass up to the reserve banks loans secured by stocks 
and bonds, but they can turn in paper having its 
origin in commercial transactions and lend the 
proceedings in the stock markets.8
Because stock market speculation had reached pre­
carious new heights in 1929, the Federal Reserve Board 
tried a policy of "moral suasion" to meet the situation.
On February 7, 1929, a public statement was issued by the 
Board that member banks should not use discount facilities 
at its Federal Reserve Bank for the purpose of making 
speculative loans. Chart I shows the changes taking place
8American Federation of Labor, "Federal Bank System
Has Many Loopholes," Vfeekly Newsletter, January 2, 1926.
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in stock prices and discount rates from 1924 through 1929.
The American Federation of Ijabor informed the workers
that the Federal Reserve Board had warned against the
speculative wave that was sweeping the nation. Yet, if
interest rates were tightened to check further speculation,
the Federation felt that legitimate business activities would
be hampered and concluded: "This situation illustrates how
the welfare of the workers is inseparably linked with every
gsocial activity."
In May, 1929, William Green, Federation president, 
proclaimed:
During the past six years, there has been unpre­
cedented sustained business progress, and commer­
cial credit is essential to its continuance. The 
Federal Reserve Board raised the rate of discount, 
which effectually checked stock speculation for the 
time. This Board is charged with responsibility of 
seeing to it the reserve banks manage credit so as 
to accommodate business and commerce.
The policy of "moral suasion" was abandoned in the
summer of 1929 because the increase in broker's loans was
not from the account of banks and was thus beyond direct
gAmerican Federation of Labor, "Money Rates Affect 
Labor," Weekly News Service. April 6, 1929.
•^American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Excessive 
Stock Speculation a Menace," American Federationist, May, 
1929, pp. 534-535.
Chart 1. Stock Prices and Discount Rate, 1924-1929
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve
Charts on Bank Credit. Money Rates and Business (Washington, D. C., 
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control by the Federal Reserve System. The Board tried a 
new technique which it hoped would exert pressure on the 
speculative situation and would not harm business. In 
August, the discount rate of the New York Bank was raised 
from 5 to 6 per cent. At the same time, the Bank's buying 
rate for bankers' acceptances was reduced from 5-1/4 to 
5-1/8 per cent.
Basically, the American Federation of Labor approved 
the new technique of the Board. It was explained in the 
Monthly Survey of Business that one factor which led to 
business uncertainty was the high interest rates on money 
for short-term loans. Businessmen would need money for fall 
production and the Federal Reserve Board was relieving the 
situation somewhat by reducing the rates on loans for 
business purposes.^
Yet, there were some labor leaders who did not under­
stand the new technique of the Federal Reserve Board. One
12such leader was William J. McForley who, in the early part
■^American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of 
Business. September 1, 1929.
12x Mr. McForley was president of the International Union 
of Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers, and past president of the 
Building Trades Department of the American Federation of 
Labor.
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of October, 1929, attacked the tight money policy of the 
Board:
If the Federal Reserve Board would only forget Wall 
Street and see to it that legitimate business gets 
what it is entitled to— money at reasonable rates—  
we would all be better off, for if history means 
anything, excesses in Wall Street will bring their 
own penalties and correctives.^
With the collapse of the stock market in the last week 
of October, the Federal Reserve Board reversed its policy. 
Discount rates were reduced and purchases were made in the 
open market to provide reserves for New York banks.
The Federation tried to alleviate the fears of its 
members by asserting that since business was on a sound 
basis, the stock market crash would not have a serious 
depressing effect upon it. The wage earners' buying power 
was higher than usual and goods had been moving from 
producer to consumer’ at a satisfactory rate.-^
However, by December, the Federation had some doubts 
about business activity because stocks had continued to 
decline. It pointed out that the lowest point had been
•^American Federation of Labor, "Blames High Money for 
Building Slump," Weekly News Service, October 12, 1929.
-^American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business. November 1, 1929.
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reached on November 13 when stock prices averaged 48 per 
cent below the peak of September 3, 1929. Losses in the 
stock market had affected every group in society, even the 
wage earners, and had caused cancellation of orders for 
automobiles, radios, and other consumer items. The Feder­
ation feared that production would be curtailed which would 
cause additional layoffs and unemployment. Yet, the 
Federation did see one beneficial effect of the liquidation 
of stocks— -the decline of money rates— which would be a 
most important factor in favor of business improvement.^
The price level and business activity started on a 
downward course in the fall of 1929 and continued into 1930. 
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve Board maintained its policy 
of easy money by gradually reducing the discount rate at 
all Reserve banks and by purchasing securities on the open 
market.
The Federation's support of the policy of the Board
was expressed in the Monthly Survey of Business:
On February 6, the Federal Reserve Banks of New York 
and four other cities reduced rediscount rates and a
•^American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business, December 1, 1929.
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movement for easier money also took place abroad.
Rates for commercial and business loans came down 
immediately, following the lead of the Reserve 
Banks. This will stimulate business improvement, 
help the price situation, and hasten progress in 
building. °
In July, 1930, the Federation noted that the lowest 
discount rate in history had been reached when the Reserve 
Bank of New York reduced its discount rate to 2-1/2 per 
cent. The Federation added: "This move to make money
easier than ever is a most constructive force, though it
17will be several months before its influence is fully felt."
However, the easy money policy was not succeeding in
expanding the use of credit. In January, 1932, a lengthy
article in a Federation publication painted a rather grim
picture of the financial problems facing the American workers
Bond prices are now below the long term value of 
many securities; if banks are forced to sell before 
prices recover, there will be many unnecessary 
losses and failures. Businessmen cannot get the 
credit they need because of the frozen condition of 
bank funds. Railroads need credit to meet their 
obligations; insurance companies also are suffer­
ing from the drop in bond prices; farmers need
16American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of 
Business. March 1, 1930. See also, American Federation of 
Labor, Monthly Survey of Business. June 1, 1930.
17American Federation of Labor, Monthly Survey of
Business. July 1, 1930.
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credit for spring plantings. Business is check­
mated by the credit deadlock.
In mid-1932, the Federation emphasized the fact that 
the depression would be ended when people had jobs and 
their demand for goods put new life into industry. Organ­
ized labor offered two main methods of increasing employ­
ment. First, it was recommended that federal credit be used 
for construction of public works, and secondly that "credit 
be issued to private business" in order that production could 
be started.
The Federation felt that the Federal Government had to 
find some way "to get credit reserves passed on through 
commercial banks to business" or "to loan it direct.
Organized labor's concern stemmed from the fact that bank 
loans had decreased sharply during the first six months 
of 1932 as is shown in Chart 2.
By July, 1932, the Federation was of the opinion that 
tension over the financial situation was easing. The drain
18American Federation of Labor, "Frozen Credit,"
Monthly Survey of Business. January 20, 1932.
I Q^American Federation of Labor, "Jobs— The Key to 
Recovery" and "Give Business Credit," Monthly Survey of 
Business. May 16, 1932.
20Ibid. See also, American Federation of Labor, Editor­
ial, "Federal Credit," American Federationist. June, 1932.
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Source: Federal Reserve Board, as cited in American
Federation of Labor, "Banks Withhold Credit," 
Monthly Survey of Business, August 24, 1932.
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of gold to Europe had ceased, hoarding had declined, and 
banks had reduced their debts to the Federal Reserve. The 
worker was informed by the Federation that the Federal 
Reserve was continuing to pour credit into the banks with
the hope that the banks would gradually begin "passing it
21on to business,"
Yet, in the fall of 1932, the Monthly Survey of Busi­
ness reported that even though there was a business revival, 
it was in the form of replacement of depleted inventories. 
However, reserves of buying power were not adequate to 
maintain economic activity. Therefore, the Federation 
concluded that in order to stimulate buying power, wages 
had to be increased as hours were reduced; then, business 
would seek more credit from banks.^2
But the banking situation by 1933 had become more 
acute and bank failures mounted steadily. Federal Reserve 
actions, were restricted by the limitations on the eligibility 
of the paper that could be discounted and by the rigid
21 American Federation of Labor, "The Government Program 
Against Depression," Monthly Survey of Business. July 25, 
1932.
22American Federation of Labor, "Wage Shortage Checks
Revival," Monthly Survey of Business, October, 1932.
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collateral requirements for Federal Reserve notes. Although 
legal provisions in both cases had been relaxed in 1932, the 
relaxation was not liberal enough to arrest the course of 
the deflation. The Federation acknowledged that the Federal
Reserve was working within its boundaries in an attempt to
give assistance during the banking crisis.23
During this same period of financial chaos, an editor­
ial in the American Federationist explained to the worker 
the operations of the Federal Reserve in regard to monetary 
policy. In the article, the Federation President, William 
Green, defined the basic operations of the System and 
concluded:
We should frankly face the fact that our monetary 
policies are controlled and take steps to have this 
managed for the best interest of all instead of for 
the priviledged few. The Federal Reserve Board
should be safeguarded not only against partisan
politics but against private banking i n t e r e s t s .24
The Federal Reserve policy from 1933 to 1936 was one
of continuous easing of credit. Interest rates on all
classes of money went down with a much sharper decline in
23American Federation of Labor, "The Crisis," Monthly 
Survey of Business. February, 1933.
24American Federation of Labor, Editorial, "Our Central 
Planning Agency," American Federationist. May, 1933.
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short-term than in long-term rates. Mortgage rates changed 
very little so that the gap between short- and long-term 
rates widened sharply.
During this period, organized labor generally favored
the easy monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Board, but
the question of rates on mortgages was brought before the
1935 American Federation of Labor Convention. A delegate
of the California State Federation of Labor contended that
homeowners and small industries were paying interest rates
100 per cent greater than farm mortgages. He offered a
resolution which condemned the practice of charging
excessive rates of interest and he wanted the Legislative
Committee of the American Federation of Labor to memorialize
Congress to introduce the necessary legislation to control
the profit in money. His resolution was referred to the
■ 95Executive Council.
In the fall of 1935, business was more active and 
prices were rising. There was an increasing volume of 
trading on the margin account and stock prices were vigor­
ously advancing which alarmed organized labor. The
25American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1935, 
pp. 241-242, 594-595. See American Federation of Labor, 
"Labor and Interest," American Federationist. July, 1935, 
pp. 739-740 for a similar discussion on mortgage rates.
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Federation was fearful that this situation might lead to 
another stock market boom and collapse. It maintained 
that since the Federal Reserve banks had stocks of gold 
that were twice as great as in 1929, a large expansion of 
credit could take place. Even though new legislative 
measures had been established to control credit and
finance, the Federation was worried that these measures
26would not be adequate.
In February and April, 1936, the Federal Reserve 
Board, responding to the increase in stock prices, made 
slight increases in the margin requirements on stock- 
exchange loans. Because of continued gold imports during 
1936 and 1937 which added to the excess reserves of the 
member banks, the Federal Reserve Board believed that a 
readjustment of reserve requirements was desirable. The 
Board did not want to modify its policy of easy money but 
felt that it would be better prepared to take preventive 
action if an indesirable credit expansion occurred. From 
organized labor's previous attitude of fear that an 
uncontrolled credit expansion would cause another stock




market crisis, it can be concluded that it was in favor 
of the Board's actions. Chart 3 shows the increase in 
stock prices from 1933 through 1936.
During the mid-thirties, the American Federation of 
Labor was faced not only with economic problems caused 
by the depression, but also with problems of an internal 
nature. From the 1933 convention through the 1935 con­
vention, an increasing number of resolutions on industrial 
unionism was introduced. At each of these three conventions, 
the Resolutions Committee rejected all of the industrial 
union resolutions and reaffirmed craft unionism. Shortly 
after the 1935 convention, eight national union leaders, 
led by John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers, organized 
the Committee for Industrial Organization. The purpose of 
this Committee was to organize the unorganized workers in 
the mass production industries into industrial unions and 
to bring them into the American Federation of Labor. The 
Federation Executive Council attempted to persuade the 
Committee to disband and when it refused, the Committee 
was expelled from the American Federation of Labor by the 
1937 Convention. The Committee for Industrial Organization 
then became the Congress of Industrial Organizations and
Chart 3. Stock Prices, 1933-1936
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Source: Board of- Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve
Charts on Bank Credit, Money Rates and Business (Washington, D. C.: 
January 25, 1939), p. 27.
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began to organize the mass production workers in steel,
automobile, and other industries.^
J. Raymond Walsh, a professor at Harvard University,
when writing about the Congress of Industrial Organizations
in 1937, proclaimed;
. . . It is a shock to discover that the labor move­
ment still retains so few economists, statisticians, 
and lawyers. What the C.I.O. needs is a research 
organization, with regional offices and staffs to 
assemble and analyze regularly the relevant facts 
about the companies and industries with which it 
deals, to explore the industrial make-up of the 
country, the conditions of the working class, the 
nature of the secular influences that are molding 
their lives.
Because of the Congress of Industrial Organizations' 
preoccupation with organizing the mass production industries 
and the need for research expansion during its early 
formative years, it indicated little interest in monetary 
policy. Therefore, it is difficult to make an assessment 
of the views of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
While the conflict between the American Federation of 
Labor and the Committee of Industrial Organizations was
27Phillip Taft, Organized Labor in American History 
(New York; Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), pp. 463-483.
28J. Raymond Walsh, C.I.O. Industrial Unionism in 
Action (New York; W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1937),
p. 278.
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occuring in 1937, a downturn in business was in progress.
The Federal Reserve in the fall of 1937 lowered the 
discount rate and bought securities in anticipation of the 
seasonal demand for currency while the Secretary of the 
Treasury released sterilized gold. To further help arrest 
the decline in business, reserve requirements wemp slightly 
lowered in the spring of 1938. The Federation approved of 
these monetary actions and the Monthly Survey of Business 
reported:
Measures to increase bank credit, which include the 
reduction of reserve requirements for banks, and 
the deposit in Federal Reserve Banks of $1,400,000,000 
of the treasury's inactive gold reserves; these 
together will increase the bank credit base available 
for loans by over $1,500,000,000; and in addition, 
the relaxation of bank examiners' regulation will 
make it easier for small businesses to get credit. 
These moves cannot but have far reaching effects in2Q ^stimulating business.
The Federation was discouraged when the easy money 
policy of the Federal Reserve was not highly successful 
in stimulating business activity. During 1939 and 1940, 
excess reserves of member banks increased steadily while 
their indebtedness to the Reserve banks decreased.
29American Federation of Labor, "The Outlook,"
Monthly Survey of Business. First Half, 1938.
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With the entry of the United States into World War 
II, the debt program of the Treasury became the principal 
source of policy for the Federal Reserve System. During 
the active war, inflationary pressures were left to the 
agencies of direct economic controls, such as the War Labor 
Board, the Office of Price Administration,, the War Production 
Board, and to the selective instruments of control at the > 
disposal of the monetary authorities.
In this period, there was no serious criticism of 
Federal Reserve policy, but instead, the leaders of the 
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations continuously attacked the War Labor Board's 
views on wage stabilization.3® Phillip Murray, head of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, told the Senate 
Banking and Currency Committee .in 1941 that wage control 
was not necessary to control inflation. He expressed the 
"firm and unqualified opposition of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations to the inclusion of wage control
• * ? 1in the p r i c e  contfol bill."
3®Taft, pp. cit., p. 558.
31U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and 
Currency, Hearings, H.R. 5990. 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941, 
p. 30.
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The Congress of Industrial Organizations in the latter 
part of 1943 maintained that every effort had to be made to 
stabilize prices, control living costs, and thus enable the 
government to keep faith with its citizens. Yet, it was the 
contention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations that 
"money could be inflationary only if spent, but not if 
saved." Therefore, the arguments against wage increases 
on the grounds contributing to inflation were "irrelevent, 
incompetent and immaterial.
1946 - 1965
When World War II ended, the United States economy was 
faced with a great volume of money and liquid assets along 
with an accumulated demand for goods. This situation 
presented a perfect background for inflation, but even in 
1947 the Federal Reserve was still acting with great moder- 
ation. By the middle of the year, the Federal Reserve 
Board and the Treasury agreed upon a policy of permitting 
short-term yields to rise, yet long-term rates continued 
to be "pegged."
Congress of Industrial Organizations, The Economic 
Outlook, November, 1943.
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By January, 1949, the American Federation of Labor was 
becoming alarmed over the inflationary tendency of the 
economy. It was looking to the Federal Reserve System for
i
a solution when it stated:
The powers of the Federal Reserve System should be 
used to prevent inflation and to provide no more 
than a reasonable and normal growth in the nation's 
money supply. If there is a conflict between this 
policy of preventing inflation and the Federal 
Reserve System's present policy of supporting the 
market for U. S. Government obligations at par, it 
should now use its powers to prevent inflation.
This should be done with wisdom and discretion? 
adjustments should be adequate, but should not be 
made so abruptly as to cause violent changes in 
prices of government obligations. The added cost 
to taxpayers of increased carrying charges on the 
federal debt would be infinitesimal compared to the 
losses they bear from continued price r i s e s . ^3
In February, the Federation noted that Secretary of
the Treasury, John W. Snyder, had announced that a new
security loan campaign "to promote savings and fight
inflation" would be initiated. Under the new plan, the
33American Federation of Labor, "Attack the Root 
Cause of Inflation," Labor's Monthly Survey, January, 1948, 
pp. 1-5. The Federation did note that on December 24, 1947, 
the Federal Reserve "repegged" the price at which it bought 
long-term government bonds at 100.25 per cent of par instead 
of 100 per cent and on January 9, 1948, it had raised the 
discount rate from 1 per cent to 1-1/4 per cent. These 
actions were steps toward higher interest rates and would 
tend to make commercial banks more cautious in expanding 
credit.
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sale of series E savings bonds would be emphasized. The 
American Federation of Labor had consistently supported the 
government in all of its programs to promote thrift among 
the workers. The 66th annual convention of the American 
Federation of Labor adopted a report endorsing the contin- 
uation on a voluntary basis of the Treasury Department's 
payroll savings plan for the purchase of United States 
savings bonds. William Green, head of the American Feder­
ation of Labor, urged the workers to support the new security 
loan campaign.
While the Federation encouraged its members to purchase 
savings bonds, it challenged charges that high wages were 
the prime cause of inflation. Boris Shiskin, American 
Federation of Labor economist, in June, 1948, said that the 
excessive volume of money in circulation was to blame for 
soaring prices.^5 He called for Congressional action to 
curb inflation and "to balance out our economy at a high 
level of production." However, in Shiskin's opinions
34 .American Federation of Labor, "Treasury Department 
Will Launch New Security Loan Drive to Fight Inflation," 
Weekly News Service, February 13, 1948.
35American Federation of Labor, Weekly News Service,
June 1, 1948.
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To cut back the money supply alone would mean an 
economic balance at a lower rate in production of 
goods which would be consumed only by those 
fortunate enough to have adequate purchasing power.^
The Federation further asserted that the Treasury had
encouraged easy money and easy credit by refusing to increase
the interest rate on its short-term certificates. To the
Federation, this action was contrary to the advice of
Federal Reserve officials and would increase the workers'
37cost of living through higher prices.
The Federation's Weekly News Service in August reported 
that the 80th Congress had adjourned with very little 
accomplished. Much to the Federation's disappointment, no
36American Federation of Labor, "Inflation Curbs Urged 
for Balanced Economy," Weekly News Service, June 15, 1948.
See also: American Federation of Labor, Weekly News Service.
June 18, 1948, in which Federation President Green enumer­
ated proposals submitted to the Republican Convention to 
curb inflation. The Federation recommended a four-point 
program: (1) That committees of businessmen, labor, agri­
cultural and other groups be called by the Council of 
Economic Advisers to develop a joint program to check 
inflation. (2) That the voluntary allocation program for 
scarce materials operating under the U.S. Department of 
Commerce be strengthened. (3) That monetary and fiscal 
policies to check abnormal increase in money supply and bank 
credit be followed. (4) That a vigorous program to sell 
U.S. savings bonds to American consumers be conducted.
37American Federation of Labor, Labor's Monthly Survey.
June-July, 1948, p. 6.
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action was taken on President Truman's sweeping anti- 
inflation program and a limited substitute was passed. The 
substitute was a credit control bill which restored wartime 
consumer buying regulations on a temporary basis and granted 
the Federal Reserve Board authority to increase the reserve 
requirements on member banks.
Even after reserve requirements were raised that fall, 
a downward trend in economic activity was becoming increas­
ingly apparent, and by 1949, it became more pronounced. 
Prices declined, business loans were being liquidated, 
production activity decreased, and unemployment increased. 
Federal Reserve policy was adjusted to counteract the 
recession. Margin requirements on security loans were 
reduced, consumer credit regulation was relaxed even before 
it expired on June 30, 1949, and reserve requirements were 
continuously reduced.
In the fall of 1949, the American Federation of Labor 
and the Congress of Industrial Organizations participated in 
the hearings held by the Joint Committee on the Economic
^ A m e r i c a n  Federation of Labor, "Congress Votes Limited 
Credit Curbs, Housing Aid as Special Session Ends," Weekly 
News Service, August 10, 1948.
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Report on Monetary, Credit and Fiscal Policies.^ Everett
M. Kassalow and Stanley H. Ruttenberg40 were representatives
for the Congress of Industrial Organizations and presented a
statement on behalf of Emil Rieve, their vice president.
The statement expressed the appreciation of the organization
for the opportunity to testify, "if even only to present
general views on fiscal and monetary policy" and explained:
Our own consideration of the Employment Act and the 
policies which can bring about its successful oper­
ation have convinced us that there is no more impor­
tant single area for bold Government action than in 
the fields of Credit, fiscal and monetary policy.4^
In the area of monetary policy, the Congress of
Industrial Organizations felt that the failure of Congress
to renew the Federal Reserve Board's power over consumer
credit in June, 1949, was an appalling mistake. This was
the Federal Reserve Board's power that had "justified its
existence" and that power should be available for use when
39The Joint Committee on the Economic Report was 
created under the Employment Act of 1946.
40Mr. Kassalow was Executive Secretary, CIO Full 
Employment Committee and Mr. Ruttenberg was Director of 
Education and Research.
4%.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Monetary, 
Credit, and Fiscal Policies of the Joint Committee on the 
Economic Report, Hearings: Monetary. Credit and Fiscal 
Policies, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 299.
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necessary. Senator Paul H. Douglas, chairman of the sub-
S
committee, commented that the continuance of the regulations
on consumer credit was attacked by some on the grounds that
it would be unfair to unduly restrict the ability of low
income groups to command durable consumer goods. Stanley
Ruttenberg said that those individuals who had opposed the
extension of consumer credit were the ones who allowed the
low income people "to become so indebted that they can't
42get out of it."
Similar to the Congress of Industrial Organizations1
views, the American Federation of Labor felt that the power
/
to control the volume of consumer credit should be restored 
to the System as a permanent feature. In addition, it 
believed that the authority of the Federal Reserve System 
to modify the required reserve ratios should be increased 
so that the System could impose additional reserve require­
ments when desired. The Federation also suggested that the 
Government's lending operations be coordinated with general 
monetary, credit and fiscal policy, insofar as this was not 
incompatible with the major purpose for which the loan 
powers were set up. For example, it was apparent to the
42Ibid.. p. 302.
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Federation that good public policy required the; expansion
of loans for housing even during the period of post-war 
43inflation.
Although the testimony by the two organized labor
groups was similar at this hearing, their appraisals of the
post-war inflation were somewhat different. While the
Federation had supported tighter monetary controls, an
article, in the Congress of Industrial Organizations' Economic
Outlook told the workers:
After both World War I and World War II the bankers 
sought to do away with the addition to the money 
and credit supply created by the bonds. In both 
cases they used the excuse of needing to fight 
inflation. Inflation, however, was primarily a 
wartime problem— and it had been handled fairly 
effectively in World War II . . . What the bankers 
were after . . . [wasj a deflation that would put 
the country through the wringer and at the same 
time restore a condition of scarcity in the money 
market which increases the ,economic power of the 
bankers.^
By 1950, the economy was showing signs of a recovery 
from the 1949 inventory adjustment. Employment and 
industrial production were advancing, prices were rising,
43Ibid.. pp. 548-552.
44Congress of Industrial Organizations, "Higher 
Interest Rates Help Banks— Hit You," Economic Outlook, 
May, 1953, p. 36.
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banks were resuming the expansion of loans, and total spend?- 
ing was increasing. When the Korean War started in June, 
a wave of precautionary buying helped to accelerate prices 
and to stimulate a growth of bank credit.
In the latter part of thfet year, the Federation 
claimed that the United States government was responsible 
for keeping the nation's money sound and preventing 
depreciation of its value. Inflation had to be prevented 
but the Federation did not want it merely postponed by 
wage-price controls as it had been in World War II.
The Federation suggested that the United States
government borrow from individuals by selling savings bonds
instead of borrowing from the banks for the latter method
was inflationary. Also, it supported the Federal Reserve
Board's task of curbing consumer credit and bank credit
and stated that the credit controls on housing, automobiles,
furniture, and appliances had already proven effective in
45taking pressure off prices of these items.
^American Federation of Labor, "Money Must be Kept 
Sound As Uncle Sam Pays for Defense," Labor1s Monthly Survey. 
November-December, 1950, p. 6. On September 18, 1950, the 
Federal Reserve Board issued Regulation W imposing controls 
on installment credit. On October 12, the Board issued 
Regulation X imposing selective controls on credit for the 
construction, purchasing, and financing of new houses.
These regulations were issued in accordance with authority 
contained in the Defense Production Act of 1950.
161
During the inflationary period in 1950, the Federal 
Reserve Board was handicapped because of its support of the 
long-term government bond market. The Reserve authorities, 
wanting to raise the long-term United States government 
bond yield, ran into direct opposition from the Treasury.
This dispute between the two agencies ended with a joint 
agreement known as the ".Accord" on March 4, 1951. The 
effect of the "Accord" was the restoration of independence 
to the Federal Reserve for the pursuit of flexible monetary 
policies.
The Federation approved of the Federal Reserve-Treasury
"Accord" because it felt that the rapid rise in loans to
business had been a root cause of inflation and it was
pleased to see that the credit inflation was being checked
in two ways. First, the Treasury no longer insisted that
the Federal Reserve buy all government bonds at par value,
and thus the banks would hesitate to sell government bonds
for loan purposes. Secondly, the banks were cooperating in
46the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program to cut down on
^The Voluntary Credit Restraint Program of March, 1951, 
was established under the Defense Production Act.
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loans to buy stocks of goods beyond reasonable amounts and
47loans for non-defense plant expansxon.
The Congress of Industrial Organizations' views of the
Federal Reserve's monetary policy during 1951-52 were
basically different from those of the American Federation
of Labor. In the report, "Federal Reserve Policy and the
Control of Inflation In a War or Defense Emergency," the
Congress of Industrial Organizations stated:
Our own studies of the recent emergency inflation 
lead us to believe that the Federal Reserve policies 
for which so much is claimed have been founded on 
false premises. Moreover, they proved to be in­
effective and inequitable when put into actual 
operation during the past two years.**®
In analyzing the monetary policies of the Federal
Reserve System since the "Accord" in early 1951, the
Congress of Industrial Organizations first considered the
use of the discount rate. It stated that an increase in
47American Federation of Labor, "Credit Inflation 
Checked," Labor's Monthly Survey, April-May, 1951, p. 7. 
See also: American Federation of Labor, "Inflation Has
Reduced Dollar's Purchasing Power to 54C in Twelve Years," 
Labor's Monthly Survey, June-July, 1951, p. 6.
4®U.S.,Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and 
Currency, Hearings. Standby Economic Controls. 83rd Cong., 
1st Sess., 1953, p. 793.
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discount rates ordinarily led to a rise in the interest
rates which member banks charged on business loans, and
this was supposed to cut down the number of borrowers.
Thus the inflationary pressure in the economy would be
eased. Yet, to the Congress of Industrial Organizations,
slight, even moderate, increases in the interest rate would
not Curtail business speculation.49 At the Hearing on
Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt,
Nathaniel Goldfinger had stated:
I do not believe that a relatively small change in 
interest rates will materially affect inflationary 
pressures one way or another . . .  A large change 
in interest rates, it appears to me, would be un­
desirable. in view of its effect on the public debt. 
Furthermore, I question whether eveh a large rise 
in interest rates, 3 to 5 per cent, for example, 
would have any material effect on personal savings 
and business investment under the economic conditions 
of the past 6 years . . . Devices other than interest 
rate changes will have to be developed if Government 
policy is to affect personal savings and business 
investment as means of influencing the course of 
our national economy.50
49Ibid.. p. 794.
50U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on General 
Credit Control and Debt Management of the Joint Committee 
on the Economic Report, Hearings. Monetary Policy and the 
Management of the Public Debt. 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, 
pp. 830, 1020-1021. See full statement by Donald E. 
Montgomery, Director of Washington Office, International 
Union, United Auto Workers, and Nathaniel Goldfinger, member 
of Congress of Industrial Organizations' Committee on 
Economic Policy. Ibid., pp. 817-822, 1020-1022, 1069-1070.
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Also, the Congress of Industrial Organizations stated 
that its statistical estimations disclosed no visible 
effectiveness of the Board's actions as far as the-money 
supply was concerned, but the interest rates on commercial 
and individual loans, as well as government securities, 
had risen significantly since the "Accord," The result was 
a substantial increase in the profits of many banks. The 
Congress of Industrial Organizations pointed out that as 
the interest rates on the Government debt climbed, the 
cost of servicing the Federal debt rose, thereby increasing 
the burden on the average taxpayer of the United States.
In addition, the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program 
was attacked by the Congress of Industrial Organizations. 
When the government was telling management and labor what 
wages they could or could not pay and the manufacturers 
what prices they could charge, the Federal Reserve Board 
asked the bankers to devise their own rules of anti­
inflation conduct. The Congress of Industrial Organizations 
asked: "Can anyone conceive of the Federal Government's
anti-inflation program including the delegation to unions 
of the control over wages, or to business the control over 
prices?"
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The Congress of Industrial Organizations challenged the 
anti-inflationary views of those advocates who wanted the 
Federal Reserve Board to withdraw its support from new 
government issues and "actively unload important parts of 
its holdings of government securities." The Congress of 
Industrial Organizations believed a real "dumping operation" 
by the Board would lead to panic and extreme deflation, 
unemployment, and economic collapse. It cited the periods 
1920-21 and 1929 as cases where the Board's deflationary 
policies had helped precipitate severe business panics. 
However, the milder actions during 1951-1952 had no effect 
in limiting the expansion of bank credit.
Yet, the Congress of Industrial Organizations stressed 
that the inadequacies of the Federal Reserve Board policies 
should not be overlooked in formulating future emergency 
anti-inflation programs. It suggested that if there were 
to be adequate and equitable curtailment of business loans 
by the banks, this should be'done by direct methods. The 
President of the United States possessed the power to limit 
the volume of credit which could be issued by the banks.
The Congress of Industrial Organizations did admit that 
sound monetary and credit policies, directed at curtailing
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nonessential business activity or speculation could also
51serve the same objective.
The American Federation of Labor's attitude toward
monetary policy during the period 1953-54 was summarized
at the 1954 convention:
Consider the big downslide of 1953-1954. In the 
first part of 1953, price inflation of the Korean 
mobilization period had fully run its course. It 
was no longer a problem. Yet, the incoming Admin­
istration acted as if inflation were a major 
menace. It set in motion strong deflationary 
policies. These were in hand with the newly pro­
claimed overriding objectives of the government 
"economy drive" and to balancing the budget.
The Treasury raised interest rates, setting off a 
general rise in interest charges on all forms of 
borrowing. The era of "hard money" and "dear 
dollar" was proclaimed. Most important of all, 
the country, in thrpes of a full-scale, long-term 
defense mobilization, was suddenly confronted with 
a curtailment of defense spending. With the 
Communist menace nowhere diminished, despite the 
Korean truce, the announced "transition from war to 
peace" not only came as a shock, but also changed 
business and public expectations to a sudden 
reduction in the defggse effort, defense production 
and defense outlays.
51U. S., Congress, Hearings, Standby Economic Controls. 
op. cit., pp. 795-796.
52American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1954, p. 
260. The Congress of Industrial Organizations was in 
general agreement with the American Federation of Labor on 
the "hard money" policy of the Eisenhower administration. 
See, Congress of Industrial Organizations, "Higher Interest 
Rates Help Banks— Hit You," Economic Outlook. May, 1953.
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The report further explained that the "hard money" policies
had served to slow down the economy. By the second half of
1953, Federal Reserve policies experienced a far reaching
shift to ease bank credit, to stimulate borrowing, and to
arrest the deflationary trend.
The Executive Council contended that although the
monetary "stabilizers" had contributed to the checking of
the recession, they had failed to reverse it. At best,
they proved effective only as props to stabilize the
economy at the lower level it had reached. Thus the
Council concluded:
. . . it is the widening disparity between the buying 
power of consumers and the rapidly increasing pro­
ductive power of industry that presents the central 
problem of the American economy. Return, to full 
prosperity depends on the solution of this problem.^
Much to the relief of organized labor, recovery from 
the recession began in the third quarter of 1954. Through­
out 1955, there was a sharp increase in consumers' purchases 
of durable commodities and inventory accumulation on the 
part of business. Also, business investment in new plants
and equipment was increasing at a rapid pace which created
\
53American Federation of Labor, Proceedings. 1954,
p. 261.
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pressure upon resources and on the available supply of 
loanable funds. The Federal Reserve Board, fearing infla­
tionary developments, attempted to tighten the supply of 
money and made it increasingly expensive to borrow funds.
At the annual convention of the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations in December, 1955, Walter P. Reuther,
President, reported:
It was relatively easy credit terms for the purchase 
of goods and services— and the easing of mortgage 
terms in 1954 for the purchase of homes— that helped 
to spark the upward surge of consumer spending and 
home construction in .the past year.^
Yet, Reuther felt that the Eisenhower Administration
apparently saw the rise in consumer debt as dangerous and
believed that it should be halted. He contended that the
effect of the Administration's general "hard money" policy
would be to increase profits for banks and other lenders and-
tend to depress economic activity. It was therefore the
contention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations that,
for continued economic growth, the Administration's general
"hard money" policy had to be reversed.^
54Congress of Industrial Organizations, Proceedings, 
1955, p. 119.
55Ibid., pp. 121, 125.
The annual convention of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations in December, 1955, was to be its last, for
during that year an agreement was signed to merge the
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial 
56Organizations. They joined names as well and the organ­
ization became popularly known as the AFL-CIO. These
differences which h^d existed in their attitudes toward
57monetary policy were linked in the merger and in the 
formation of one research department which was composed of 
economists from both organizations.
Throughout 1956, the underlying policy of the Federal 
Reserve System continued to be "restraining inflationary 
developments in the interest of sustainable economic growth. 
Discount rates were increased to enforce open market 
operations by making borrowing unattractive to member banks 
except in emergencies.
The newly formed AFL-CIO, like the previous separate 
organizations, attacked the hard money policy of the
EC /3°The merger agreement and the "Implementation Agree­
ment" were signed on November 30, 1955, under which the 
transfer of property was arranged and the rights of the 
unions and members in the merger were formally recognized. 
Taft, op., cit., p. 660.
57Supra.Chapter V, pp. 161-162.
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Eisenhower administration. The AFL-CIO Industrial Union 
Department in the fall of 1956 told the workers that the 
cost of money was to go higher because the bankers had 
"teamed up with" the Administration in raising interest 
rates. The "prime" interest rate which was charged to the 
big corporations had been raised by the First National 
Bank of Boston followed by the New York Banks. To the 
AFL-CIO, this action by the First National Bank of Boston 
appeared to be a signal to the Federal Reserve Board to 
also increase the discount rates.
The AFL-CIO also argued that the hard money policies 
had destroyed the New Deal mortgage protection. For the 
first time since the twenties, conventional mortgages were 
accounting for a large share of home financing instead of 
the Veterans' Administration and Federal Housing Adminis­
tration loans. The AFL-CIO was disturbed because the 
conventional mortgages did not carry government guarantees. 
Therefore, because of the risk and the high interest rates, 
the workers were being driven out of the housing markets.^
AFL-CIO, IUP Bulletin. September, 1956, p. 8. Dis­
count rates were raised late in August, 1956, to 3 per cent 
at the ten Reserve Banks with rates of 2-3/4 per cent.
59AFL-CIO, "Hard Money Policy Causes Decline in Gov't 
Mortgages," IUP Bulletin. November, 1956, p. 8.
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Nat Goldfinger, AFL-CIO economist, believed:
The Eisenhower Administration . . . has failed to 
give leadership in the most important aspect of 
economic policy— that of increasing the living 
standards of the low income groups and of increas­
ing cultural, educational, welfare and social 
opportunities.60
He attributed the general prosperity under President
Eisenhower to the policies instituted by the Roosevelt and
6 1Truman Administration.
The Economic Policy Committee of the AFL-CIO, in its 
review of 1956 reported that the tight jnoney policy had 
failed to stem the investment boom of the large corpor­
ations. Instead, the high interest rates had retarded the 
growth in certain sectors of the economy, such as home 
building, and had increased the profits of such institutions 
as banks and insurance companies.^
This Committee in January, 1957, stated:
Current monetary policy needs to be re-examined.
The causes and effects of a tight money market 
are different when seen through the eyes of
60AFL-CIO, "Economists In Disagreement on Adminis­
tration Policies," IUP Bulletin. December, 1956, p. 9.
6:1 Ibid.
62AFL-CIO, Economic Review. January, 1957, p. 4.
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someone otlier than a specialist in monetary
policy.63
The AFL-CIO Executive Council declared that "important 
types of borrowers have suffered" from the tight monetary 
policy. Farmers, city and state governments, and small 
businesses found it increasingly difficult to borrow funds 
for necessary improvements and repairs or continuation of 
successful activity.6^ The Council recommended a three 
point program to combat the inflation failures:
1. Pursue policies designed to accomplish a steady, 
balanced rate of growth in the national economy.
2. Relax the present "tight money" policy.
3. Take specific steps to alleviate the hardships 
caused by tight money.66
63AFL-CIO, "A New Look at Monetary Policy," Economic 
Trends and Outlook,January, 1957. Other criticisms of 
monetary policy by the Committee were: "The pattern of
discount rates chasing U.S. Treasury bill rates created 
f inflation and confusion in the short-term securities market. 
Instead of a Federal Reserve effort to keep the interest 
rate on Treasury short-term bills low, so that the discount 
rate would be low, it followed the backward pattern of 
letting Treasury rates go where they would by not inter­
fering too much and then raising discount rates to meet the 
new heights of Treasury rates. Through a 'hands off' policy, 
the Federal Open Market Committee did not support the price 
of Treasury long-term bonds . . . The result: Treasury
attempts to move the Federal debt into long-term issues and 
out of the bank structure were not successful." AFL-CIO, 
Economic Trends and Outlook, March, 1959, p. 3.
6^AFL-CIO, News. February 9, 1957, cited by Neil W. 
Chamberlain, Sourcebook on Labor (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., Inc., 1958), p. 959.
6 6AFL-CIO, "Relax Tight Money Policy," Economic Trends 
and Outlook. February, 1957, p. 2.
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The Council further suggested that the government provided 
for federal aid to education, an expanded public housing 
program as well as one for middle-income housing, and the 
establishment of a governmental corporation for low interest 
rate loans for specific necessary social programs.^6
The Industrial Union Department1s Executive Board in 
March requested that the Eisenhower Administration and the 
Federal Reserve Board reverse "present unjustified hard 
money policies" and.warned that there were "signs of slowing 
down" in the rate of. economic expansion. The IUP Bulletin, 
during most months in 1957, featured articles attacking the 
tight monetary program.^
Wages and Prices and the American Economy was the topic 
of a statement issued by the AFL-CIO Executive Council in 
August. The Council argued that a dangerous and paradoxical
^AFL-CIO, IUP Bulletin publications as follows: 
"Economic Activity Showing Signs of Slackening, IDU Board 
Warns," March, 1957, p. 5y "Hard Money Probe Balked by 
Administration Pressure," April, 1957, p. 13; "Little Change 
Noted in Economy," May, 1957, p. 15; "Tight Money Aids 
Banker; Taxpayers Carry Burden," June, 1957, p. 9. "Housing 
Slupip Aggravated as Money Costs Go Higher," August, 1957, 
p. 12; "Recession is Not the Answer," September, 1957; and 
"Bankers Look to Consumer for Continuing prosperity," 
October, 1957.
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situation confronted the American economy. Since the end of 
1956, industrial production had been going down. At the 
same time, prices had continued to move up despite a decline 
in aggregate demand and the rapid rise in the production 
facilities of the nation. The Council did not feel that 
this paradox could be explained as a "cost-push" inflation 
and stated:
. . .  it is hard to see how "cost-push" can be the 
cause when, according to official Government 
reports, labor costs remained practically unchanged 
in the past five years in spite of rising wages and 
improving fringe b e n e f i t s . 6®
Organized labor felt that their criticism of the 
Federal Reserve's tight monetary policy was well founded 
for by the late fall of 1957, there was evidence of an 
economic recession. With recognition of declines in economic 
activity, the Federal Reserve officials moved to lessen 
the degree of restraint in November and December, 1957, 
by reducing discount rates.
The Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO used 
the expression "too little and too late" in February, 1958,
AFL-CIO, Wages and Prices and the American Economy.
A Statement Prepared by the AFL-CIO Executive Council 
(Chicago: American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organization, August 14, 1957) (in the files of 
the AFL-CIO).
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to sum up the reaction to easier credit by the Federal
Reserve Board. It explained that the Board "grudgingly"
acknowledged the recessionary trend in the economy, and cut
margin requirements on stock purchases from 70 to 50 per
cent, followed by a cut in the discount rate. . Even with
easier money, the Department believed all indications
pointed to a further slide in the e c o n o m y .
Several months later, the Department used the following
adage as an explanation of the situation in which the nation
found itself regarding monetary policy:
You can step on the brakes and stop a fast moving 
car but you can't get it started again merely by 
lifting yourToot from the brake p e d a l . ^0
It pointed out that the Federal Reserve had again reduced
the discount rate by one-half of one per cent, and also had
lowered the reserve requirements. The Department believed
that, theoretically, these actions would make credit more
readily available, but until purchasing power balanced with
productive capacity, it was doubtful that easier money
would serve as an economic stimulant. Only then would
®^AFL-CI0, "Tardy Credit Easing Moves Will Do Little 
to End Slump," IUP Bulletin. February, 1958.
^®AFL-CI0,’"Money Moves Seen Having Little Effect on 
the Economy," IUP Bulletin. May, 1958.
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monetary policy be of help in encouraging economic growth.
By the end of the third quarter of 1958, economic 
activity was again advancing with gains recorded in personal 
consumption expenditures, residential construction, and 
government purchases. The AFL-CIO noted in October andi
November that the Federal Reserve Board had raised discount i
rates and was taking certain other credit restricting steps.
Organized labor believed that the Treasury and Federal
Reserve officials apparently had not "learned their lesson"
72and their actions would bring on a further recession.
During this period, Everett M. Kassalow, Director of 
Research for the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department 
stated:
We are presently operating under several handicaps 
in the monetary and credit field, so far as our 
objectives of sustained, stable economic growth is 
concerned. For example, the basic legislation in 
the monetary and credit area was laid down before 
the passage of our modern system of social— and 
economic— reform legislation which culminated in 
the Employment Act of 1946.7^
7 1Ibid.
7^AFL-CIO, "Bankers Gain as Monetary Policy Threatens 
Recovery," IUP Bulletin, October, 1958, p. 9. AFL-CIO, 
"Credit Screws Tightened in New Blow at Recovery," IUP 
Bulletin. November, 1958, p. 4.
7^U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Rela­
tionship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth (Commen­
taries submitted by economists from labor and industry), 85th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, pp.,53-54, 821.
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In his opinion regarding the broad realm of credit 
policy, the strain on the Federal Reserve Board could be 
reduced by the judicious use of other Federal credit 
instruments. He felt that there was a tendency on the part 
of the public and probably of some Board officials to 
arrogate too much power and responsibility to the Board.^ 
In 1959 as the economy recovered from the 1957-1958 
recession, organized labor continued to attack the tight 
money policy of the Federal Reserve System.^ Chart 4
75The following articles appeared xn the AFL-CIO, IUP 
Bulletin in 1959: "Tighter Money in Prospect, Could Brake
Recovery Rate," February, p. 15; "Federal Reserve," March, 
p. 2; "Recovery Rate Too Slow," April, p. 15; "Reserve 
Board's Policies Cloud Nation's Recovery," May, p. 13;
"Money Supply Tightened Despite Needs of Jobless," June, 
p. 2; "Tight Money Impact Grows, Higher Interest Rates Seen," 
July, p. 12; "Danger, of Recession Seen as Money Becomes 
Tighter," August, p. 3; "Interest Charges Increase in New 
Tight Money Moves," September, p. 12; "Wage Inflation 
Theories Blasted by Top Economists," October, p. 13; "Money 
Costs to Treasury Highest Since Big Crash," October, p. 14; 
"Housing Boom Slows Down as Tight Money Takes Hold," Decem­
ber, p. 11. See also: AFL-CIO, "Tight Money Manis," IUP 
Digest. Summer, 1959, pp. 89-100, and AFL-CIO, "Back to Tight 
Money?" IUP Digest, Winter, 1959, pp. 122-128; AFL-CIO,
Policy Resolutions of The Third Constitutional Convention 
(Washington: American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, 1959), pp. 37-38. (In the files of 
the AFL-CIO); U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 
Hearings. Employment. Growth, and Price Levels. 8 6 th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1959, pp. 3109-3110.
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shows the changes in discount rates from 1954 through 1959 
and the increase in long-term United States government bond 
yields. f
In December, 1959, the AFL-CIO Economic Policy Committee 
stressed that the nation had to have enough money and 
credit to carry on the business of a growing population.
Even though the Federal Reserve spokesmen constantly 
reassured the nation that the Board was trying to provide 
enough money, the controversial question to the Committee 
was "How much was enough?" It felt that "financial 
intermediaries," "velocity," and other economic factors had 
not made enough difference to keep the majority of 
Americans from the effects of tight money. It concluded 
that for a nation emerging from the 1958 recession, a rapid 
increase in money and credit would not be "undue.
The AFL-CIO predicted in January, 1960, that still 
higher interest rates and scarce money lay immediately 
ahead as the result of Administration and Federal Reserve 
policies of deliberate credit restraint. It was apparent 
to organized labor that "the Federal Reserve feared
■^AFL-CIO, "Money and Credit— Tighter and Tighter," 
Economic Trends and Outlook, December, 1959, pp. 1-4.
Chart 4. Discount Rate and Yield on Long-Term 














Source: Board of Governors, Historical Chart Book (Washington, D. C.:
Federal Reserve System, 1965).
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prosperity even more than recession, and that monetary 
policy was being tailored accordingly." It was the hope 
of the AFL-CIO that tight money would be injected into the 
election campaign of that year. However, it felt this was 
doubtful because the subject was so complex and it was 
difficult to draw public attention to the issue; despite 
tight money, the current boom would probably continue through 
that year.^
By the late spring of 1960, the economy was showing 
signs of a recession. The AFL-CIO could not understand why 
the Federal Reserve continued to keep the discount rate at 
a high level. . It contended that tight money was hurting 
the small businessman, home buyers, consumers and workers 
and was a factor in the continued high rate of unemploy­
ment. 7®
The AFL-CIO was pleased to see that by July the 
Federal Reserve had finally eased the credit restraint by 
lowering the discount rates. However, it noted that interest
^AFL-CIO, IUP Bulletin. January, 1960, p. 12. See 
also, AFL-CIO, "Ike Economic Viewpoint Hit by Labor and in 
Congress," IUP Bulletin, February, 1960, p. 14; AFL-CIO, 
"Higher Interest Costs Extra Billion," Economic Trends 
and Outlook. February, 1960, pp. 104.
7®AFL-CI0, "Monetary Policy," IUP Bulletin, May, 1960,
p. 2.
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rates had not started down and there was little indication
79of any significant change in the near future.
That fall, organized labor proclaimed that there was
little doubt that the nation was being plagued by a third
Republican recession. Although the AFL-CIO knew that
tight moneys was not the only reason for the decline in
economic activity, it held the Federal Reserve— with the
encouragement of the Administration— primarily responsible.
Therefore, organized labor demanded:
There is a need to reverse present policies now and 
to take counter-action. This would be too much to 
expect of the Eisenhower Administration or of Mr.
Nixon, neither of whom has expressed concern over 
entry into a new recession with nearly six per cent 
of Americans already jobless.
From its standpoint, the best action to take against
recession was the presidential election of Senator John
F. Kennedy.®'*'
At that time, the monetary authorities were becoming 
increasingly concerned over the balance-of-payments deficit.
^AFL-CIO, "Cost of Money," IUP Bulletin, July, 1960, 
p. 15.
AFL-CIO, "A Third GOP Recession," IUP Bulletin. 
October, 1960, p. 1.
81Ibid.
The AFL-CIO in November, 1960, noted that the discount 
rate had been cut to three per cent by the Federal Reserve 
but felt that it was unlikely to go lower unless there was 
a deepening of the recession. It told the workers that the 
major reason given by the Federal Reserve for not lowering
82interest rates was the gold outflow from the United States.0* 
The AFL-CIO felt that the incoming Kennedy Administration 
had inherited a related set of economic problems— a
Q Orecession and a"flight from the dollar.'
In 1961, the balance-of-payments problem received 
greater attention from the AFL-CIO.®^ It was pleased to 
see that the Kennedy program was trying to lower long-term 
interest rates by having the Federal Reserve maintain the
82AFL-CIO, "Consumers Gaining Little From Money Easing 
Moves," IUP Bulletin. November, 1960, p. 9.
8 3AFL-CIO, "Prosperity Will End Gold Crisis," IUP 
Bulletin. Pecember, 1960,p. 13. See also; AFL-CIO, "The 
Balance of Payments Issue," Economic Trends and Outlook, 
Pecember, 1960, pp. 1-4.
84AFL-CIO, "Labor's Goals for a Better America," 
American Federationist, February, 1961, p. 20; AFL-CIO,
"The'Balance of Payments Issue," Economic Tends and Outlook. 
February, 1961, p. 3; AFL-CIO, Balance of Payments Policy,
A Statement Prepared by the AFL-CIO Executive Council 
(Miami Beach; American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations, February 26, 1961) (in the files 
of the AFL-CIO).
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Federal securities market on more than a "bills only"
Q Cbasis. However, by late spring, it was disappointing to 
organized labor that the Administration's efforts to 
reduce the long-term interest rates were "generally unsuc­
cessful." Yet, it optimistically.noted that the United 
States.'balance of payments position had improved, and the 
gold outflow had almost diminished. It strongly believed 
that since the c/old outflow was almost halted, the excuse 
for both high short-term and long-term rates was no longer 
valid and it recommended:
A vigorous approach to monetary policy would 
utilize all the tools of the Federal Reserve 
Board. This would include a further cut in the^ 
discount rate which still stands at three per 
cent and which holds up the price of money. It 
would also require far more than token purchases 
on long-term bonds.®®
This basic attitude by organized labor continued throughout
the remainder of 1961.
By January, 1962, the AFL-CIO was pleased to see that
an economic upturn was being forecast by most economists.
85AFL-CIO, "Reserve Shifts Money Position," IUP 
Bulletin. March, 1961, p. 14 and AFL-CIO, "Economic Program 
Outlined, IUP Bulletin. February, 1961, p. 5.
86AFL-CIO, "Interest Rates Stay High? Put Brake on 
Recovery," IUP Bulletin. May, 1961, p. 13.
184
Yet, it feared that higher interest rates authorized by the
Federal Reserve officials for savings deposits in commercial
87banks would be detrimental to the economy. The AFL-CIO 
considered that this action would more than likely push up 
savings and loan associations' interest on deposits, and in 
turn would result in higher rates on mortgages. The AFL-CIO 
predicted that a slackening of housing construction would 
follow, adding to any general fall in economic activity 
which might occur after mid-year. It was critical of a 
speech by Federal Reserve Board Chairman, William McChesney 
Martin, in which he stated that the Board would not interfere
with any higher interest rates "resulting from the inter-
88action of supply and demand."
In its spring meeting in Washington, D.C., organized 
labor's view was summarized by the AFL-CIO Executive /Council 
which stated that the upturn from the recession "had been 
less than expected last January." The Council added that 
these economic developments had "unfortunately" borne out
®^0n January 1, 1962, Federal Reserve banks were 
allowed to raise interest rates on any savings deposit from 
3 to 3-1/2 per cent and to 4 per cent on thbse left in the 
bank for one year or more.
88AFL-CIO, "Vigorous Economic Upturn New Seen by Fore­
casters," IUP Bulletin. January, 1962, p. 14.
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warnings of the AFL-CIO and it called for a Federal Reserve 
policy designed to maintain low interest rates on long­
term loans and to insure continued ease in the money 
market.89
During this period, Stanley Ruttenberg, economist for 
the AFL-CIO, requested, among other things, that an anti­
recessionary tax cut be effected. In his testimony before 
the Joint Economic Committee, he stated:
I must express concern over rumors, and I guess it 
is more than rumor, that the Federal Reserve Board 
will seek to offset a tax cut, if one comes, by a 
tighter money policy. Action of this kind would 
simply destroy the beneficial efforts of the tax 
reductions. While it is important to take monetary 
measures to help ease the balance-of-payments 
problem, they must be selective and constructive in 
nature. A general effort to tighten the availa­
bility of funds and thus raise interest rates across 
the board now to meet the payments problem just 
cannot be tolerated at a time when the American 
economy needs credit ease and lower borrowing costs 
in order to overcome stagnation. Policies to meet 
the international monetary problem can and must be
89U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings. 
State of the Economy and Policies for Full Employment. 87th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 347. For similar recovery 
views by organized labor, see: AFL-CIO, "Tighter Money in
Prospect Despite Slack in Economy," and "Labor Offers 
Prosperity Plan," IUP Bulletin. July, 1962, pp. 5 and 87 
AFL-CIO, "Let's Stop Recession Now," IUP Bulletin. August, 
1962, p. 1.
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shaped that do not undermine the achievement of 
what must be our number one objective— theqnrestoration of recovery. u
The economy had changed little by November, 1962.
The AFL-CIO reported to the workers that the Federal Reserve 
had responded to the demands for easier money by adjusting
qionly to meet the seasonal needs of the member banks.
In the early part of 1963, organized labor maintained
that more than ever before the economy needed expansionary
fiscal and monetary policies which would reduce unemploy-
ment below the five per cent level. Chart 5 shows the
rising trend of unemployment and interest rates which
concerned organized labor. The AFL-CIO Executive Council
warned that "job-creating efforts can be nullified by a
tightening of the money supply and an increase in interest
rates," and again urged Congress to reject proposals that
93would increase long-term interest rates. But the Council 
90AFL-CIO, "Council Expresses Concern with Lag in U.S. 
Economy," IUP Bulletin. May, 1962; See also, AFL-CIO, 
"Interest Rate Policies and the Economy," Economic Trends 
and Outlook, July, 1962.
9-*-AFL-CIO, "Relaxing of Cuban Crisis Finds Economy 
Unchanged," IUD Bulletin, November, 1962, p. 13.
92AFL-CIO, "Same Problems," IUD Bulletin, January, 1963.
93AFL-CIO, "Council Opposes Tighter Money," IUD 
Bulletin. March, 1963. 1
Chart 5. Unemployment Rate and Yield on Long-Term 
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Source: Economic Report of the President, January, 1964, as cited in
AFL-CIO, "Gearing Money Policy to Economic Growth," American 
Federationist, May, 1964, p. 9. 187
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regretfully stated in Augusts
In mid-1963 . . . signs of an increased payments 
deficit and pressures from Western European cen­
tral bankers lead the Administration to impose 
monetary restraints on the domestic economy. The 
money supply was tightened, interest rates, were 
raised and the discount rate, which the Federal 
Reserve System charges on loans to commercial 
banks, was increased from 3% to 3-1/2%. This 
restrictive policy will have little, if any, 
impact on the payments deficit, but it places a 
damper on the faltering advance of the economy, 
at a time of high unemployment and large amounts 
of idle plants and machines.
The Federal Reserve Board's action of raising the 
discount rate was called "outrageous" by AFL-CIO president, 
George Meany, and he urged an immediate "meaningful" tax 
cut to offset the "ill-considered" action. The AFL-CIO was 
quite aware that the Federal Reserve had been trying to keep 
domestic capital at home and to attract foreign capital by 
"operation nudge." This had involved driving up the short­
term interest rates and holding down' the long-term rates.
94AFL-CIO, Balance of Payments. A Statement Prepared by 
the AFL-CIO Executive Council, (Unity House, Pennsylvania? 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, August ,13, 1963) (in the files of the AFL-CIO). 
See also: AFL-CIO, The National Economy. A Statement Pre­
pared by the AFL-CIO Executive Council (Unity House, Penn­
sylvania: American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, August 15, 1963) (in the files of 
the AFL-CIO).
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Yet, organized labor was of the opinion that the constant 
upward movement of short-term rates would mean higher 
interest rates in general.^ The Industrial Union Depart­
ment in December, 1963, denied the need to curb the United 
States economy because of the balance of payments and urged 
that direct controls be instigated over the flow of invest­
ments to foreign countries until effective international
Q 6monetary reform was achieved.
Nathaniel Goldfinger, economist for the AFL-CIO, in
,March, 1964, commented:
In 1964, America once again faces a potential threat 
from the Federal Reserve— monetary policy may be 
used to negate the demand-generating and job-creating 
impact of the tax cut. Once again, the Nation's 
monetary policy may be tilting with the windmills 
of overall demand inflation or ineffectively respond­
ing to a. balance-of-payments deficit, leaving 
persistent, high levels of unemployment in its wake.^
^AFL-CIO, "Labor Blasts Higher Interest," IUD Bulletin, 
August, 1963, p. 3.
^AFL-CIO, "Economic Planning Urged by Convention 
Resolution," IUD Bulletin. December, 1963, p. 13.
^U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Domestic 
Finance of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings. 
The Federal Reserve System After 50 Years, 8 8th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1964, p. 1472.
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When the Federal Reserve Board in November, 1964, raised 
the discount rate from 3-1/2 to 4 per cent, the AFL-CIO 
continued to view this with alarm. The Executive Council 
stated that it would have a curbing effect on parts of the 
economy, and would do very little to curtail any sudden 
short-term outflows of private capital. To the Council, 
the strength of the American dollar depended mainly on the
strength and the prosperity of the American economy at home
. . Qftand it requested a reversal of the Board's actions.
Organized labor's attitude toward monetary policy in
1965 was primarily a carry-over from the previous years'
concern with the Federal Reserve Board's actions on the
99balance of payments issue. The AFL-CIO stressed the need 
for vigorous resistance against the campaign in favor of
98AFL-CIO, Federal Reserve Board Action. A Statement 
Prepared by the AFL-CIO Executive Council (Washington, D.C.: 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, November 24, 1964) (in the files of the AFL- 
CIO) .
99AFL-CIO, Balance-of-Payments, A Statement Prepared by 
the AFL-CIO Executive Council (Bal Harbour, Florida: Amer­
ican Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organ­
izations, February 28, 1965) (in the files of the AFL-CIO).
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tighter money and higher interest r a t e s . O r g a n i z e d  
labor's awareness of the significance of monetary policy
was quite clearly expressed by Nathaniel Goldfinger when he
i
said:
The AFL-CIO has consistently viewed monetary policy 
as a subject of concern to every American. What the 
Federal Reserve System decides can affect job oppor­
tunities of men and women all over America. What the 
Federal Reserve decides affects the cost of money, 
of cars, of houses, of doing business, and the upward 
and downward trends of business cycles.
Summary
The publications of organized labor from 1914 to 1945 
reveal an attitude toward monetary policy which was limited 
both in depth and scope. Economists and statisticians 
within the administrative structures were few in number, 
and the organizations found it necessary to turn to trained 
persons in the financial field for information and explana­
tions.
100aFL-CIO, Statement on the President1s Economic 
Report. Presented on behalf of the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Walter P. 
Reuther, Vice President, AFL-CIOy Chairman of the AFL-CIO 
Economic Policy Committee, and President, UAW, March 1,
1965. (In the files of the AFL-CIO).
•1-Olu.s., Congress, House, Hearings. The Federal Reserve 
System After 50 Years, op. cit., p. 1474.
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Organized labor's general approach to monetary policy 
from 1914 through the 1920's was characterized by a lack 
of knowledge and spasmodic interest. It, however, dis­
approved of high interest rates, feared excessive stock 
speculation, eyed bankers with suspicion, and supported 
price stabilization as a monetary policy objective.
During the depression years of the 1930's, organized 
labor became increasingly aware of the influence which 
monetary policy had on the worker and on industry, and of 
the need for an expansion within its own research depart­
ments. Although at times advocating stronger governmental 
control, it favored the Federal Reserve's actions attempting 
to alleviate the critical economic situation.
The Second World War brought no basic changes in the 
attitude of organized labor to Federal. Reserve policy.
Its major criticisms were directed toward the War Labor 
Board.
Since World War II, organized labor has experienced a 
marked growth in its understanding of monetary policy. This 
maturing has been reflected in its publications and in its 
increased participation in government hearings. The junction 
of staffs and attitudes by the merger of the American Feder­
ation. of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations
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in 1955 aided research development. The Employment Act of 
1946 served as a stimulant to its interest in monetary policy 
and it advocated those policy measures which would fulfill 
the objectives of the Act.
Prom the end of World War II through the late 1940's, 
contradicting views toward Federal Reserve actions were 
expressed by the American Federation of Labor and the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations. The American Feder- . 
ation of Labor believed that the money supply had increased 
abnormally causing inflation and it wanted the Federal 
Reserve to follow a course of tighter money. The Congress 
of Industrial Organizations felt that the Federal Reserve 
was pursuing the correct policy by continuing to support the 
long-term government bond market. However, both organ­
izations agreed that consumer credit controls should have 
been retained.
During the Korean War period, the American Federation 
of Labor felt the need for inflationary control and supported 
the Federal Reserve-Treasury "Accord." The Congress of 
Industrial Organizations maintained that the Federal Reserve 
policy in 1951-1952 was ineffective and urged direct 
monetary control in this type of emergency.
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Organized labor vigorously attacked the Federal 
Reserve's hard money policies of the Eisenhower adminis­
tration. It believed that the Federal Reserve was fighting 
a "phantom" inflation and was contributing to recessions in 
the economy.
During the 1960's, the American Federation of Labor 
and Congress of Industrial Organizations became increasingly 
concerned over the balance-of-payments problem. It con­
cluded that the Federal Reserve's policy of "operation nudge" 
was not highly successful and suggested direct controls 
over foreign investments until effective international 
monetary reform could be achieved.
CHAPTER VI
ORGANIZED LABOR'S VIEWS TOWARD INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY REFORM AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
1943-1965
From 1943 through 1965, organized labor expressed 
definite attitudes toward the Bretton Woods Agreements 
and the Federal Reserve System. The purpose of this 
chapter is to present organized labor's views toward 
international monetary legislation and proposals for reform 
within the Federal Reserve System.
Bretton Woods International Monetary Agreements
International monetary affairs again captured the 
interest of organized labor in the early 1940's.^ It was 
concerned that decisions of far-reaching importance in 
world affairs were being made without the participation of 
the organized labor movement.
1Supra, Chapter IV, p. 127.
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One such decision centered around international 
monetary stabilization which was being subjected to intense 
study by various nations. The Congress of Industrial Organ­
izations felt that it was a question of great intricacy, 
difficult to understand and explain. However, it was a 
matter of profound importance to workers because the outcome 
could influence employment, incomes and the standard of 
living. To the Congress of Industrial Organizations, this 
field was unfortunately left to the expert who may or may 
not act in a way to serve the masses of the people.
The Congress of Industrial Organizations considered
/
the gold standard no longer feasible because the United 
States held a large portion of the world's supply of gold, 
and there would be no practical means of redistribution to 
foreign countries. It noted the United States and Great 
Britain had suggested alternative proposals which were 
known respectively as the White and Keynes Plans after their 
authors. The organization explained in The Economic 
Outlook that each plan defined the value of the national 
currencies and provided that no country could take indepen­
dent action to change the value of its currency without 
permission from the international monetary authority. If 
a country were to have temporary difficulty in its balance
of payments, the monetary authorities under each plan would 
provide credit support until the country's emergency situa­
tion was rectified. Thus, exchange rates could be saved 
from instability and the world kept from financial distress. 
The Congress of Industrial Organizations contended that it 
was of utmost importance that the United States, in dis­
cussions on monetary stabilization, insist on either of the 
followings
(1 ) its freedom independently to fight depression 
and maintain and extend employment and social secur­
ity, whenever the rest of the world refuses to come 
along, or (2) a definite understanding that the 
international monetary authority shall be committed, 
not simply to exchange stability, but preeminently 
to world conditions of full employment, rising 
standards of life, and enlarged social security.^
It stressed that this subject demanded understanding and
3study by the labor movement.
/
In.1944, a plan, uniting the recommendations of Keynes 
and White, emerged at the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 
and attended by delegates from forty-four nations. At 
this meeting, provisions were made for an International
^Congress of Industrial Organizations, "The Gold 




Monetary Fund and an International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (World Bank). The International Monetary 
Fund had a basic two-fold purpose: first, to stabilize
values of the currencies of member nations, and second, to
provide credit for trade by making foreign exchange avail-
's<' /able.to central banks or ‘other government agencies. The 
United States'quota was $2.75 billion of the total $8 . 8  
billion. The International Bank, with a proposed sub­
scription of $9.1 billion had two primary functions:
1. To provide long-term credit for the reconstruction 
of war-stricken nations and the development of 
resources in those countries whose industrial­
ization has been slow.
2. To provide, through credit, the foundation for a 
permanent expansion of world trade among nations 
by increasing productive capacity.^
Of the total, the United States'quota was $3,175 billion,
more than twice the amount of the next largest contributor.̂
During the hearings on the Bretton Woods Agreements
Act, both the American Federation of Labor^ and Congress of
Industrial Organizations were represented. William Green,
4Studenski and Kroos, op. cit., p. 462.
^Ibid.
gSee statement on Bretton Woods in the American Feder­
ation of Labor, Proceedings. 1946, pp. 182-183, 610.
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president of the Federation, recommended that Congress 
accept this agreement with clarification and safeguards.
With the understanding that the Bretton Woods Agreements 
would not alone serve as a complete solution to post-war 
chaos in international trade, Green explained the Feder­
ation's reasons for supporting the agreements.
He stated that the policy followed between the wars of 
national self-interest in competitive currency depreciation 
fostered depressions, discriminatory control of foreign 
exchange, and other forms of economic warfare. This policy 
in some cases temporarily aided in solving domestic 
problems for individual countries but in the long run con­
tracted international trade, lowered the standard of living 
in all countries, and strengthened trends toward isolation­
ism. To Green, the Bretton Woods Agreements would provide 
a plan for the elimination of such practices and a gradual 
restoration of the orderly and stable exchange relationships 
essential to expanding international trade. He believed 
that it was advantageous to the workers that the currency of 
their country be stabilized, that inflation or deflation be 
avoided, and that their savings and their earnings not be 
destroyed by extreme fluctuations. He stressed that the 
American Federation of Labor's interest was not limited just
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to the American workers, but he believed that it was both a
matter of human decency and a matter of enlightened self-
interest for the United States to share through the World
7Bank in restoring the pre-war economic status of allies.
The American Federation of Labor recommended that 
several changes be made in the Bretton Woods Agreements. 
Among these changes was that consultation with the Inter-
Qnational Labor Organizations be made a basic administrative 
procedure before deciding upon policies and use of funds.
The Federation further suggested that contracts initiated 
under the reconstruction and development loans should 
include standard labor provisions recommended by the
QInternational Labor Organization.
At these hearings, the Congress of Industrial Organ­
izations was represented by James B. Carey, Secretary-
7 .U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Cur­
rency, Hearings. Bretton Woods Agreements Acts. 79th Cong., 
1st Sess., 1945, pp. 679-681.
Q The International Labor Organization was founded in 
1919 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference. Even though 
Samuel Gompers headed the charter commission, American 
organized labor was not represented at the International 
Labor Office until the United States government accepted 
membership in 1934. Taft, pp. pit., p. 596.
^U.S., Congress, Hearings, Bretton Woods Agreements 
Act.. op. cit., pp. 681-682.
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Treasurer, who said that his organization stood firmly 
behind the Bretton Woods Agreements. He offered the endorse­
ment of the Congress of Industrial Organizations to the 
Agreements and urged that it be adopted without amendments 
or changes. In supporting the International Monetary Fund, 
Mr. Carey stated:
For . . . reasons of economic and political security, 
of stabilized currencies, and a continued flow of 
foreign trade, and of a rising standard of living 
through the world, we in the C.I.O. endorse whole­
heartedly the proposed International Monetary Fund 
as an integral part of any program for economic 
cooperation with the rest of the world.^9
He explained that the Bank for Reconstruction and Develop­
ment would not encroach upon private banking. Instead, it 
would stimulate greater activity on the part of private 
banking interests by guaranteeing loans and by supplying 
loans in instances where they could not be made through 
normal channels at reasonable rates. Mr. Carey concluded 
that "the fund and the bank are indispensable to the orderly 
development of an expanding United States economy in an 
expanding w o r l d . I n  July, 1945, the bill to provide for
1 0Ibid., p. 1185. 
1 1Ibid., pp.1186-1187.
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the United States' participation in the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development became Public Law 171, but it did not include
1 9the provisions desired by the American Federation of Labor.
In 1959, the AFL-CIO made a statement before the sub­
committee on the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
Stanley H. Ruttenberg, then Director of Research for the 
AFL-CIO, offered the support of his organization to House 
Report 4452. This bill provided for an increase of $1,375 
billion in the United States' quota in the International 
Monetary Fund and of $3,175 billion in the World Bank.
He stated that the increased amount in the International 
Monetary Fund would be commensurate with the expanded 
volume of international trade, generally high prices of 
commodities, and the increased convertibility of currencies. 
The AFL-CIO believed that the World Bank had satisfactorily 
performed in aiding economic growth to foreign countries, 
and its funds should be expanded.
Although the AFL-CIO supported these agencies, it 
emphasized that they had relatively limited functions. The
l^u.S., Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1945, XCI, part 14, pp. 888-889.
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International Monetary Fund was not directly engaged in
financing development projects and the World Bank's loans
did not include "social capital" projects such as schools
and hospitals. Yet, in the opinion of the AFL-CIO, projects
of this type were vital not only to improve the living
conditions of the underdeveloped countries, but also for
economic growth. Therefore, it urged that other programs
be instigated to assist economic development in the under-
13developed countries.
In 1965, the AFL-CIO supported a proposal to again 
increase the United States' quota in the International 
Monetary Fund along with increases for other members. The 
quota from other member nations would rise from a total of 
$16 billion to $21 billion, and the United States' quota 
would be increased from approximately $4.1 billion to $5.2
billion. Nathaniel Goldfinger, before the House Banking/
and Currency Committee, stated that the AFL-CIO was concerned
•^AFL-CIO, International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
Statement by Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Director of Research, 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House 
Banking and Currency Committee on H. R. 4452. and H. R. 4453, 
March 5, 1959 (in the files of the AFL-CIO). See also, 
AFL-CIO, "Helping Economic Growth,"Economic Review,
December, 1958, pp. 73-80.
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with this problem because the "economic health of the
United States and foreign countries affects every American
citizen." He contended that in the 1960's, the United
States' balance of payments deficit had been used as an
attempt to avoid necessary improvements in social legis-
lation and, at times, to tighten money. Mr. Goldfinger
concluded with the AFL-CIO Executive Council's statement
made in February, 1965:
In the long run, a more effective international 
monetary mechanism is the basic solution to the 
payments problems of the United States and the 
world. The United States should continue to seek 
a mechanism that would provide an effective bank 
for the world's credit needs.^
In conclusion, the Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 
1945 was supported by organized labor because it felt the 
outcome would have an important effect on income, employment 
and the standard of living. Although the Congress of
14AFL-CIO, Act to Authorize an Increase in the Inter­
national Monetary Fund Quota of the United States, State­
ment of Nathaniel Goldfinger, Director of the Department of 
Research, American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations, to the House Banking and Currency 
Committee on H. R. 6467, Bill to Amend Bretton Woods Agree­
ments Act. April 6 , 1965. (in the files of the AFL-CIO).
See also, AFL-CIO, Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive 
Council, Balance of Payments (Bal Harbour, Florida: American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
February 28, 1965) (in the files of the AFL-CIO).
Industrial Organizations stood firmly behind the Agreements 
without amendments, the American Federation of Labor felt 
that a provision should be made for consultation with the 
International Labor Organization.
The AFL-CIO continues to defend the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank. This interest by organized 
labor reflects an increased growth into the area of inter­
national monetary affairs and a basic feeling that it, too, 
should have a voice in these matters.
The Federal Reserve, A Public System 
Since World War II, the AFL-CIO has offered various 
proposals for reform in the structure and composition of 
the Federal Reserve System. Also, it has been critical of 
the way the principal instruments of control have been used 
by the Federal Reserve authorities to implement its policy 
decisions and has suggested proposals for strengthening 
these instruments. Convention proceedings of organized 
labor, government hearings and reports, organized labor 
publications, and general statements have reflected its 
attitude toward desired reform within the System.
It is the basic belief of the AFL-CIO that the
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provisions of the Employment Act of 1 9 4 6 should be applied 
to the Federal Reserve as well as to the rest of the govern­
ment. In order to accomplish this objective, organized 
labor has suggested that the Federal Reserve has to be
changed "to make it a truly public system and a regular
16part of the United States government." The AFL-CIO has 
given consideration to changes in the Board of Governors, 
the Federal Open Market Committee, the Advisory Council, 
and the Reserve Banks.
Board of Governors
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
is composed of seven men, each of whom is appointed by the 
President of the United States, and these appointments are 
confirmed by the Senate. Each member serves a fourteen-year 
term and is ineligible for reappointment after serving a 
full term. One term expires on January 31 every two years. 
The Chairman and Vice Chairman are designated from the Board 
members by the President.. These offices are for four-year
•̂ •̂ The Act provided that the Federal Government should 
use all practical means to promote maximum employment, 
production and purchasing power.
•^AFL-CIO, "Gearing Money Policy to Economic Growth," 
American Federationist, May, 1964, p. 13.
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renewable periods, and do not necessarily coincide with the 
President's term of office. The members of the Board 
represent the Federal Reserve Districts, but only one 
member from any one district can be appointed. In selecting 
members of the Board, consideration is given to financial,
agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests as well
17as geographical divisions of the country.
In the view of the AFL-CIO, the terms of office of the 
Board Chairman and Vice Chairman of the System should 
coincide with the terms of the office of the President of 
the United States, and these officers should serve "at the 
will of the President." This change, to the. AFL-CIO, would 
bring about a closer harmony between the President and the 
chief officers of the government's monetary authority.
In addition, the AFL-CIO recommends that the terms of 
•office of the members of the Board ̂ of Governors be reduced 
below the fourteen-year period. It wishes to retain the 
policy of overlapping terms of office but suggested expir­
ations "every year or two."
17Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System (4fch 
ed., Washington, D.C.: The Federal Reserve, 1961), pp. 73-
75.
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The AFL-CIO feels that there should be on the Board of 
Governors a fair representation of the trade union movement, 
consumers, and small business interests. In addition, the 
number of members of the Board who would come from any one 
economic segment of society should be specifically and 
strictly limited. The organization believes that only 
through such a change in the governing body can the System 
become a truly public governmental institution, representa­
tive of the "experiences and thinking of the major economic 
groups in American society," rather than of a small minority 
(bankers).'*'®
Federal Open Market Committee
At a level of authority equivalent to the Board, the 
Federal Open Market Committee is composed of the seven 
members of the Board of Governors, plus five members from 
the twelve Reserve Bank presidents or vice presidents. The 
five members are elected annually by the Board of Directors
18U.S., Congress, Hearings. Monetary Policy and Manage­
ment of the Public Debt, op. cit.. pp. 819, 830; U.S., Con­
gress, Hearings. The Relationship of Prices to Economic 
Stability and Growth. Commentaries, op. cit.. pp. 54-55; 
U.S., Congress, Hearings. The Federal Reserve System After 
50 Years, op. cit.. pp. 1480, 1486.
of the Reserve Banks. The Committee is charged with the
responsibility of deciding the extent of the open market
operations and the conditions under which the operations are
1 Qto be undertaken.
The AFL-CIO, from 1958 to 1964, significantly changed 
its attitude toward the Open Market Committee. At the 
hearings on the Financial Institutions Act of 1957, the 
AFL-CIO maintained that a strict limitation should be 
placed on the number of members of the Federal Open Market 
Committee who came from any one economic segment of 
American life. It felt that the Committee was dominated 
by bankers and big businessmen and was not representative
• Of)of the American people. .
The Third Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO 
in 1959 adopted a resolution concerning the Open Market 
Committee. It recommended that the Committee should be 
made a public body, representative of the American people,
19Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System, 
op. cit., p. 76.
20U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and 
Currency, Hearings. Financial Institutions Act of 1957.
85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 1710.
, 210
or should be abolished and replaced by a more representative
21Board of Governors.
In 1964, the AFL-CIO advocated the abolition of this
Committee and the transfer of its "current functions" to
22the Board of Governors. No doubt organized labor wanted 
to centralize control within the Board of Governors (after 
its recommended changes had been made within the Board's 
. structure) and to eliminate the influence of the five bank­
ers.
Also, it is the contention of the AFL-CIO that the 
nineteen New York dealers in government securities "who 
acted on behalf of the Open Market Committee are a private 
monopoly." These dealers handle their transactions pri­
marily with multimillionaires and big commercial banks and 
do not deal with the broad middle and upper-middle classes. 
The AFL-CIO feels:
. . .  we should develop some other method, an alter­
native method, which would broaden the base of
21AFL-CIO, Policy Resolutions, op. cit., p. 38. See 
also, AFL-CIO, "The Federal Reserve— A Public System, 1 
Economic Trends and Outlook. March, 1959, p. 2.
0 0“ U.S., Congress, Hearings, The Federal Reserve System 
After 50 Years, op. cit.. p. 1498.
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23operations of the Open Market Committee perhaps 
through the 12 district Reserve Banks . . . that 
the purchases and sales of government securities 
should be broadened out at least to reach that 
part of the public which wishes to purchase govern­
ment securities.2^ -
It is organized labor's opinion that, although it does not
have the solution to "this problem," it deserves careful
examination.
The Federal Advisory Council
The Council consists of one member-from each Federal 
Reserve District who is selected annually by the Board of 
Directors of each Reserve Bank. The Council is required 
to meet four times a year, but may meet more often if it 
wishes or if the Board requests it to do so. It deter­
mines its own procedure and elects its own officers. The 
Council serves in an advisory capacity; it confers with the
Board on business conditions and makes advisory recommenda-
26tions regarding the affairs of the Federal Reserve System.
*JIf the Open Market Committee were abolished, the open 
market operations of the Board should be broadened.
2^U.S., Congress, Hearings. The Federal Reserve System 
After 50 Years, op. cit.. p. 1500.
2 5Ibid., p. 1501.
26Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System, op. 
cit.. p. 77.
212
The AFL-CIO feels that this is a "bankers' council" 
since its members have usually been prominent bankers who 
accepted the position on an honorary basis. Organized 
labor believes that the Council should be replaced by 
representatives of the trade union movement, consumers, 
small businesses, and farmers, but it has no further 
recommendations for change.^
The Federal Reserve Banks
The twelve Federal Reserve banks are "mixed institu­
tions, " i.e., public and private ownership. Although capital 
stock is subscribed by the member banks at the statutory 
rate of six per cent of each member bank1s capital and 
surplus, only half of it had been paid in by 1964. The 
member banks1 stock of the Federal Reserve cannot be trans­
ferred and is entitled to be retired only at par in the 
event of liquidation or dissolution.^®
Nathaniel Goldfinger, AFL-CIO representative at the 
1964 hearings on the Federal Reserve, extended AFL-CIO
27u.S.» Congress, Hearings, Federal Reserve System After 
50 Years, op. cit.. p. 1480; see also, U.S.,Congress, Hear­
ings. Financial Institutions Act of 1957. op. cit.. p. 1710.
2®Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System, op. 
cit.. pp. 66-69.
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support of House Report 3783. This bill would permit the 
return of the $500 million Federal Reserve stock to the 
6000 member banks. When questioned, he stated that he was 
opposed to the "symbolism" involved in the stock ownership—  
"the private ownership of a public system." He felt that . 
the Federal Reserve should be a truly public system without
OQ"symbolic" private ownership. 7
The Board of Directors of each reserve bank is composed 
of nine men. Of the nine members, six of them, Class A 
and B directors, are elected by the member commercial banks 
of the district, and the three Class C directors, including 
the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, are appointed by the 
Federal Reserve Board. Class A directors are bankers 
representing member banks of their district, while the 
Class B directors must be actively engaged in commerce, 
agriculture or industry. The general public is represented 
by Class C directors; one must be a person of considerable 
banking experience who serves as the Chairman.
29U.S., Congress, Hearings, Federal Reserve System 
After 50 Years, loc. cit.
■^Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System. 
op. cit.. pp. 69-72.
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Despite the provision that Class B directors do not
include bankers, and that the Class C directors represent
the "general public," the AFL-CIO maintains that bankers
dominated the Board of Directors and changes are necessary
in its composition. It urges the inclusion of representa*-
tives from organized labor, small businesses,,and consum- 
31ers.J1
Member Banks of the Federal Reserve System
The membership of the Federal Reserve consists of
national banks, whose affiliation is compulsory, and state
chartered banks, whose membership is voluntary. However,
the state chartered banks must meet the requirements of the
32Federal Reserve Board.
As early as 1933, organized labor supported financial 
experts who recommended that all banks in the United States 
become members of the Federal Reserve System.^ This same 
basic idea was advocated in 1964 by the AFL-CIO. Mr.
31U.S.,Congress, Hearings. Federal Reserve System After 
50 Years, op. cit.. p. 1486.
32Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System. 
op. cit.. pp. 64-66.
33Supra. Chapter .IV, p. 17.
215
Goldfinger, testifying for his organization, recommended
that some method be devised to make it compulsory for all
commercial banks to be members of the Federal Reserve. When
he was questioned further, he admitted that perhaps
Federal Reserve regulation over reserve creating power of
the commercial banks would serve the same purpose as actual
membership. He explained that his organization simply
wished to extend the control of the authority of the Federal
34Reserve over all commercial banks. The AFL-CIO has, also, 
considered proposals pertaining to nonbank financial 
institutions.
Nonbank Financial Institutions
Nonbank financial institutions have increased in size 
and relative importance in the American economy. Organized 
labor sees these financial intermediaries as a potential 
offset to monetary policy because of the consequent rapid , 
increase in the public's holding of liquid assets. Changes 
in the volume of these near money assets may have an
■^U.S., Congress, Hearings. Federal Reserve System 
After 50 Years, op. cit.. p. 1492. For earlier statement, 
see U.S., Congress, Hearings. Monetary. Credit and Fiscal 
Policies, op. cit.-. p. 301.
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important effect on the demand for money balances and hence 
on the velocity of money. For this reason, the AFL-CIO 
feels that the monetary authorities would have a better 
control over the level of the money supply if nonbank 
financial institutions were brought under the Federal 
Reserve System.
Instruments of General Monetary Control
The power to buy and sell securities in the open market, 
the power to fix discount rates, and the power to alter the 
reserve requirements of the member banks within limits 
specified by Congress are the three major instruments of 
general Federal Reserve monetary control. The AFL-CIO 
believes that the Federal Reserve Board has failed to use 
with flexibility all three monetary instruments for 
regulation of the money supply to meet the needs of a
Of.growing economy.
35The Report of the Commission on Money and Credit, 
Money and Credit (Encrlewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 81, n. 1.
36AFL-CIO, "Monetary Policy for All Americans," Labor1s 
Economic Review. August, 1959, p. 42.
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Open Market Operations
The Federal Reserve's purchases or sales of readily 
marketable asset claims in the open market is referred to 
as open market operations. Through these transactions, the 
Federal Reserve can effect the cost and availability of 
credit.
The AFL-CIO has indicated a realization of the
importance of open market operations and its effect upon
the money supply and the level of interest rates. However,
it was opposed to the Federal Reserve's "bill's only"
policy and believes that open market operations should be
conducted in both the short- and long-term ends of the
markets.^ Stanley H. Ruttenberg, economist for the AFL-
CIO, stated in 1961:
Monetary policy as a means of encouraging expansion 
is less effective than restrictive monetary policies 
because of the stickiness of long-term interest 
rates . . . However, if efforts were made directly 
at reducing the long-term interest rates, increased 
credit availability could be turned into a success­
ful expansionary technique by making not only more 
credit available, but available at lower long-term 
interest rates.
•^Ibid.. p. 43. See also, AFL-CIO, Policy Resolutions. 
op. cit.. p. 38.
38The Report of the Commission on Money and Credit, 
op. cit.. p. 64, n. 2.
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Discount Rates
The discount rate is the publicly announced charge
applied by the Federal Reserve Banks on discounts or
advances to member banks. Every fourteen days, each Federal
Reserve Bank must establish, as a matter of statutory
requirement, its discount rate, subject to review and
approval by the Board of Governors. Legally, the Board has
the power not only to approve the rates established by each
Reserve Bank but also it can take the initiative in their
determination. In recent years, the tendency has been for
the rates to reach uniformity after some temporary lags.
Generally, changes in the discount rates are used to
support the effectiveness of open market operations. These
changes tend torfollow movements in market rates. However,
the relationship between the discount rate and the market
rates varies. This could be contributed to the infrequent
change in the discount rate as opposed to the continuously
moving market rates. Often, the result of this differential
39may counter those effects of open market operations. In 
this regard, suppose the Federal Reserve were pursuing a
39Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System. 
op. cit., p. 46-50.
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tight monetary policy. If market rates of interest increased 
faster than the discount rate# the commercial "banks would 
tend to borrow reserves rather than to seil short-term 
securities.
Stanley Ruttenberg of the AFL-CIO supported a proposal
which was a compromise between the "present" discretionary
40policy and a fully automatic rule. Under the compromise,
changes in the discount rate would be tied to changes in 
the Treasury bill rate but the spread between the two rates 
would be changed periodically on a discretionary basis.^
Mr. Ruttenberg would probably reject a fully automatic 
rule because of the danger of tying the discount rate to a 
single market rate. If that particular rate moved out of. . 
line with other short-term market rates, it also might pull 
the discount rate out of line. Yet, the compromise proposal 
would allow for discretion on the part of the monetary 
authority in making necessary adjustments. No doubt 
Mr. Ruttenberg felt that open market operations could be
^®A fully automatic rule proposes that the discount 
rate should be determined automatically each week by the 
current rate on short-term Treasury bills.
41 . .Commxssxon on Money and Credxt, op. cit., pp. 6 6 ,
n. 1.
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strengthened without the counter effects of the fully 
discretionary procedure. But, the proposal Mr. Ruttenberg 
supported would actually give nothing which could not be 
achieved under the fully discretionary system.
Reserve Requirements
Since 1933,^ the Federal Reserve has had the authority
to change the required reserve percentages in order to
achieve countercyclical adjustments in the reserve position
of member banks. Yet, since 1951, the Federal Reserve has
used this instrument in a countercyclical manner only during 
43recessions.
The AFL-CIO has taken the position that reserve require­
ments should play as important a role in controlling infla-
44tionary pressures,"if they exist," as the discount rate.
Federal Reserve authority to vary the required reserve 
percentages for commercial banks was first made available on 
a temporary basis in the emergency banking legislation of 
1933 and was made a permanent institution of reserve banking 
by the Banking Act of 1935. Board of Governors, The Federal 
Reserve System, op. cit., p. 51.
^ Ibid.. p. 55.
44AFL-CIO, "Monetary Policy for All Americans," op. 
cit.. p. 48y U.S., Congress, Hearings, Employment. Growth 
and the Price Levels, op. cit.. p. 3110.
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Stanley Ruttenberg commented in 1961:
It is not a wise policy for the Federal Reserve 
Board to give up its use of reserve requirements 
. . .  I agree that major reliance should be placed 
on open market operations, but it is also wise to 
retain, for countercyclical purposes, reserve 
requirements as well as the discount functions as 
a means of regulating the level of money supply.^
Also, secondary reserve requirements have been
suggested by the AFL-CIO as an "additional and appropriate"
instrument of monetary policy. Generally, "secondary
reserves" are considered an analytical rather than a legal
concept. There is no hard line of demarcation between
earning assets held by a bank and secondary reserves./
Yet, these reserves would be differentiated from other 
assets by a banker in that they are easily convertible 
into cash without a significant loss. A bank's balance 
sheet does not show secondary reserves as a separate 
category. No doubt organized labor would want legal 
specification of secondary reserves in coordination with 
the Federal Reserve Board's standby authority to impose 
these requirements. However, the AFL-CIO has not 
specified what it would consider to be actual secondary




In 1961, when the Commission on Money and Credit
recommended that existing statutory reserve requirements
against savings and time deposits be repealed, Stanley
Ruttenberg did not agree. Not only did he feel that these
requirements should be maintained, but also he proposed
that the Federal Reserve Board develop techniques to apply
a similar type of reserve requirement on competing nonbank
47financial intermediaries. However, Mr. Ruttenberg did
not justify his reasoning for reserve requirements on nonbank
financial intermediaries.
Nor did Mr. Ruttenberg support the Commission's
recommendation that the range of reserve requirements for
demand deposits be set from eight to eighteen per cent.
The Commission felt this would give the Federal Reserve
Board power to meet the needs of growth emergencies.
However, Mr. Ruttenberg simply contested the necessity
of changing the range from the established range of seven to
4fttwenty-two per cent but did not defend his position. °
46 .Ibid.. p. 6 8 .




Organized labor has generally held the position that 
more use should be made of selective monetary measures in 
order to strengthen monetary policy during an inflationary 
or over-investment boom situation. In 1964, the only 
selective control available to the Federal Reserve author­
ities was the power to alter margin requirements on .credit 
granted by any lender— banks, brokers, and dealers— for 
the purpose of purchasing or carrying listed securities. 
Since the 1920's, organized labor has been concerned with 
stock market speculation and has supported governmental 
controls over stock market activity. Although organized 
labor publications give no insight into its attitude 
toward, the margin required, no doubt it would prefer high 
margin requirements by the Federal Reserve. This would 
minimize the danger of excessive use of credit in financing 
stock market speculation and the reoccurance of a spec­
ulative stock market boom, like the one in 1929.
Stanley Ruttenberg suggested to the Commission on 
Money and Credit that if margins were proper for the New 
York Stock Exchange, they were also proper in the Treasury 
securities market. He concluded that stand-by authority 
by the Federal Reserve to impose effective and flexible
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margins on the secondary securities market would be helpful
49in preventing speculation and manipulation.
Organized labor maintains that an effective stabiliza­
tion effort requires that there be stand-by authority to
use selective controls over consumer credit and mortgage 
50lending. However, it feels that these instruments should
be supplemented by selective controls over loans for
inventories as well as plant and equipment expenditures.
Stanley H. Ruttenberg pointed out that if one examines the
business cycle of the post World War II period, the most
volatile sectors in the economy have been inventories and
plant and equipment. To him, the absence of selective
credit controls over these areas "dooms monetary policy
in a complex economy to excessive general restraint during
51inflationary situations."
Nathaniel Goldfinger has said:
. . .  it is often more effective to treat the specific 
causes of inflation directly at their sources, rather 
than indirectly, because monetary policy is so impre­
cise in its effects.^2
^Commission on Money and Credit, op. cit., p. 117, n. 1.
SOg.S., Congress, Hearings, Employment. Growth, and 
Price Levels, loc. cit.
^Commission on Money and Credit, pp. cit., p. 76, 
n. 1, p. 257, n. 4.c o^U.S., Congress, Hearings, Federal Reserve System 
After 50 Years, op., cit.. p. 1474.
225
Coordination of Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy formulation, to the AFL-CIO, must be 
brought "within the fold of the United States government 
and not.left outside." Organized labor strongly stresses 
coordination between the monetary authorities, the Treasury, 
the Labor Department, Commerce Department, and the lending 
agencies of the United States g o v e r n m e n t . 3̂
Coordination is also desired by the AFL-CIO between 
monetary and fiscal policies to achieve sufficiently 
expansionary and growth-generating forces for economic 
balance and strength. It feels that balanced economic 
growth generally requires an ample, increasing money supply 
at relatively low interest rates. However, if fiscal 
policy is designed to encourage and monetary policy to 
discourage expansion within the economy, the AFL-CIO 
believes the result can be serious economic distortion.^ 
Yet, the AFL-CIO does not feel that countercyclical 
debt management would serve as an appropriate instrument 
for stabilization. The need to minimize the cost- of
5 3 Ibid., p. 1481. . , , , . 
5 4Ibid., pp. 1 4 7 3 - 1 4 7 5 .
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managing the federal debt must have top priority. Therefore,
the AFL-CIO maintains only coordinated fiscal and monetary
. . . 55policies should be used for stabilization.
In general, organized labor has advocated monetary
f  i
ease because of its association with expansion of business
f !
and employment. Yet, it does recognize that a tight monetary
policy is necessary when the economy is faced with an
actual demand inflation, such as in wartime.
In conclusion, the AFL-CIO feels that when its,
recommended revisions have been made within the Federali
Reserve System, it will be a public instrument of public 
policy— "a public system."





The growth and development of the organized labor 
movement in the United States has been a long and involved 
struggle for survival, recognition, and acceptance. This 
struggle has brought forth a changing character within 
American unionism which has been reflected in its attitude 
toward monetary reform and monetary policy.
Organized labor's maturing approach to these mone­
tary actions has progressed with the advances that have 
been made in economic theory. More specifically, the 
Keynesian revolution helped to clarify the use of monetary 
and fiscal policies in the achievement of economic objec­
tives.
The following sections will summarize organized 
labor's attitude toward monetary policy and monetary 
reform, give general conclusions for the entire period 





In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the 
United States' economy was undergoing a persistent price 
decline with occasional brief interruptions. Certain 
groups in the economy suffered at various times from this 
deflation. The laboring classes, including those who were 
members ofvunions, were faced with an insufficient supply 
of money, high interest rates, and during periods of 
depression, high levels of unemployment. Because of these 
adverse economic conditions, the platforms of the early 
labor organizations, such as the National Labor Union 
(1866), the Industrial Congress and Industrial Brotherhood 
(1874), and the Knights of Labor (1878), included somewhat 
radical monetary reform proposals. Organized labor urged 
the abolition of the National Banking System and the
issuance of paper money by the government.
f '
Because of the defects in the National Banking System, 
organized labor had a justifiable complaint; but it is very 
doubtful that it basically understood the operations of the 
System. Organized labor's opposition to the National 
Banking System can be particularly attributed to a deep- 
rooted resentment toward bankers. It viewed bankers with 
suspicion because of their close alignment with business
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interests and their "monopoly power" over the money supply
which oftentimes resulted in high interest rates to the
. - ->
workers. Moreover, unfortunate past experiences with
!
worthless private bank notes issued prior to the Civil 
War and earlier waves of bank failures probably left a 
lasting impression on union members.
This fear of bankers and worthless bank notes brought 
about organized labor's appeal for governmental paper 
currency. Apparently organized labor hoped this would 
break what is regarded as the "monopoly power" of banks 
by transferring this power to the government. Thus, the 
issuance of paper money would be controlled by the 
government in the public interest rather than by the 
bankers in the private interest. No doubt it also believed 
that if the government issued paper money, there would be 
more paper currency in circulation, lower interest rates, 
and a relief from price deflation. Yet, it would be 
difficult to speculate whether or not the government would 
have actually increased the money supply in sufficient
iamounts to meet the demands of organized labor.
In the 1890's, the American Federation of Labor 
adopted the basic views of the earlier unions with one 
exception. The Federation, apparently reflecting the basic
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conservatism of Gompers, wanted money issued "to and by the 
people." This unique proposal suffered from two primary 
weaknesses. First, it was subject to various interpretations 
by the members, indicating the lack of understanding of the 
proposal. And second, the Federation gave no actual 
explanation as to how this goal was to be achieved. There­
fore, it can be concluded that this proposal by the Feder­
ation was more in the nature of a "radical slogan" serving 
primarily to rally support for monetary reform.
The free silver movement became a topic of major 
concern to organized labor during the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. Both the Knights of Labor and the 
American Federation of Labor supported the free coinage of 
silver at a ratio of 16 to 1 because they felt it was an 
alternative method of increasing the money supply, as 
contrasted to the issuance of money by the government or 
"to and by the people." But the question of the monetary 
standard of the United States— bimetallic or gold— reached 
a political climax with the presidential election of 1896. 
Even if William Jennings Bryan had won, it is doubtful that 
he could have secured the passage of a Free Coinage Act. 
Shortly after the election, an expansion in the money 
supply through increases in gold production brought rising
prices and returning prosperity without resorting to the 
free coinage of silver. With the passage of the Gold 
Standard Act and the second defeat of Bryan, organized 
labor's interest in the free silver issue declined.
Thus it can be concluded that organized labor 
recognized the need for an increase in the money supply 
which was a reasonably sound objective. It responded 
to the economic conditions of the time by offering 
proposals for reform within the monetary system. Yet, 
because of its limited knowledge and fear of bankers, these 
proposals can be considered somewhat extreme and restricted 
in depth.
1900 - 1928
In the first three decades of the twentieth century, 
the American Federation of Labor, reflecting the earlier 
view of the previous labor organizations, switched its stand 
from money "issued by the. people" to money "issued by the 
government." This reversal no doubt can be attributed to 
a misunderstanding in interpretation by the union members, 
the need for clarification ...on the part of the Federation, 
and the lack of a definite program for achieving its earlier 
proposal. ‘
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The assessment of labor's views toward monetary reform 
is complicated by its lack of a clear definition of money. 
Organized labor was not specific in its definition, but 
one would suppose that it included gold and silver coins 
and treasury notes. However, it must be remembered that 
definitions of money at that time perhaps varied from the 
generally accepted definition of the 1960's.
Organized labor did not participate in the hearings on 
the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. Even 
after the Act was passed in 1913, organized labor continued 
to push for its old idea of money "issued by the government."
During the early 1920's, organized labor faced 
increased employer opposition as indicated irT the open shop
i
drives and company unions, and thus was engaged in a basic 
struggle for survival. It, therefore, devoted the greater 1 
part of its time in pursuing primary trade union objectives 
instead of pushing for monetary reform. Nevertheless, 
organized labor realized that it was still in an unfavorable 
position in dealing with the bankers. It feared that the 
bankers were using their influence as members of Boards of 
Directors and as financial advisors for business to dis­
credit the trade union movement. As an alternative means 
of by-passing the bankers, the American Federation of Labor
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supported the establishment of the Postal Savings System. 
Because it was ctn instrument of the government, organized 
labor regarded this system as a safer place for the 
workers' funds. There had been proposals by some union 
members recommending that Postal Savings handle demand . 
deposits. Its support of this System was not only a 
reflection of organized labor's distrust of bankers but 
was also a mild form of "boycotting" the banks.
The influence of Samuel Gompers' conservatism was 
exemplified by the American Federation of Labor in-the 
mid-twenties when it repeatedly rejected radical monetary 
proposals at its annual conventions. Even when the Feder­
ation affiliates established their own financial institu— • 
tions— labor banks— the Executive Council of the Federation 
warned that these endeavors should be approached with 
extreme caution. The death of Samuel Gompers in 1924 and 
the election of William Green as Federation President 
did not cause a marked change in organized labor's attitude 
toward monetary action.
When the American Federation of Labor realized that 
the Federal Reserve System was a firmly established 
institution, its pragmatism became evident. It began 
lobbying for amendments to the Federal Reserve Act which it
./
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felt would be beneficial to the laboring classes. However, 
the American Federation of Labor soon realized that it 
lacked a comprehensive understanding of "monetary problems" 
and needed expert advice in order to make any type of 
successful assessment of monetary changes. Often, its 
attitude toward monetary reform and policy was a mirror-image 
of the opifiions of financial experts to whom it turned.
The American Federation of Labor wanted the Federal 
Reserve, through monetary policy, to stabilize the 
purchasing power of the dollar. Furthermore, it criticized 
the high interest rates and the Federal Reserve's lack of 
control over stock speculation in the.’ latter part of the 
1920's.
In conclusion, organized labor from 1900-1928 had made 
little progress in its basic understanding of monetary 
actions or even the definition of money. It rejected the 
Federal Reserve System as a solution to its monetary reform 
proposals. Yet, because of organized labor's pragmatic 
nature, it supported amendments to the Act which it felt 
would be beneficial to the laboring classes. The basic 
struggle for survival limited organized labor's time for 
concentration on monetary objectives. However, the Great 
Depression served as a stimulent to increased interest by
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organized labor in the area of monetary reform and monetary 
policy.
1929 - 1946
The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression 
instilled in the leaders of organized labor the need for 
further exploration and explanation of the operations of
the United States monetary system. William Green, Federation
\
President, appealed to economists and banking experts to 
submit articles for publication in the American Federation- 
ist. His plea was answered and a number of articles appeared 
for the benefit and enlightment of the members.
No doubt influenced by these publications, organized 
labor supported those legislative measures which sought 
to strengthen, centralize, and regulate the banking system.
In addition, it wanted to bring all banks under the control 
of the Federal Reserve. It is understandable and quite 
reasonable that from a security standpoint, organized labor 
would have advocated this measure. The American Federation 
of Labor rejected appeals by somas. members to lobby for 
nationalization of the banking system and reaffirmed 
Gompers' philosophy of working within the capitalistic 
framework.
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In the area of monetary legislation, there was a 
notable change in organized labor's attitude from its 
support of the free coinage of silver in the 1890's. It 
was apprehensive about leaving the gold standard and the 
devaluing of the dollar because it feared that-these 
measures would contribute to price inflation and decline in 
the purchasing power of the workers' dollar.
Regarding price inflation, organized labor might be 
considered somewhat inconsistent in its views. It 
favored the Goldsborough Bill in 1932 which proposed to 
raise wholesale commodity prices to the existing level 
before the deflation and then to maintain the; prices at 
that level. Yet, organized labor neglected to consider 
the inflationary tendencies of the bill, but supported only 
that portion pertaining to price stabilization; This 
ambivalent attitude of organized labor toward prices was
a further indication of its pragmatism and its lack of
\
understanding of monetary issues".
The Federation hoped throughout the Great Depression 
that the Federal Reserve's easy money policy would stimu­
late business recovery. However, it soon realized that 
bank loans "were not being made to business." Therefore, at 
times it advocated stronger government action to achieve
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this end. Organized labor1s reactionto the ineffectiveness 
of monetary policy in the early 1930's could be favorably 
compared with the understanding of monetary policy in the 
1960's. It is generally considered that monetary policy is 
more effective during "boom" periods than recessions.
The world economic conditions brought about increased 
Federation interest in international monetary reform. It 
favored the World Economic Conference and the Tripartite 
Accord primarily because it believed international trade 
would be stimulated, providing more work for wage earners.
The schism within the American Federation of Labor, 
which led to the formation of the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations in the mid-thirties, brought to the labor 
movement a new militancy and changing viewpoints. However, 
it is difficult to assess the attitude of the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations toward monetary policy and reform 
during its early formative years because of its preoccu­
pation with organizing the mass production industries.
Yet, because of the rejection of Gompers' philosophy, and 
the more radical nature of the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, there is little doubt but that its leaders 
would probably have favored reforms such as the national­
ization of the banking system.
The competition between the American Federation of 
Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations- and the 
favorable government and middle-class position toward the 
labor movement helped spur union membership in the late 
thirties and into the war years. The growth in the labor 
movement undoubtedly brought an increased awareness among 
politicians of the influence that organized labor could 
possibly have on political issues. No doubt the encourage­
ment by politicians and the general maturing of organized 
labor increased its concern with and participation in 
domestic and international monetary legislation. This 
was quite evident when organized labor was represented at 
the hearings and supported the Bretton Woods Agreements in 
1945. It felt the outcome would have an effect on employ­
ment, income and the standard of living.
Thus, one can conclude that the Great Depression was 
a turning point in the growth of organized labor's attitudes 
toward monetary reform and monetary policy. It was develop­
ing an understanding of the role of a central banking 
system and of the role of banking in the economy. This can 
be attributed in part to articles in labor publications by 
financial experts. Organized labor pragmatically supported 
legislation to strengthen the banking system in hopes that
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these measures would be beneficial to the laboring man.
Yet, its greatest expansion into the area of monetary policy 
and reform came during the Post War Years.
1946 - 1965
A stability in membership, a gradual decline in 
militancy, and a more business like approach to its objec­
tives characterized the organized labor movement in the 
post war years. Since organized labor has achieved general 
acceptance and gained security, it has broadened its goals, 
which includes greater interest in the area of monetary 
policy and reform. The growth of the labor movement to­
gether with the complexities of the time contributed to 
expansion in their research departments. Such economists 
as Boris Shiskin, Stanley Ruttenberg, and Nathaniel Gold- 
finger have helped convey organized labor's attitudes to 
Congressional committees and the general public..
In the late 1940's, conflicting views on Federal 
Reserve monetary policy were expressed by the American 
Federation of Labor .and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations. The American Federation of Labor wanted 
the Federal Reserve to follow a tighter monetary policy.
In view of the economic situation, the Federation made
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a correct assessment of the monetary policy to be pursued 
at that time. The Federation felt there was an abnormal 
increase.in the money supply which was contributing to 
price inflation. Yet, the Congress of Industrial Organ­
izations differed with the Federation's reasoning and 
maintained that the Federal Reserve was pursuing the proper 
policy by continuing to support the long-term government 
bond market. The Congress of Industrial Organizations 
feared that higher interest rates would have caused a down­
turn in business activity.
During the Korean War period, the American Federation 
of Labor again stressed the need for inflationary control 
and supported the Federal Reserve-Treasury "Accord," which 
would allow the Federal Reserve to pursue flexible monetary 
policies. In retrospect, the Federation's position on this 
issue can be viewed as basically sound. However, the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations criticized the 
Federal Reserve policy in 1951-1952 as being ineffective 
and urged more direct monetary control in the war-time 
emergency.
Both organizations and the merged AFL-CIO attacked 
the tight money policies of the Federal Reserve through­
out the Eisenhower administration. They believed that
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the Federal Reserve was fighting a "phantom" inflation and 
was contributing to recessions and unemployment in the 
economy. It stressed that the goals set' forth in the
IEmployment Act of 1946 should be the basic objectives of 
the Federal Reserve authorities. Organized labor would 
not deny that a tight monetary policy should be used during 
a period of demand inflation. Yet, because of the high 
levels of unemployment during the Eisenhower administration, 
it could not classify price rises as demand induced, and 
would not concede to the explanation of a "cost push" 
inflation. However, one would have to accept the fact 
that inflation was present, especially during 1955-1957, 
regardless of how it was caused, and the Federal Reserve 
authorities were generally pursuing the correct monetary 
policies. It could, therefore, be concluded that organized 
labor was not correct in its appraisal of Federal Reserve 
actions. Nevertheless, in light of organized labor's goals 
of increased employment and production, an easy monetary 
policy would have been correct, but excessive upward in­
stability in prices would have been the sacrifice.
With the merger of the American Federation of Labor 
and the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1955, 
organizational competition was eliminated and more time
242
and energy coUld be allotted for the pursuit of other 
objectives. In addition, the views of both organization'^ 
toward monetary policy and monetary reform.were blended.
The formation of one research department, composed'of 
professional economists from both organizations, gave the 
AFL-CIO greater ability to broaden its research depth and 
increase its specialization.
The balance of payments problem in the 1960's has 
been an object of concern to the AFL-CIO. It was of the 
opinion that the Federal Reserve policy of "operation nudge" 
was not highly successful and suggested that direct controls 
be used over foreign investments until effective inter­
national monetary reform was achieved. If direct controls 
were used, interest rates could be lowered, production 
stimulated, and employment increased. Yet, direct controls 
may be criticized in that they infringe on the rights of 
private enterprise.
Since the AFL-CIO stresses the goals set forth by the 
Employment Act of 1946, it urges greater cooperation and 
communication between the Federal Reserve and other govern­
mental agencies. Also, the AFL-CIO feels that coordination 
between monetary and fiscal policies is needed. These 
general recommendations certainly could npt be considered
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extreme, but on the contrary, could be considered well- 
founded.
In order to facilitate this coordination, the AFL-CIO 
has proposed that the Federal Reserve's instruments of 
monetary control be strengthened and used judiciously.
The AFL-CIO has suggested for example that greater 
selective credit controls be used, that frequent changes 
in legal reserve requirements be initiated, and that the 
Federal Reserve1s control be extended to non-bank financial 
intermediaries. However, to assess the validity of these 
positions by organized labor would entail a thorough analysis 
of debatable issues which are not within the scope of this 
study.
The AFL-CIO has further recommended that changes be 
made in the structure and composition of the Federal 
Reserve System to give organized labor a greater choice and 
representation in policy-making. The AFL-CIO feels that 
the composition of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal 
Advisory Council, and the Directors of the Federal Reserve 
Banks should include organized labor representatives. 
Organized labor's position is well taken because the 
language used in the Federal Reserve Act and amendments 
is not clear in this regard, especially in light of the
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of the statutory requirements for occupational representation.
Perhaps organized labor should be permitted a voice in 
policy making decisions. It has gained prominence and 
recognition in the United States society and general 
maturity in its approach to economic problems. • As is 
understandable, due consideration must be given to 
qualifications and educational background, including 
banking knowledge, of those individuals selected to 
represent organized labor, whether on the Federal Reserve 
Board, the Federal Advisory Council, or Directors of 
Federal Reserve Banks.
In actuality, the problem of organized labor 
representation lies not only with the terminology of the 
Act and the educational specifications that are generally 
needed, but with "drawing the line" as to the various 
segments of society to be represented. In other words, 
if organized labor should achieve this goal, would not 
small businessmen, farmers, and consumers likewise want 
specific representation?
Organized labor's representation within the Federal 
Reserve System is a controversial issue. But from organized 
labor's viewpoint, it is understandable that such 
representation would be most desirable.
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In addition, organized labor has suggested that the 
Open Market Committee be abolished. Yet, if this occurred, 
the efficiency of open market operations could be impaired.
If organized labor did achieve a position on the Federal 
Reserve Board, perhaps it would become more cognizant of the 
significance of this Committee and thus retract its proposal.
In conclusion, the post-war years have found greater 
participation and analysis by organized labor toward 
monetary reform and policy. This is due in part to the 
great reliance placed on its professional research-staffs, 
the general maturing of organized labor, and the passage 
of the Employment Act of 1946. The AFL-CIO feels that 
only after its recommended revisions are made within the 
Federal Reserve will it be a truly "public system" which can 
fulfill the objectives of the Employment Act.
General Conclusions
Organized labor has come a long way in its approach 
and attitudes toward monetary policy and monetary reform.
This growth has been in three primary stages: 1866-1928,
limited knowledge and understanding; 1929-1945, expansion 
and learning; 1946-1965, increased maturity and involve­
ment. Organized labor's interest in monetary reform and
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monetary policy has generally coincided with the business 
cycles of the United States economy; its views have been 
more strongly expressed in reaction to periods of depression 
or inflation.
Judging from organized labor's recommendations con­
cerning monetary legislation during the 1866-1965 period, 
it can be concluded that its primary condemnations resulted 
from its early "resentment toward bankers." Even in the 
1960's, organized labor specifically pointed out that it 
opposed the "bankers' control" of the Federal Reserve System.
Because of this view and its general maturing, one can 
predict that organized labor will not cease the pursuit 
of its goals in monetary reform and monetary policy. Per­
haps as it continues to increase in specialization and 
depth within this area and continues to participate and 
lobby for monetary legislation, it will become more 
- tolerant toward the role played by bankers. This tolerance 
could possibly be brought about by organized labor's . •
representation within the composition of the Federal 
Reserve System.
Yet, the future participation of organized labor in 
monetary actions could well hinge on the independence of 
the Federal Reserve System. Should Congress abrogate the
independence of this System and bring it under.closer 
control, the persuasive political powers possessed by the 
trade union movement in the United States may bring about 
organized labor's representation in the System. If this 
action should be taken by Congress, then there is no 
doubt that the future will bring even greater AFL-CIO 
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